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Date: 1/8/2010

Judicial District Court - Cassia Cou
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User: SUTHERLAND

ROA Report

Page 1 of 3

Case: CV-2009-0000517 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher

Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher
Date

Code

User

5/19/2009

NCOC

NEVAREZ

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Roderick B Wood

NOAP

NEVAREZ

Plaintiff: Soignier, Mary Killins Notice Of
Appearance Allen BEllis

Roderick B Wood

NOAP

NEVAREZ

Defendant: Fletcher, W Kent Notice Of
Appearance Michelle R Points

Roderick B Wood

NEVAREZ

Filing: J1 - Special motions, petitions and
Roderick B Wood
pleadings -Order Granting Change Of Venue PAY
TO NEW COUNTY

TARA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/10/2009 10:00
AM) MSJ (1 hr)

Michael R Crabtree

SUTHERLAND

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment

Michael R Crabtree

SUTHERLAND

Motion for Summary Judgment

Michael R Crabtree

SUTHERLAND

Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher

Michael R Crabtree

NOHR

SUTHERLAND

Notice of Hearing

Michael R Crabtree

6/29/2009

MOTN

TARA

Motion for Disqualification without Cause Rule
40(d)(1 )

Michael R Crabtree

7/1/2009

HRSC

TARA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/20/200910:00
AM) Motion for Disqualification without Cause

Michael R Crabtree

TARA

Notice of Hearing - Motion for Disqualification
without Cause

Michael R Crabtree

NOTC

NEVAREZ

Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Disqualification Michael R Crabtree
wlo Cause

AFFD

NEVAREZ

Affidavit of Mary Killins SOignier

Michael R Crabtree

AFFD

NEVAREZ

Affidavit of John F Magnuson

Michael R Crabtree

MEMO

NEVAREZ

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

Michael R Crabtree

AFFD

NEVAREZ

Affidavit of Allen BEllis

Michael R Crabtree

7/30/2009

TARA

Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment

Michael R Crabtree

8/4/2009

TARA

Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment

Michael R Crabtree

NOTC

NEVAREZ

Notice of Association of Counsel: Jeffrey Strother Michael R Crabtree
with Allen Ellis for PL

3/6/2009

MOTN

NEVAREZ

Motion to Strike Affidavit of W Kent Fletcher

Michael R Crabtree

3/10/2009

CMIN

TARA

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 8/10/2009
Time: 10:02 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Denise Schloder
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Mary SOignier, Attorney: Allen Ellis
Party: W Fletcher, Attorney: Michelle Points

Michael R Crabtree

6/12/2009

HRSC

6/15/2009

7/27/2009

7/28/2009

"

Judge
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Date: 1/8/2010

Judicial District Court - Cassia Coun

Time: 10:28 AM

epage 2 of 3

User: SUTHERLAND

ROA Report
Case: CV-2009-0000517 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher

Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher
Date

Code

User

8/10/2009

HRHD

TARA

Hearing result for Motion held on 08/10/2009
10:00 AM: Hearing Held MSJ (1 hr)

Michael R Crabtree

9/10/2009

MEMO

TARA

Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment

Michael R Crabtree

9/22/2009

JDMT

TARA

Order & Judgment

Michael R Crabtree

CDIS

TARA

Civil Disposition entered for: Fletcher, W Kent,
Defendant; Soignier, Mary Killins, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 9/22/2009

Michael R Crabtree

MOTN

NEVAREZ

Motion for An Award of Attorney Fees and Costs

Michael R Crabtree

MEMO

NEVAREZ

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Michael R Crabtree
Attorney Fees

AFFD

NEVAREZ

Affidavit of Michell R Points Setting Forth
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree

HRSC

TARA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/25/200909:00
AM) TCC: Michelle Points to initiate

Michael R Crabtree

NOHR

NEVAREZ

Notice of Hearing 11/25/2009@9:00a.m.

Michael R Crabtree

MOTN

NEVAREZ

Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree

MEMO

NEVAREZ

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow
Costs and Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree

NOHR

NEVAREZ

Notice of Hearing 11/25/2009@9:00 a.m.

Michael R Crabtree

10/22/2009

SUTHERLAND

Notice of Appeal

Michael R Crabtree

10/26/2009

SUTHERLAND

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of
Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by: Ellis,
Brown & Sheils, Chartered Receipt number:
0012320 Dated: 10/26/2009 Amount: $100.00
(Check)

Michael R Crabtree

SUTHERLAND

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Michael R Crabtree
Supreme Court Paid by: Ellis, Allen B (attorney
for Soignier, Mary Killins) Receipt number:
0012322 Dated: 10/26/2009 Amount: $101.00
(Check) For: Soignier, Mary Killins (plaintiff)

TARA

Reply to Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Costs and
Attorney Fees

Michael R Crabtree

TARA

Supplemental Affidavit of Michelle R. Points in
Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Michael R Crabtree

TARA

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/25/2009
09:00 AM: Case Taken Under Advisement
Motion for Fees & Costs
TCC: Michelle Points to initiate

Michael R Crabtree

.,10/1/2009

10/7/2009

10/13/2009

11/19/2009

11/25/2009

ADVS

Judge
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Date: 1/8/2010

Judicial District Court - Cassia

Time: 10:28 AM
Page 30f3

User SUTHERLAND

ROA Report
Case: CV-2009-0000517 Current Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher

, Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher
Judge

Date

Code

User

11/25/2009

CMIN

TARA

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Fees and Costs
Hearing date: 11/25/2009
Time: 8:58 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Maureen Newton
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number: CHAMBERS
Party: Mary Soignier, Attorney: Allen Ellis
Party: W Fletcher, Attorney: Michelle Points

Michael R Crabtree

12/24/2009

NOTC

NEVAREZ

Notice of Transcript Lodged

Michael R Crabtree

TRAN

NEVAREZ

Transcript Filed

Michael R Crabtree

12/29/2009

MEMO

TARA

Memorandum Opinion GRANTING in Part and
DENYING in Part Defendant's Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Costs

Michael R Crabtree

117/2010

JDMT

TARA

Judgment (in favor of Kent Fletcher $8,283.00)

Michael R Crabtree

CDIS

TARA

Civil Disposition entered for: Fletcher, W Kent,
Defendant; Soignier, Mary Killins, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 1/7/2010

Michael R Crabtree
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at -Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,
v.
W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CaseNo.CV·

OC 0905785

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

Comes now the plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, through her attorney of record, and complains
and alleges against defendant W. Kent Fletcher as follows:

I
At all times relevant, defendant W. Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher") was an attorney at law duly
licensed by the State of Idaho with offices forthe practice of law located in Burley, Idaho.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - J
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II
At all times relevant, an attorney/client relationship existed between defendant Fletcher and
Zachary A. Cowan ("Cowan").

III
Prior to his death, decedent Cowan was a beneficiary of the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust which
beneficiary status was scheduled to terminate by the terms of the trust on November 7,2003, to wit,
decedent's fiftieth birthday, at which time portion of the trust assets were to be conveyed to Cowan
outright. As found by the magistrate court In the Matter of the Estate of Zachary A. Cowan (Cassia
County Case No. CV-2006-1234), the trust was formally terminated on March 4,2005. Upon
termination of the trust and by its terms, a substantial portion of the trust assets was conveyed to
decedent Cowan prior to his death in 2006. A copy of the trust is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
IV
In May of2005, decedent Cowan retained and instructed defendant Fletcher to prepare a last
will and testament. Included in Cowan's instructions was the direction that property owned by him,
which had previously been subsumed in trusts in which he was a beneficiary, be devised to plaintiff
Mary Killins Soignier. Defendant Fletcher prepared the aforesaid testamentary instrument which
is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and incorporated herein by reference.
V

In drafting decedent Cowan's last will and testament (Exhibit 2), defendant Fletcher
negligently failed to ascertain that decedent Cowan held no interests in trusts and the last interest
held was in the Leonarda Cowan trust which interest terminated as early as November 7, 2003 (the
decedent's fiftieth birthday) or as late as March 4, 2005 (the Final Release and Discharge of the
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2

000014

trustee), two months earlier. That is, defendant Fletcher drafted a will (Exhibit 2) in which
decedent's bequest to plaintiff Soignier, i.e., "beneficial interest in trusts", would be frustrated
because the Leonarda Cowan Trust had been terminated prior to decedent's execution of the will.

VI
Further, defendant Fletcher negligently failed to advise decedent Cowan that upon his death
there were no trust interests, as such, to be conveyed and that Cowan's testamentary intent vis-a-vis
plaintiff Soignier, as set forth in the will authored by Fletcher, would be frustrated.

VII
As a proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence as aforesaid, the probate court
ruled, in pertinent part, on September 18, 2007, as follows:
Mr. Cowan signed a "Final Release and Discharge" agreement on
March 4, 2005. His beneficial interest share in the corpus of The
Leonarda A. Cowan Trust was delivered over to him. The Trust was
terminated.
At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any
interest in any trusts.
After such review, it is evident the affidavits do not provide the Court
with any factual insight regarding how the existing facts, as applied
the testator's Will, evidences any ambiguity. Therefore, this Court
does not find a latent ambiguity in regards to the testator's intent.
The fact that the testator did not have an interest in any trust at the
time of his death does not create a conflict with his intent towards the
American Cancer Society. His stated intent towards each beneficiary
is clear, and his stated intent regarding Ms. Soignier does not come
into direct conflict with any other portion of the Will. Therefore, this
Court concludes that Ms. Soignier has failed to demonstrate the Will
contains a latent ambiguity.
As a further proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence, the probate court ruled that

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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plaintiffSoignier take nothing under the will and that decedent Cowan's estate "should be given to
the American Cancer Society".

VIII
As a proximate result of defendant Fletcher's negligence, he breached his duty to plaintiff
Soignier, a named beneficiary under the will, to properly execute decedent's will so as to effectuate
the decedent's intent as expressed in the will (Exhibit 1), all to plaintiffs damage in excess of the
jurisdictional minimum of the District Court.

IX
Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Chartered, to
prosecute this action and is entitled to recover sums as and for reasonable attorney's fees incurred
herein.
Wherefore, plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1. For compensatory damages in excess of the jurisdictional minimum of the District Court;
2. For costs of suit and reasonable attorney fees;
3. For such other and further relief as the court and jury deem appropriate.
Dated this 25 th day of March, 2009.

Attorney for plaintiff

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury in accordance with the provisions of Rule 38(b) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Attorney for Plaintiff
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'.L'l:'Q...1:or

ruan... the r1gb.t to

tran:s:!B:'

'PI:ope:r:ty

to the trut a.ta:t:.. a.t any t:.i:P by 1!i::U. or ot:h-.rwise _

Such

PI:OPerty shall bACO~ a pe--t o~ ana #ubject to tha provisions at
this t:.ro.st.

J

I
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While the

3 .1

to 'Or

.~ply

'.h:Ust~

1. l..1v1ng I the TXU.Irt••s .hal.l

~y

tor the benefit 'Of the 'J!l:'\a1:or the net Ulcoma o't 1:h.

1:J::uat .su"C., qa.arteX'-"a:n:m1ally I 'Or At mora trequent intervals.

In

additio:.n, t..he "'l"r\l:ataas shall
. p_":! 1::.0 o. applY' :tor the benetit of the
"

'Ot

'I'l:'UstO% ae lIl\loh of the principal.
~I

"om.

~.

vri~.

ti»e to t.i:ae, 4inct in

ctetara.f.ne

tbat

such

'l'X'U.sto.' a

propGl:

Tl;1l.Sta1Ul shal.l pay. to

ar~

.usu1.butJ.ona

u.l 'C:h,
01:'

SU))~#

trust: estate u 1:he
the

'!:8

~ficient

c:::ara

al'1d

~

';erWIua.

fox

the

lIl2l.1ntana:nca I

tb.o

apply fo: the l:Jene.tit ot tbe 'r:rUStor

80

~

mUCh 'Ot the trust ..ut:. u
p:t"01Ticla

ef'i: th. '.l!::'\:LIrto::.

t:lua '1':r:1:UI't....

~

..

.th. 4eath

~

0:

d.a~,

.

'l:Kt1n U'aU

th. '.r'rWItc:r,. tbe

~ 4G;bb. QVe4 'by 'thu ~; or· 'ltY
as a conseqt.tanca ot her

the

. o~ last ill:..... ,

~9'

and

of T:rU.s1::.or'. probata . .tat:a and ot
vh1c:h

c!e.cs

ot 1:.rI:uJt.,

en-

raal. proptl2:1:y), inclu41ng e.xpezus.1iJ

~a.l exp~ •• ,

:.'IJ:Iovo-tlpeo.1t1ad. ·ctehta

1I.&Y pay

(ot:h.e: t:bim. pl:'Ollis&O:Y nat•• ,

.

or sale

~

~l:, at the d&~ ot, or

payment
o:t Which are s~ by lIlortg8CJ•• ,
,
~F.CIIl:aC.aU

naees8&l::Y t.o so

.

D%Vl:Sro)tS 01'

".1.

(!au.

ere

~

~i.

C:::Ollta of e.<tDi:D.1at.:ratioD

tx:ast.

o.blic;a1:10n4

Payment. ot tha
o~

tlla 'l'l:"!atOr'l'

prob;;ate ~&t. 1Jha1.1 b. :mad. in the .01_.4.1-==--t1011 ot. tl:le'l':Ustees

in t:h. event that: the UMt:.s of ':l'r'I:I..5't.r'. probata estate
a4..~t. to p ..y aucb obJ.it;a,ttona, a:rsd shall baocae

the trust estate only in the

8ValSt

8l'l

&:1:'.

oPl:i.9-.tioll at

and to ~a extent that tha

000021.

ts

Q» • •

Qr

TrUator'e probata astata are insutt1cient to

d1aaha~a

:Nob. obligat1ona.
4.2

Upon the'deat:b. of the 'l':T:Ustor, tha lr'rWIteu ahall

alloeattl and/or <U.s1:ribut. the trwat
sat:istaction at t!.,be

p:ovillion.

o~

_tata :d.a.ining- .fie::-

sac:t:.on 4.1 of t.l:Ua '.r1:Wtt.

Agreement as toUOW1I:

Cal

III tl2.e

~y

.went 1:hat the "l":I:"t1ato:o' • •on,

tha
'r:UfItor
I
the
"
..
. TrwJt... &ball
.
~

distribute to tha ~or'. sai4

IJqft

~tavU' i.nt:a~t i . A~l<l

.

ill the. t:.rwrt elftata at or, by :roa$Onot the 't'Z:'Uator'. 4&ath in

.

that: ce:rt:~ Z'1Ml. property cOlImIOD1Y 'lC:nown
'.the Sprillgc

ea~t:ry

-

."

3 St.av·ems Cot.ll:t,

club I lta.J1c::ho lti.rar:o I CI., outr1c;Jht.nd

ot t.:z:'ust: an4 tl:.. ot a.ll t:I:aluI:tu: I
otho:z:o c1aat:.h t:ax.a.

a..

:tA the

lnbez:1tanc::., astau or

.vent "that the

shall Dot bw. surv1v.cl the

h'$.

~tcr,

~~tor".

w1thc:st1t

said

:r~

GOll

to his

i.aue, the qi~t ~~nant to th1. aUb.aetiOh 4.2(4) shall be
4i.cr1J:>u.t~ 1:0 8..QJDRJ. nxmm ar.;.- U
sa 8hal.l: not have
liurvived.

the

.~.ection

4.2(a) ahall tail.

au.:r:v1.ved

'!:uatCJl:'

the

(b)

In. the event tba.t

the

'rrtUJtor,

the

gi~

~.u.a.trl:

tIA1f.R]INcs

~8"

to

this

c::BAZD Ghall. haVQ

shall

c11atribut. to

LAWREN'C'S C'lUZEH Yhat.-ver intuest 18 held in the truat u.ta.ta

at or

by

r . .·.o1\ of i:A. 'h:u.stor.; ~ deAth in "Chat certUn

res.idential real property located on San. AntQnio ilt:Ie.d l:Ietween

se"enth and lU.qht.l:t stre.t./ c:armel., CA, outr19'l'1t and tr•• oJ!

trust. and. fra. of all transt:er, 1nb.eritanc8, utat.. or other
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d-o.th taxes.

not

In the event tha.t

survivad

the

I..AW;REN'Cli

tha.

"l"rWItO:l:' I

c::B1ZD shall l)ot lulva

g:.1.rC

pursuant

to

tlUa

lIUb. .cti011 ... 2 (b) shall. tail.
'ftle 'tl:ustua shall e.st4hl1sh a trust abar.,

(c:)

ct...iqna:ted

'f.1U:TS'f :r,

to b~ ~de4 v~tJ:L ON!: JJ'O'!nm3D

tor

00/100 DOLI~ ($100,000.00)
WJ)paragn;ph '.2 (c)

tor a

lIs

.

.

~.~..

~al.l

~ 'l'.tiOUSUI)

o~

4i.a=jJ)qt:. the . . . .ta

I!tEI

eac:h ~~1cia:ry .at: ~orth 1.n

(1), (il), and (iii) who w:vlv..

xiJnllll ot 0WiRd
.

($300,000.00).

'.rBOU!W1l)

TlilOS'r:r

.um

ho.ld,

as a

~tor

00/1.00 'I:IOI.&LU.S

a"",1n1atar an<!

aep&l:'a-t:.

~t:

.a

lwreinatter ~cvi4e4!
(i)
b~t'it
'l'lltJS~:r

!t'he 'l'l::'U8t:.ca. . lIhal.l pay to or ~lY :to%' 'the

'"

~ 'nS2! 80

of

.... t:.h.

~i:.e_,

xw:h'

. j.n.

o:f ~

net·1nc:cae ot

i:ba.1r 4iec:::r:at:1on,

necessary or d ••iralll. :tor th. prOper health,
c:a..r. aDd

~ o~ .uch b~:icia-ry,

'.

bene:t!:Lt ot LttPI J"tJ'!N'1'.2S

as

.c)

the 'I"rust.e.,

miJOJIIII&%'Y 0%'

ci••i.rGla

(~~/OOO,OO)

in

their cUsc:rei:ion,

qiv~

mouSAND

cal.end&r year;

000023
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lieea

.

.

incQJle shal.l not ueeed. YIV.l!

in any

Apply tor the

auc:::b. o:t the nat 1hcc:nae ot

'

ot

0%'

tor 1:.ha proper l'laa.lth, support,

,

pa.yments

peovWa4 such

1D any 9'iva:n ceJ.anClD%'
year,
.

(:U.) ~. ~t._ IIhall pa.y to

'l!ROST 'I

.~,

flCiI't,' ~':nVB 'l'BOOs.utD DO~

pay:aen;t:a o:t inea.aa &hall.
($5, QOO. 00)

daua

OOLLAltS

(~ii),

Tl'l.e 'l'%'\l.Steu shall pay to or Ilppl:r
~2 .0

fo%' tha })ena:U.t at lO!!t'.1

of

u

'l!l1t1S'.! %

necessa..:y

0%'

the

~ta. . ,

duira):)le

fO%,'

lQUcm

0%

tlle net il'lCQlS.

in their d.:i.8cretiOll,

~

:il:ropu

~th,

a......

rauppo:r:i:,

c;ar. 4n4 lUtini::anaJ'lc. 01! .-c.:lc::h tI.ac~1diU"/, prO'9'ide4 ,ucb.
~y:u.nta ot

irtCOlU shall nQt exce-sd. l"lVI 'mO'C1s.lHtJ DOLr.JUtS

($5,000.00) in

any given

ca.J.end.&:' Y8a,

.. ot 1;be net. incoIIe of OtrSr.r t
.
appUed as h8%'.:!,;raa.JxJVe pl:'QVUad ca.ah year;

(iv) A1'lJ'

bcl.CUl~.
'

not. paid or

IIh.a.l.l b-. aCC'lZZlJllla1:ed 8.l1t1 ~ad to,

Prlnci»&1.

o~ each o~ the ).)enc~1aiar1aS

4&a.th

u:.

.ab. .c::tiCl1 4.2Cc},

'.t'm1Sc:r :t

to 'rlWSr.r

the

~. . .

IIhall

"O'pc2h tha

~ ... thi•

lWD8d.

t:nLna~1I%

~

(as ~:1.c1e4 in subsaction •• :2 (d) }

ona-tb:1.rCl (1/3) 01: the v&l.ua 01: tllo l;'OM~ . . . .t.s in
Tm18'!l! I

(as t.hen coftStitutec1) •. 'l1he

.ha.ll

discretion,

in thair

c:hoo•• wh;tcb ....tII t..o ~~~.

..

'.

tJpon

o~ all ot t:l:I.e beaa:CicU.&:ri_ na:aecL 111 thic

the C14atll
~ion

".2 (e) ~

C~'l:1.'t:\rt:'.ad,

(d)

~o.,

,

the;

asha.ll be

o~

~~erre4

~. 'l:rUStaes

sl:uI:.I:'., 4a.ignatAcl

asSets

.TRttS'.r
. .%

aJI

I

tl:I.ell

to 'l'aOS'! :rIo

shall tOot:al::Il..iesb

II

~nc1 '1:rtl5t

T.RtJS'! ·I.I, to consist: ~t ~ bala.1:l.Ce o:t t:h.o

trust estate rail j nin; a.rtar sa:tiS:t:~ctiop. ot t:be proviaions ot

section

".1

ot thJA

!n:ua~

A9X".e2IIa:t.~

tlu:ouc,;h (c) o:t th.1. Section ".2.

=ncl

~.aetJ.ona

'r!la '.r::r;wstaes shall hold,

eaministu &lld o.iatrilnrt.a tho assat. of'l!lWS1' U ...

7
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(ct.)

&

slIpua.ta

(1)

In

tn.

th&t the 'h'ustor'a

WfUlt

son I

ZAc::!!'Al\Y cotoN, shall have. su::viY.~ th. ~toZ', ~ p~icr

to the ti:u

wen.

he. ,.hAll 13v. attataK the

_g_ of fifty

y04.'rU, th. "l'rUJsta•• SlUlll pal to or apply t'or, the benetit
o~

~/. ~c1

the

san ..ve.n.'i:y pa%'Cant:

nat income ot nuS'l'!I,
~~~e:n1':;

to

perc.nt

(7011

~'r

of

o;t t:.h.

or at laC:.

~••

ben.ef~t o~ ~ ~r/.

ot tlle principal. of

aeventy

~annually

III ac!4it1on, tlw

apply tor the

01:'

IlUch

intexvala.

(70~)

ahaU

p.r

.on

&MUd.

SO

'II- (but not ~ ~C4S. ot

pri.ucipal

tha

aa

't:l:1sn
'"

eonstlttttad) as th,_ 'J!J::"I1st. . . , i.n. thaU 41.c::-ai:ion, d.:.CIIl

naea•• a.:ry .'tor tb_ proper hAl.th r

tba ·~tnr....

lJIGintanaIlc;:AI o.t

wppert:.,

.

sa14

~

.

n:t1B'D' Q.tJ.l!tR,

_

0:

'l'he 'r:rU8taes

$Ol1.

IIl:I.aJ.l pay t.o or apply 1!!a:r: tha banat'it. ot!

care and

ru.ac::a,

~ox'a

he' .~-if' aha aball not than

•J

.~.

l.iVj..DI~h

1'lW'S'l'

~

:pe:2:'aaa.t (30""

n: quart.r-:a:mWll.ly or

o.f t:h4 net: illccm.e of

~t :JIL:)re :treqa.an~ in~a ..

.In addi:~~CD, the . ~~.. IiIhall PIlY to 01:' appl.y for the
~~:.t.t

o~

pri.t:1e~l.

the 'l':I:"Ilstor'a aa.iA niece
of! 't'lUlST

pel:Q!Q:Ot [30%]

n

(but

80

lIU<:h

not· in. axe...

ot

t:)1!

tha

~

o;!- t:he principal ... than c:onat1tuta4.) as

the 'l:':rWIta_, in t:l2A1r cU.seretion I det!!ll nec:essazy t'o:r; the
propel:

h~t.b,

~orJa ,.~id

support,

~.

ana

UintanallCa of the

niace.

(11) Wll.cn

the

~or' CII

son I

I1hal.l attain the aq. of tift,y yaar.,
B
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'l'RUS'r' ~%

I!S.lu:J.l

..

~

---

._- . .....

,

......

"

the t:uat ••ta-:'a

ta.n.1.nate, and .&venty p.rc:ant (7q4)

o~

ot 'l".K06'l' IJ: than on

~fut:ad

h~

aball 1::a

(30~)

-r:

o~

t:;'wIt, a.nd thixty

ot t:h. t.:::u.e aat:&t:. of

II thell on

T:rt.1at.ar'1I said Bon C'U'trilJbt IUl4 t.r;ea

percent

to th&

hand. IIhall ~ C1£.t:r1buted

to ~CQ:"8 'niece, s.utmtl

E:r.t.iDN gI.ID, Cl\1't:riQlJ.t and.

era.

shal.l

bava

di80nticm

to

o-.f 'trtUJ-t.

c:tsoc.. the

~

Tl:Wrt.....

u.at:.a to ):).

distributed to eaab.
(ll.i.)

ZAC!Q.:RY COWIK,

l:D

tha, ..vent the 'r:t11Stor'.· Bani

_hall tUa pJ:'ior to atia1n1ntJ a9- of :t1:ftl'

....

laving then, l1v!..'n9 iasua, the 'rrUataes 8hal.l

!l'fiW:'a,

dist:.:ribute t.M enti:r:e 1::raat
bane . .venty

esta":~

~S'.L'

crt

IX t:b.en on

(70') t:o th.. t:htm living' issue ot

pe:rt:1In'C

ZAcs::A.Rr ~, by l:'it;h1: of! r~eDt:ai::io:n, f%'. .

o:t

'l!:ruat,

and. thUrt::y pa:cent (304)1:0 t:.ba ~cn"'. ni-e., ~

lUTZ'IM QIJ,p; pz1:'IVide4, ~, in the aVIIllt: t:b.at tbe
~r'. .~Cl 111.0. 1SJ:Lal.1. not :be U v1J.1q
d.i.i:.%~1>ution,

Ilny

IIJ'1.l};)p.iI.l:'2lg:rapb
0%

4.:l eel) (1.1i), har ahare

%lWS'l: .IX shaJ.l. H

l';ty ri~.b:t:

ptSrsuant
o~

&1:

t.b.a

to

date ot
tbis

the Uust astau

4J.a't:2:'ibutad to her 't:h.n liv1Jlg .issue

o;t rep:::l:8S811tati0J2 traa of! t:ru..st.
(1v) 'In t:ha av-.nt -that ZliCB'ARY COWAN ,ball cUe

prior to &1:ta1n1ng the aq.

o~ tiff:!(

years, without liv1ll9

issue, the 'l"'.!:'ustees sl:!.aJ.l distl:'ibut:a the entire trust

estate. of 'l'RtlS'l' II to S.lN'l:lU £lLUN RZI·ID tree ot trust
a.::n4

i:f

ISh.

shall

not

be

11'ling

Itt

the

cta.t..

ot

9
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50BGJ5!JZ:0

-.- ...

.-

tiatrlbution, the tru.1::. ..tat. shall

~

--~-

cU.Atrihuta<1 to

t=he than liv1ng issue

Q~

SANDRl. ZlIi£1!N DUrn by right

repx-asentation, free

o~

t:l:U.Ist.

4.3

It, &.t the tme

o~

the

at

cloa'th, or at any

~rl.

It.tter time be~on tull d.1..5trlhut.1an o~ the't:1:UIt ell'blt., u.~
COWAN', SAlItJ'.RA
and

JaIrltJlll(

QIJD 'and all

no othilr diapoaitiQn of the

the 't.'r\:1st ..tate,

o~ 1::.h.ai1"

t~t

or 1:11e portion

issu.*

a:r:.

4.c: ... aeCl.

allb.1:a ia d1rec1:.eCl, herein,

a~

11:,

1:b;eA rcuilUn9 ( 1Ihal.l

tl::I.erGl%pon be diS1::.l:dl:l\l'ta4 to on. or aore cha.ri.t:i.. . eno.en

u

1::l:I..

~

eul:lj ect to 'tb.6 lh1:t..tic= on

<11scn:etion of the 'l'l:Uate. .,

.

.

.~

ltiserat1.on that aac:h ~i1:i. . he ;.ua..l~~ie4 c::h.U'itiaa as d.efinec! ill
Sec:t1cm 110 ot the
, •4

).:Ay

Intun&.1.

.

.-

:aevem1e Ccda

.

p:t'ov1.ioA8. of

t.l:IJA

.

o~ 198'~
~

Aqreclll4nt:.

to the

-<;;gut:r:ary notv1~, isi the avast. that:. any ...a.ta of a
P~tUUlt

:be14

to tha Fov:ia1oNl of thU

~. ~~t b4e0ae

di~ebl.a to' a ~';~ici~ u:hCS.c' "the q_ ..,t tvtQ1ty-cm.e
Yeo..l:'CiI,

~. '.I"ru.o~

tor

(3J.)

aabAJ.l rctaj"n aucl:l . .illata in .. turther t:l:'llat tor

t:ha. ~e:fit of. auch. benetL:iary.
apply

~t

The

~.tees

tlla :bane:fit ot such l>e.ae~icia...-y

.i.no_, c.:n4 the pr:1..ncipl:Ll.

o~

tl:I..

~

80

shall :pay to or
lII.t:IA:h of the. net

..eate as the '1';:'WJt... . , j,n

t:l1ei= discraUon, Claar. uce •• ary. tor the ;p::t:opor bacl.i:h, QUl3Port,

oare .ma.i.n"te:nanc:a and e4uc::atio:a ot ~ch be:l4ticiuy,
atter taking
.
i:nt:o aoc:o~i::, -eo ~. u:tant; the 'l'%"Uateu d.e. . }lJ:OpU I any income or

otha= resources ot a~ch banatieiary outside thia ~ru.t, known to

the Trustaes.
(21.)

When such :Can~icia.r.l attains the a<Ie of twiUlty-one

l"'caJ;s f the 'l'%uSUla .hAll distribute tea wc:h J:)enaticia:ry the
10
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tUlt:lxa trw:.t. e:at.1.1:. ~ bald tor hi. or har be.."letit,

free ot

~atore ncaiv~

cOlIlplet:.

t::ruat.

If

benet1C:iary cba.ll 4:1.

BUc::b

c:iistribtltion
of the ~t estata .at a.ida for his ~ her ben.tit
I
,
b.aret:lndB%', the ~ Shall cUat:ril::lute the balance ot the trust
estat.e 1:0 such p.no" or antiti_,

and

em.

web

tez:a.a

~

the ~an~iciary ..hall

. conditions, either outrliht or in t:rwIt, u

d •• iCjlJ&'bI in ~i. or llar -l.ut. w111 ,,4lIitte4 to prOb«te by a court. of

coa;Jetent. j'a:d.84ici:j,cm, ...k~nq

'th.1a

powGr

of

In t:he ."ent '!;hat IIItlC:h .l:>eneflciuy' abAll tail. to

appoitlt:lGent.

e.xaroia4il aUQb po~

ot

t.ha bala.nc.

a~t'lQ :r~~ 1:0

l:::Ieneficiary,

ot

a~i:n~t:,. t::ba ~...

shal.l 4Uri:ribut.e

the't.l:uat . .tab to tha than liy~

by'

l:'ight

.

bt

l:4i~t'11:&t.ic=,

O~,.

""

#-

uaua

o~ a'UCh

the

d.~a.ul.t

in

thfil then liv1n9 !aa'Q. of 't:l2A parents. frau whom sUCh

'f:l:I.e:-eof't to

'bena:Uo!uy waa d . .c-ec4ttd, by rig'ht of

~r"1I%l1:4tion •

•~ P.aOV:tSl0H8

It ~ _hare or sepue,te

5.l.

,ceno:Uciary o't

IS

tl:::ust held tor

~ held p\u:aua.nt b.i:r:_to

t::lle opi:oio~ o:f 1:J:a.A ~,

any income.

b.Ii., at any ta.., in

a. %'a1r 'lIUU:lCat val.U. so' lew,

in

relation to the coata ot! admin:1.rt::ration
thcaot'_
'!:hAt c:ontinuanca
.
.
Q:t the

t:r:ust

i:mpah

t.h.

pt.U:"tn12U'1t

o.Cec:iapl~t

such

benetieicu:y I

of

the

p~os.~

o~

the

t:::uat,

in th• .ir d..1.cl:' ..'t:if;)n,· wi: kre not nquirac1

'l'rus1;eaa may,

teninate

to its 1:.e:Ju will d.et-at or suDst.antiaUy

t-"""Wrt:

l1iet.tdJ;n:.t.te

end,

'the

%'aqardl ... "
p+,1ncipa.l

ot'
a.n4

~.

the
1IJl'J

ot

aoc%:\led

11
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such
or

u.n4illftril:n:tta<1 U!c:c:zme tb.a:t'.o~ to such D6llUiciary,

ccmse:r:vator,

prcv1sions

othu- fiduciary.

C:c'

5 • :a

or h.1a gtla.rdiAn ,

trnln.

lICOna%'

tel:1inat::'ld 1:ts e.ocordanee with ot.her

each truat haleS hereunder shall tend.nat.

lle.reo~ ,

twen1:.y-on. (21) years

the

a.f1:o:i:

d~t:h

gt the

llUlt .url1v~ of the

'l'rU$'tor I t.be 'n"1:l.8tor'. niece, SAlmIlI. EIt.ZIN XII·'l:i8:R, and tho.. o-t

the 15sue of UCEARY C01Qlr or SJl1"DBA
.u~

at the 4aath o:e the 1!raa'tor.

I~

UtJtiJ.R wo are 11v1l19

];lri.r1aiJ:)al and u:adis:b:'ib'll'tad

income ot any trust so ~ted sball.:Ca c:U..n1.bute4 to the tl:le:n
i;nc:101lll :b.n.:ei~i.e of 1:b.at. 1:::J::rwiI~ in "the propol:tiONI 1n wb.i.cb ~.Y

5.3

reaic;1enc.

o~

-rAe

l.oca.~

. ,.

...

".

are, at 'the till.

~. ~a_

1:a:l:'.Dl.inatIon, Urt.1Uad l::O rae.iva
~t...

.uthorice '1:h. \111.

..."1"

Q~

~t.O~/ •

on San AntaniQ Roa4, ca:ael, eaJ.ifornia., alld. the

'fll:r'l:lJ.ture. aM ~1Ib..i..:ng. thu.o~, at. aucb.

tb:lee, tor eu<:& -po:'ioda,

and on such t.a:z::ms and ~:itiona u tha '!::I:Ua"C'" may c!et.ea.1:Da, by
any

g~

t.ha %ol.l.ow1llg;

-

~~

COWA!l' CUld hi. t!2IlIUy, 8.I.JmltA:m:L'lmN

la'LID and he: ~uU.ly I BlUS: UJIRmI'c::B C'HAZ'BlI and hill tudly.'

tUUl

~t

~

.

A.t. any

CB'A2JD 1a. &et.1:nq as a 'lrwltatil ot this '.1'rt1St

.

Agra.ant, be :is l1al':eDy

speo1~1c::a.ll.Y ~ofi1O.4

ruide.nce en4 ! ta fum! tura.
ut:ate, rlillga..rdl .... of any

all"

10. . . .

to ratain said

fU:1:dahinqlil as a.Bats at the trast

the tl:ust

01::

:11:. bew.ticiariee :may

&Utter by Virtue' o~ said retention, to occupy said residence and

utiJ.ize :1:1::. :t\lrni't::U:;'e !!tAd j'Un.i.ab.i:ng8. :for hi. p.raonal

of other members
Ul'j

ma.

Z!.l~

o~

his

f~ly,

provuloru; at

with tha asseta of

It.

and 1. ral1$vaa of the e!tact of

ll!W to~ic!Ct1n9' S

000029
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~t.ta

:trom du.lillC;;

i:.J::ust e.5tate far hill Pe.J:"SoruU acc:013l'1t. ~d

12

IE/El

WiI. &nd tha.~

S31ttIJOSStt

~ ~Jns

... - -- ...........

"

rulhint;1

a:n.";{

tte.in ot:' pX'arJ.t. trOll a1.lC.b. c:!e&l1:lq., U

5U.ch proviaior.s

rud ::esi4811ce.

of lav l'elat. to

6.1.

,

~-

'.I!lla

.tnteraat

.
Mch balWfieilU"Y in

~

.
I

~ ~

IIW4

pzoinc:ipal of Il.Dr tra.st hueS. punua.Dt bar.t.o shall 1:1. :era. t'rtnIl the
oQn'b:ol

or 1ntU':t'e2:'CCe ot any =:e4itozo o'J! amah

~fic1ary

e.M

b::'o1I the cl&.i::la.s 01' otllA!tJ::1I .1l1cl.u41ng any "P9,1lM o~ INcI.h b4U1.~iQiill:Y.
~

inter.at.

ot:

-ach

beMt.1c:1ary

fhall

hot

be

flUbj.at

1::Q

Gtt.c:::1:I:&Ictt I exac:u"CJ.on" qarnilll:l:lPc't, c:l.ahul a:1si.nq !':rem ljIrocaed.J.llqs
.

.

' .

in ~iCl" ar ~ at:her tCl:'ll1 o~ l.apl. or .qti.1tul.. l....-y

~.

0:1:'

1illll1.

'l!be interest:: o~ e.C!h ~1c.ia:ry IfbalL DCrt. be ~c.»tibJ..

.,..

aJltic:1JjWltion or
'tl:'allsfer a

&l.1enatiOll

~ i.ll~

'l'rU5t

ben.tici&%y ~ "
to

-eD

anI! any at:"talZl:pt to antioipate or

.ll-n.

JWuma
7. 1.

"

b4iI vc.14 II.D1 .il:l• ..e:t.c::s-ti.va.

0", =~DK

incam4 an4 pr1r1cipal

dl.uibu1:.ahl. to

~

pAid. cUrac:tl.y t.o a .benef,":J.oia,ry o:r: m:a:y be a.pplied.

a: :ben4l!l~icia:ry#..

llPPX'QPl:'.:1.at'... Ally

.

WiU.

and ' ba:t1et'1t

b~t:.1ei.a.t:y

AS

the

,

~tcu

deGl

who i • .i.ncei>&oit:atad 't:hrot::l9'fl. ·Ul1\. . . ,

age or ether cause lfJay have the income mel p:d. :sc1p.u to 1lhic:b he is
aneit::.loca appli.a. to h.is l:Ienat1t:..

Income

or )tr1nc:1p.al. cu.su1l:nlta:bJ.e

i:o a b.natioiary whic:b :may be .UbjllCt .to e:cec:ut1cn. or l.avy whan

received by the
bane:!it..

bcn.~iciar.r

Arr:I DUc:b.

may bo applied to such

CLpp1.icauo~ ¢f inCQIIA Ol:'

on such occasic::m.a a..n4 in 8UcA'lImlller as thea

~ene~iciary~1

pril:1Oip«l
~t.ea

.maJ.~

be mac..

deem a.dvisslJJ.e

1.3

000 030
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99PL'3S'3l9E

..

ud lUy include

pa~t.

t.Q " RIUle%1c1ary pers.onally

per.on. 4eaaed appropriat.

~

the

~aas.

be:l.tioiuy or other persons to 'Whoa
ill

or to otller

Th_ r.o.ip~ o~

cU~il:lution

the

U 1W1a sball b.

etnllplata c:1J..D<::b.c.:ge o~ ~. 'l.!rWIt... ' nGponIIibillt1es.

M:IlfGL:r:SG
bah 0% the 1:rt1at

G. :I.

0.,

~

ah.u-u ahall be a ••~t. t!r:ust

tor tl:'\Ult I ac::co='t.1nq I tax 2U'1d a.l~ ,otha%'

pa:i:po....

'.rl:l.o

'l':1:'Uat.eu I

hovevel:', lDlJ.y ~l.. the pt:~ o~ th_, ••~t. 1:::l:WIt, ....ta ~ :
•

l

inte%'''~ in 'the lIL1.:ng'~e4 propa:t:y.

~d u:::1C:.U.vida4 .~ &Il:ut.l.l :
,

"

.,.

~o

always l:>a eqc.iLl to 1:bat t:r:11st' S propo'.l:'tio'Da1::e oou.t:r:UnltJ.on

the

m:1nq1ed assata.

'1"h1. 'b:uat 1.

, .l.

JIA~

.

1.D eal1:torrd.a. and .b&l.l.

))4a

q~cad, co~.a m:K1' a4lll'Jn1atu.d acc:ol:'d..i.ng, t..o C&l.1tot:n.ia laW'

. even thc:rugh ad:ai.nlate::1tQ

el.C'Wher..

shaU not i%1cJ.\Jdo. any p:!:inciplu

c:b.o1ca

o~

Ol:'

'l'he OI.l.i.tornia laws appl:1.~
1&11'11 l:'1tl.&1:.J.n~'

1:0

ccm.nic::t.a

02;'

1aQ'll.'

AC~ BY. ftOS'l'DS
10.].. 'Wh.il.o t::he

'rl:Uator is livL"l9', the 'rrUSteu aheJ.l

rQn4ar to TrUstor • written account or. tha trust

adaini.~tion.

suell.

~to:-.

~ecount

GhaJ.l be made Well requ.aated. by the

the dAath 01: -t:h. 'rl:'USt;;o:r: ,

accounting to

o.a.ch

t:.ha ~

Ui:.ar

Mal-l rliUld.ar an ...nnual

beneficiary to whOlt. ..t

the t.ba

or

000031.
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the

'.

ac:c:o'Untinq trust illcolae lIUly be d.iauihutad.
e:1~itl.d

to an aecoun't1..:aq are -..i.nors, thdJ::

delive:ra4
to their puanu or 9"Q&l:'d.1an.
t
to an

IlCCC1.l.nt.!n9

a:z:.

(65)

acoounb• •~all. 1:1.

the perSon

01:'

~~

tor

ll'nl". the aCQCu:nting i . o:bj acted to in wr!t1n9

,such :benefiaiuy.
,d,xty-~i""'.

'If ben.fici~i. . eJ:lti1:la.d

~PC:1ta.te4, ~

delivered to thai: cotui1~to:c:', 9"Q&l:'d.1an

~c:~ ~l ~

cla.:rat ~-=-

...u.in-sr

~.~

too t.lJ.

to vhCllll the

accounting- 18 to be l"e:n4ue" (acept ac:<:p\llltinga :r:endere4 to the
Truator) ,

the

iilec:cNnt

.hal.l be

4.~

~1n-.l

~

co::I.Qltud.v. 1n

r~t

to aJ.J. ~ctd.~
cU..~o.'" in i::h. QCCO\1h~.
'1"tlc
.
.
•
I
i!I.~Quntinq aha;tl be bind1n~ on all. penons tJitc~ ill the't.l:'Ust,

inclu41ntt banaficiari. . wb.o
,

110

bene;!'!.c:i.al::y ..~

.t,ha

pova%:' t:o

al~

~

."

l'lOt lc:noVl1 or wb.c are not yet bo:rn •

~ co~j'~on

wit:h

.

~ ~

1SbaJ..1

l::LaVD

o%' . . .zsc!l tb. t::ro.at. by' ap~%OVI1t.l ot an ac::counting'.

-.me
l.J. • J.

L1!O~ A •. COlQlf and UltlCBNCB C!1IAZ'l!:N are designated

as tl:!Aa ~.,.. of the ~ hereun4Ser.
-...
1.1..2 On
the.
d&at:b.,
r . . ipa.tiol1
l.rlroNAItDA J\.. COWAN,
h~.'IUld.or.

on the

or

1neapaeity

LAlilltmfar

CS"AZU CIl:JAl.l serve as the sole TrUstee

<leath~

resignation 0:' incapacity of t.AWlUDfO

caA2lDl, ROBERr HN'OOXIN' sbal.l IIl1.:'Va a.a .. T%Ua't!.. . haraundar.

d.. .'th, r.,d9'Jl&t:!.on or ineapacj,.ty o:f! ....1t:l;a.ar LZONI.RD1
:aO~. lmOOI'\XN,

',A.

COlfJUJ or

the WBLIS ll'uao BANlt,

&

N • A _ slull aarve aa a

I

000032
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at a t.ble when LAWll'JDtC!l!l CHAZS is SlOT. .erving- as

'l'l:'tl.sta. b.a:ra:uM.er,
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of
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"

11.3 70r

of the into:p.etAtlQn Qt this

p~o.~

~,

the inee.pacl.ty ot the 'rZ\lIrtor, 0:;' ot .. 'l'rUaUa to ae:rve U
'l'r\lStec,

ahall

be

oonc:lu.s!vely

.cerlif!ea.t1c:m ot tvo

(2)

••t.abli.lhed

.

the

by

suc:a

phYllilc1JmB II.tte:u:Ul'19'

SUc:4

writ.tan

'l':r:'LUI't;or or

1'ruatee tha:t auc:A 'rrua't.ol: or Tr\Uit.. . i. unable to manage hie c:nm
a..tt&.1l:'s or tho. . ot th4 truat.
11... ... '.t"r:'wItee -":I

r .. i~tion eo ul of

9"lU<1iau

0:;' by

~

reaip

'l:!Y.

c:ur.t'CAt. ill~ bcat1c:.iui..

t.111l1g t.l:1e

apprgprlat;e

b.a.v1nc;;; j\U:iac5..ic::t1on over t:.I1e. tl:'I.:Z.8"t.

C)~

A

~ces.or

the

ot

OX'

their

tu

court

ot ru1pat.1on,

~

•

u'tata to the

'n1ataaa.
.ba.11.' 1:28 required

ot

ey

'l:J:'WI'e..

na.Ded.

11.5 No

:bolX!

11.6

IJUC:cesaor 'rt'1:1Stee ahall be.' obligated to ODmi ne

]1'0

Q~ ..~

vi." t:Aa oocto;ant:a " ..oQ:rI1a

••

~

pat1t1a:t1 vith'

In: the .vent

the re&l.gn!.nq. t'rU.st.ee sbe.ll convey
daaignatad.

91"rillg- v:'1tten not1c.

shall be

;rupoca1b~.

gt:. ~ p:.v1QQ8 ".r:z::t1.-1:!84.

onlY' tor his ow a.ct&I

Ol:'

omi •• ions

-which
~. cp;o8aly
,
. . negligetlt 04 lIUlda .in }'a4 taith..
U.7 lfo

~

4e4l.!»st

nth

tb.e

c:cnoern.iDq the V.l1dity at any act1aJl8 ot

~

~

1.nqu.ire

auc;:h '1"l;1;&8t. . . .

11.8 'l!ha 'rrU.ate•• may raceiva rauonal)la compensation and
.r.ilabUl:'.~t t02:'

e¥pCll::s.a.

~~ C:::Olll~UOD ~ ::e:Lml:n~rsement

fol:' e::qIez:usN tahall. b. paid. frena and Iihall. ba a proper- expense ot

the U'U$t.

1.6
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lIOWllRS OF T.lt8 TJP.tra'rlllS:!.

12 • 1 The
pX'o~
I
I

p~,

whatl:uar %"aIll 01:

incl~

ha:r..Utld-.r,

slmll

'rl"US'C8.5

vitb.

hav.,

to all

'W2Uc:h hY at a:rt'J tilIe be held

property hal.d

iUly

l:'U})act

roX' a

Jnor,

Whether

conatituting principa.l or acc:aaUlo.1:e4 income, t:h. totlovin9 pov.."
lU'J.I:l rights, which m.a.Y,be exercised in the 'l'r1:I:8taea' d1scntion at

any 'Cu. ana

1'r=1I 't:l.lM. to

~

beratUlc1ar c:n4 until. ac:tuAl
Ca)

'l'O

dta:r1ng'

diatr1b~tlon o~

a~l•. and

upcm.

.

alld

atcclt

~c::ipt.ion#

all property:

~c:2b' l.~ o~ 1:1JiuI

vot.,

CODVarlliO'l1

.,.

a:n4. ~ gi'9'8 pZ'aXi- to

.

1:.0

~

to

as t:J1ey aay

d1veralt~C&tlon.

without

.'
s*cu:r1'C.1u havJ.ll9 voti.tw;J ripta,
'to

(b)

any tl:USt

0%

ratain any pa:zt 9t t:ll.e 't::'wrt pr~ coldllCJ

1Ilto tbe.1r po. . . . ..1.on, tor

deem

cont1.l1wLnc.

~.

pay any u.UDfUlt.leviad.

right

flAY

o.t'

or othal:wi. . Which aay

cttach, l::I4tlO4l9 or· boo gJ.V8D to

vote, any

t:l:l-

option

to

any t.iJI.e

4t

!:lol.d.c. ot rury

.~,

bona.# sacari1:iu, or ether 12lst:z;WILeJit~ O'f any natura therGOf

tonwig put ot the truat estate.
~o

(Q)

eonso11c!4t.ion,
tor.cloo.ura,
.1::'Uc~

joi.n 1.u any

cOlJll:linatioll,

~qa

ot

Q~

pl.CLl'l

loliSC:it.,

l:"aQ:z:va,rUza:Uon,

eapit...li~a1:1on,

or

~rtq~9'8,

cUs8clution,

o~ar

Cb.l.lUJ_ CIt

.

ot a:ny cOl;pO:t'a.t!on, ·trg:st, or organi2u:ation, or the.

property cr a.set. tllu.of; to aepQait. bonda I Reeks,
seCUl:'ities held. by thea vith
~omm.it::.t •• ,

~

too

~

any

c::n4 bo~d

prct.ectiva

Q1:

ot.h8l:'

or s1mila..r

t:/.:Q.y .tlcat:r.it.1.. l.aU8<t :J.n

conn.c:ticft therewith i!M to pay Uly ......IQ!UU1U th4rlJUnder.

17
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.

(d)

Ifo en:toZ'Ce

mort.t;.c;e or d••d o"l b:'u.:&'t or

a11y

plec1ge held hU'e'QllC1er a.nQ t.o purcb.uo at:

any Ala ta..aun4ar

uy property s\1hj tct t.herato.
(e)

To purebase

.~iU. . OJ:'

at:hel:"

~~

t.ram.,

and to m.alaa loa:oa aJ:d a~, ••~e4 er lUUIaC2\U'ed, to I

the G:lCe<:I'lltol:' or other :rap¥'eSCJta.tive of the ~r'8 e.at&ta.
(~)

ea.l.

'l!o -"n-9'&, ~t.;r;Ql, .Gl.l. Gt pu.bllc. ~ pr;iV1S.~

~O1:' ~ OJ:'

convay I

d~ ~~

on c::z'e4i:t.,

part.1t1on~

eXdJa.nga,

..wxuv1d..,

.

.

repe.i.:., ;:0

. .opt:J.onel
.

~-t:

mortgaq.,

le.cuse. ~c;;a;'
.....
t..::z:a.. v!~ or. ~~' beyond the ~ti~ ot any tl:'l1a't:,

ple<!qe, i:lll:;nrC'V'a,

~

d:1.'lfide,
.

.

or v;l:t:.hput netic., to

tQ

.

~o: al$Y pU:cpc.J., inel.'a.dbw ~cn:~.:t:1C1n tot:'·cmd. z-4IlI&CI'V1!Ll. o~ -.1.1

...

c;tIls or oil, alld to cn.t..l::' ift'to any eovenanu oZ' &F8-e.ment.;,

:!:'ala-t.1.ng to Foper\:y eo 1 . . .e4
then or ther...~ b.a
(9')

~

01:'

any llIprova.eat. wtUc.b )lAY

thereCD. .

'1'0 ~., ~t t:D a.Z'b:Li::r.atd. c:m, ral......

with or without consi~tJ.ol'1, ar otl:w:Vi•• e.4jlUlt elZliJd b

favor
d..tend

OX'

a.~t

any

t:zust,

to .inatitut:.,

co=p:r:cm:i•• ,

and.

&ct:i0llJl a.nd p%O<:aedim;a.

ell)

":0.

d.eeJll &dv~@l. u

car.r:y fJUCll. iluiUJ:1l.%1Ce

ZUI

the

'r~

lDZ:Ly

an a:lI:pC1Sa o~ the trastr· to PAY' pZ'uai'IDS and
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L:EONAltDA. A COWAN and. LAWKENCE'CB:A:Z;2N. as Tm..cu:e:s of the Trust ~
dcscr.ibed ~ b.ereby ac.knowiqe and accept tbt fi:rrcsoing F"ll'St Amendmeat.

DIted: $'1*?-7\Ii:;:i

2'l, 1997

~ ~C'

~

LeozIItd& A. COWU\.

r;?r:=~
STAlE OF CALlP'0llNrA)

)45.
COUN'IY. OE ~ON'I'E1USY)

')
},u.
COtINrY' og SAN nv.NCISCO,

1

000 044

FIRST AM:ENOMENT OF Tm
1991 lU!S'TAn!MENT OP 1'EB nUST AGR.EEME:NT
OJ'

LBONAJU)AA COWAN

Pursumt to tba appticable provisioas oftfut 1m lli:rMrmcmi of the 'trost Aareement of
LeonardI. A. Cawu, executed OD. Oc:tob« ~ 1992.. wbioh restat!d in its t.adruy the LEONA.'BDA
A COWAN 11WST oll982, IUd merdnI.couarda A. CowJn r&'.Sa'Wd ~ ~ to alter, amend
or revclat flu! trust in wlJoLJ or m. put" lAcuud A.. Cowm ~ pt:rtiany ~ laid Trwst
.Agrecrneat as 1blIowr.
'
~, the ~ o!~04 43(0) ~hceby dd.o'c:e4 tu thtlt eurUetYt

SECOND. JiDc;e mUST I was d;..,;....te4 br~:F.Il\BT haciP, tiIA ptoviaioll of
S=tion. 4.1(d) Ire beteby cIari!ed to ~o t&it 1lWST 1I ia ~ oaI.r i:NIIt ~ to be
O8tabliabed UDd« the 1luIt ~ mel Its tcDa . . her'eby ~ awl confirnwl; and
,

I.ASI. in the .teCO!¥l' cut third a~ ofScetioA 11.2..
Rplaced by H!NllY 'WINE'IUY.
.
]A

,

ltOmalT MNOOICIN is benby

t.I1 otbc ~ tho pto"iiaOD.t of ~ Twa Apa:mam. are llc:n:by I'I!:inocl ami

coaf1mFd.

'

I ceni:fY tball. bavc l'Qd tbG fi:qoi:Da Ftnt 'A~ 10 ,tho 1m lU5tlltot:D.ot of'The
Trust ~ ofl.cozwda A. Cowan. &114 that it c:atro.;t1y Itatef the cbaDscI I wiIb. to malee. I
apptOYD s:Ud.Fnt ~ iD.1ll p~

Signed. at

us4 ~ tb.IIt thO T.ru.:stcca ~ it.

~ ~ thiI~'ltb ~ of ~rh:dltl(""
':"'I

~

etL........

/)..

r.lc

1991.

/"-

.-4"t.t.J~~
I

1
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LEONA1U)A A. COWAN TRUST OF 1982

Witla&X I. 1.2ti.IQ IlECAMit1i& 31.12~2

(See~' CompildOSlRaport)
AsslSlll ON' HAND ON PBc;:PNIQ'1 t

Am$

&..
1

I

~on
Cub bcld in BUlle: of Amaic&
IICC:Q\lUt

2

I Arpoum

aumbcr 00332-18110

ill.l50..52

Cub. helci hi -Smith ~
Invecrmeat ~ acc:oaut uamber 635-63186-1j

14 -

RJ:ceivabJo from,Scnk ol_~e

3

~ ir1 Ptess Publishina Llqujdstin, T~

4

UDcllvidcrl ~" ~ i.:D m.cdiUJI ~ .aod.loi:

._. '. .

6:29 H.amptm:tlload, Alameda. CA _ alS325.135
racrtaa&o 11;) Ba12k of 0U:laDd

S

m

1.0&9.43
33~8S4.n

1#,000.00

Sl,l64.60

Utdividad SO% imaat in 554 &c:tU
6215 :De:ar ValIc:r Road, ~ CA

331~.OO

6

Crlmdoo,.W"lSCOnsin Main U.s. po$t office

194.460.00

7

Wmior, AJabvna Mail:! U.s. post o1!lce

431,000.00

8

Truma.u, Mim:2aota Main U.s. post o:tBce

162.700.00

9

Lew:istoD., MiuJ:M:sota Main U.s. poGt

10

L~ pan:acahip ~ i:I1l'lIdr: CrnkAssodaP$

11

LiJ.rrirr4 partIlc.nhip ~ mCalcab 19&:2.

23.749.00

12

Limited~

20,000.00

13

Limited pa.rtDC:abip in1'crest in MeDdik. L.P.

omc:o

imc::zarirl r~CI' R.Ii1:I= ~

167.QOO.00
9.650.00

~

.

1l,700II:il~

Tom!
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EXHIBIT ,,"A"I

f

I

LAST WILL & TESTAMENT
OF

ZACHARY A. COWAN
I, ZACHARY A. COWAN, of Declo, Cassia County, Idaho, publish and declare
this to be my Last Will and Testament revoking all other and former wills and codicils that may
have been made by me.

CLAUSE 1
DECLARATIONS

I am single. I have no children.
All of my property is my separate property. It is my intention by this Will to
dispose of all property which I am entitled to ~o~e of by will, community and separate, real.
personal and mixed, which I may own or lwve any interest in whatever at the time of my death.
CLAUSE 2
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTAINE

I nominate and aDI)Olllt
.,

estate. In the event Stephen D. Westfall should Dre:d:ec;~em~

fot any reason to act as my

Personal Representative, then, in such event, I appoint Mary Killings, Heyburn, Idaho, as the
Personal Representative of my estate. I direct that the Personal Representative and alternate
Personal Representative .appointed in this paragraph' shall serve without bond.

000047
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Initials ~
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EXHIBIT 2

CLAUSE 3
POWERS OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
My Personal Representative is authorized and empowered to exercise all powers

in the management of my estate that any reasonable and prudent individual would exercise in the
management of similar property owned in my Personal Representative's own right, upon such
terms and conditions as may seem hestto my Personal Representative, and to execute" and deliver
any and all instruments and to do any and all acts which my Personal Representative may deem
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this Will.

CLAUSE 4
DIRECTIONS TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

I direct that my body be cremated with no services. I direct that my mend, Bob
Soninger, shall be responsible for the ashes. My ashes shall be spread over Carson City, Nevada
brothels.

CLAUSES
DlsposmON OF CERTAIN PERSONAL PROPERTY BY SEPARATE WRITING

according to a written list of items and intended ~ecipients thereof prepared either in my
handwriting or signed by me, if such a list is in existence at the time of my death.

CLAUSE 6

RESIDUE
Ail of the rest, residue and remainder of my property which I own or have any

Initia1s~

, _2_000048

(

./

•

interest in whatever at the time of my death, other than beneficial interests in trusts, I give,
bequeath, and devise to the American Cancer Society. All beneficial interests that I have in any
trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary Killings. I exercise any power of appointment that I

might hold and appoint Mary Killings. If for any reason Mary Killings predeceases me, her
interest and the power of appointment shall pass to Stephen D. Westfall.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, lbave hereunto set Illy hand and seal this ~ +~

day of ft'ktJj

,2005.

The foregoing instnnnent, consisting of four (4) pages, including the page signed
by the undersigned witnesses, was, on the date thereof signed, published and declared by the

above-named Zachary A. Cowan, to bebis LastWill and Testament, in the presence of us, who,
at his request and his presence and in the presence of each other, and on the same date, have

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Cassia

)ss
)

We, ZAq-IARY A. COWAN, the Testator, and _---:::..Bo:;,.;;na;;.:;:.......;.Ra...;.e~D__a_vi_s_ _ __
_ _ _ _a_nd_Ka_l_l_i_Hi_·t_t_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-->, the witnesses, respectively, whose

-3-
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names are signed to the attached or foregoing instrument, being first duly sworn, do hereby
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testator signed and executed the instrument as his

Last Will and Testament and that be bad signed willingly, and that he executed it as his free and
voluntary act for the pwposes therein expressed; and that each of the witnesses, in the presence
and hearing of the Testator. signed the Will as witnesses and that to the best ofills knowledge the
Testator was at the time an adult, of sound mind and under no constraint or undue influence.

Witness

I

v}tlli
er1+.
Itness
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by Zachary A. Cowan, the
Testator, ~d
"

Bona Rae Davis and Kalli Hitt

.

thewitne.S~~' this;?

i

'It

sf ATE

OF IDAHO

day

of_LL..+~,L--_ _ _

-->

Residing at Burley, Idaho
My Commission expires

NOT ARY --- PUBLIC
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/CJ -0 --/0

,ONALD J. WILPEP.

MAR 2 5 2009

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

=

J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
By J. RANDAll
OEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,
v.
W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

'ti

0C 090 5 7 B5

SUMMONS

TO: W. Kent Fletcher
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED That in order to defend this lawsuit an appropriate written
response must be filed with the above-designated court within 20 days after service ofthis Summons
on you. If you fail to so respond, the court may enter judgment against you as demanded by the
plaintiff in the complaint.
A copy of the complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice or

SUMMONS -1

000051.

representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written response,
if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule lO(a)( 1), and other Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall also include:
1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an answer to the complaint, it must contain admissions or denials

of the separate allegations of the complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.

Your signature, mailing address, and telephone number, or the signature, mailing

address, and telephone number of your attorney.
4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to plaintiffs attorney, as

designated above.
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the clerk of
the above-named court.
WITNESS My hand and the seal of the clerk of this court this

J5' day of March, 2009.

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

.. OAV'IJ NAvAHfUJ

By7UU

Deputy Clerk

SUMMONS -2

000052

L/?J7

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at -Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

2009
j

DAVID

.

L

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,

W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.CV OC 0905785
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE

That I am the attorney for the above named defendant in the above-entitled action. That on

I

~h

the ~ day of April, 2009, I received copies of both Summons and Complaint and Demand for Jury

Trial in the above.entitlj 'i:t:n and that I hereby ackn~w~edge said se/5e.
DATED This _(.f?_ day of April,

2009/~

J. I
)

Craig Meadows

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE - I

000053

/

____

.......... ...,v.\.}u

.l:""'M

Crystal Severson

Hawley Troxell

ALLEN BELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHElLS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 Xotth 8th Street
PO. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No 1626

Page 3

APR 0 1 2009
J DAVID NAVARRO,
By PATRICIA A DWONCH

Attorneys fot Plaintiff

IN TIIE DIS IruCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Mary Killins Soignier,

Plaintiff;

W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case NoCV OC 0905785
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE

That I am the attorney for the above named defendant in the above-entitled action. That on

I

~11

the ~ day of Apr iI, 2009, r received copies of both Summons and Complaint and Demand fOI Jury

Trial in the above-entitlj "6~n and that [hereby ac~~:~",;edge said s~e
DATED This _f.t?_ day of April, 2009.

/

Craig Meadows

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE - 1

000054
)

~

J: I

Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

MARY KILLTNS SOIGNIER,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0905785
ANSWER TO COMPLATNT, AND
DEMAND FOR JlJR Y TRIAL
Fee Category: I.l.a.
Filing Fee: $58.00

)

---------------------------)
COMES NOW Defendant W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record,
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and by way of answer to the Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial ("Complaint') filed by Plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, admits, denies and alleges as
follows:
1.

Defendant denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein.

2.

Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs I and II of the Complaint.

000 055
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JUR Y TRIAL - 1
041880070.1485305.1

3.

Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph III of the Complaint on the

basis that the referenced document speaks for itself, and further, that the allegations set forth
conclusions of law to which no response is required.
4.

With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph IV of the Complaint,

Defendant admits that he drafted Exhibit 2 of the Complaint at the request of Zachary A. Cowan,
but denies the remaining allegations on the basis that the referenced document speaks for itself.
5.

Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs V and VI of the

Complaint.
6.

Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph VIl of the Complaint on

the basis that the referenced and purported "ruling" from the probate court speaks for itself and
specifically denies that said court found that Defendant was negligent.
7.

Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs VIII and IX of the

Complaint.
8.

In response to Plaintiff's demand for relief and judgment, Defendant denies

Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested.
AFFIRMA TIVE DEFENSES

The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation
of Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and
all of Plaintiff's claims for relief. In addition, Defendant, in asserting the following defenses,
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is
upon Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is

000056
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
04188.007014853051

upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility
or liability of Defendant but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of
responsibility and liability in the Complaint.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the
applicable statute of limitation.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant by reason of
compromise and settlement of the claims upon which the action is based.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Plaintiff's
injuries, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by the conduct of parties other than
Defendant, who are not parties to this action.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the statute
of frauds.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because evidence of
any oral agreement upon which this action is based is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
PlaintiiJ is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Defendant's
acts were justified.

000057
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRlAL - 3
04188007014853051

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant in Ada County, as the
only appropriate venue for any dispute is Cassia County.

RULE 11 STATEMENT
Defendant has considered and believes that he may have additional defenses, but does not
have enough information at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule I I of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants does not intend to waive any such defenses and
specifically asserts his intention to amend this Answer if, pending research and after discovery,
facts come to light giving rise to such additional defenses.

CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant has been required to retain the services of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
LLP to defend him in this litigation and should be awarded his reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 and § I 2-121, Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54, and other applicable law.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues so triable and will not stipulate
to a jury of less than twelve (12) jurors.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendant W. Kent Fletcher prays for entry of judgment as follows:
l.

That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiff take nothing thereby;

2.

That Defendant be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily

incurred in defending this action; and
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

000058
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
0418800701485305.1

DATED THIS

~y

of April, 2009.

000059
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5
041880070.14853051

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~f

April, 2009, I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL by the
method indicated below. and addressed to each of the following:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

/u.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564

000060
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRlAL - 6
041880070.1485305.1

)

"10 __,
AM_~,

_ __

:

J)tWID NAVAHRO. C'er\<.

J

~l! A GAH!~~~'

APR J 3 200J
J. DAVIa NAVAAAQ

Oy AJO f&IOH.

Craig L. Meadows, ISS No.1 081
Michelle R. Points, ISS No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxel1.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com

c.

QMm

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MARY KILL INS SOIGNIER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0905785
STIPULA TION FOR CHANGE OF
VENUE; ORDER THEREON

----------------------------)
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, by and through their respective
counsel of record, and pursuant to this Stipulation seek this Court's Order changing venue of this
action to Cassia County, Idaho. Ada County is not the proper venue for this case as the subjects
of this litigation took place in Cassia County, and the Defendant resides in Cassia County.

000061.
STIPULATION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; ORDER THEREON - I
0418800701483134.1

___ •• _

4~6/2009

••• w

. . . . ..17

J:&A

~002/002

J4:>!l564

~Crystal

2:17:56 PM

DATED IllS

4-

Severson

xell

Page 4

day of April. 2009.

ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED

DATED IHIS

.9/!;:;Of

April, 2009.

ORDER TO CHANGE VENUE

THIS MAIlER having come before the Cowt upon stipulation oftbe parties, and good
cause showing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action should be transferred pursuant to I.RC.P.
40(e)(2) to the DistIict Cowt of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in and for the
County of Cassia.

/·. ., 4""'"1,.:) day of ApIiI, 2009.
(~

DATED TIDS

04183 0070 14831341

)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

APR 1 3 2~o.s

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on OilS _ (jay of April, 2009, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing STIPULA nON FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; ORDER THEREON by the
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564

Craig L. Meadows
Michelle R. Points
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
[Attorneys for Defendant]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.954.5238

000063
STIPULATION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE; ORDER THEREON - 3
0418800701483134.1

Date: 4/13/2009

Time: 11 :52 AM
Page 1 of 1

User: CCNElSRF

Judicial District Court - Ada C

ROA Report
Case: CV-OC-2009-05785 Current Judge: Ronald J. Wilper
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher

Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher
Date

Code

User

3/25/2009

NCOC

CCRANDJD

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Ronald J. Wilper

COMP

CCRANDJD

Complaint Filed

Ronald J. Wilper

SMFI

CCRANDJD

Summons Filed

Ronald J. Wilper

4/612009

ACKN

CCTOWNRD

Acknowledgment Of Service (4-6-09)

Ronald J. Wilper

4/7/2009

ACKN

CCDWONCP

Acknowledgment Of Service (04/06/09)

Ronald J. Wilper

APDF

CCDWONCP

Application For Entry of Default Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

AFDF

CCDWONCP

Affidavit Of Stephen C Brown in Support of
Application for Entry of Default

Ronald J. Wilper

APDF

CCDWONCP

Application For Entry of Default

Ronald J. Wilper

AFDF

CCDWONCP

Affidavit Of Stephen C Brown in Support of
Application for Entry of Default Judgment and of
Non-Military Service

Ronald J. Wilper

ANSW

CCGARDAL

Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
(POints for W Kent)

Ronald J. Wilper

STIP

CCBOYIDR

Stipulation for Change of Venue: Order Thereon
(Stipulation Only)

Ronald J. Wilper

VENU

CCNElSRF

Change Of Venue to Cassia County

Ronald J. Wilper

REQU

CCNELSRF

Request Sent to the Supreme Court Via
Interdepartmental Mail 04/13/09

Ronald J. Wilper

CDIS

CCNELSRF

Civil Disposition entered for: Fletcher, W Kent,
Defendant; Soignier, Mary Killins, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 4/13/2009

Ronald J. Wi/per

STAT

CCNELSRF

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Ronald J. Wilper

4/9/2009

4/13/2009

Judge
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
IN THE MAITER OF CHANGE OF

)

VENUE.

)

ORDER

An Order was entered in the District Court wherein venue was transferred from Ada County,
Fourth Judicial District to Cassia County, Fifth Judicial District in the case listed below:

Mary Killins Soignier v. W. Kent Fletcher
Ada County Case No. CV OC 0905785
Therefore, after due consideration and good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that venue for all further proceedings in this case be, and they
hereby are, transferred from Ada County, Fourth Judicial District to Cassia County, Fifth Judicial
District.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Administrative District Judge R. Barry Wood shall be
assigned this case for further reassignment within the Fifth Judicial District for the purpose of the
detennination and disposition of all matters, including trial.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk for Ada County shall file and
serve this order upon the parties or their counsel and take any action necessary to transfer venue of
this case to Cassia County.
DATED this

I 1- day of May 2009.
By Order of the Supreme Court

ATTEST:

cc:

Administrative District Judge Darla S. WiJIiamson
Administrative District Judge R. Barry Wood
Trial Court Administrator Larry D. Reiner
Trial Court Administrator Linda Wright
District Court Clerk J. David Navarro, Ada County
District Court Clerk Larry Mickelsen, Cassia County

r
L

'I

11

\i;Y Art

Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 l'vfain Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,

C- VqOcY!'dl 7

)

vs.

)
)
)
)

W. KENT FLETCHER,

)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV OC 0905785
AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT,
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

)
)
)

Defendant.

)

-------------------------------

COMES NOW Defendant W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record,
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and by way of answer to the Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial ("Complaint') filed by Plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, admits, denies and alleges as
follows:
1.

Defendant denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein.

2.

Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs I and II of the Compiaint.

AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL - 1

000066

04188 0070 1493466 1

3.

Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph III of the Complaint on the

basis that the referenced document speaks for

itself~

and further, that the allegations set forth

conclusions of law to which no response is required.
4.

With respect to the allegations set forth in paragraph IV of the Complaint,

Defendant admits that he drafted Exhibit 2 of the Complaint at the request of Zachary A. Cowan,
but denies the remaining allegations on the basis that the referenced document speaks for itself.
5.

Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs V and VI of the

Complaint.
6.

Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph VII of the Complaint on

the basis that the referenced and purported "ruling" from the probate court speaks for itself and
specifically denies that said court found that Defendant was negligent.
7.

Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs VIII and IX of the

Complaint.
8.

In response to Plaintiff s demand for relief and judgment, Defendant denies

Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation
of Plaintiff. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and
all of Plaintiff s claims for relief. In addition, Defendant, in asserting the following defenses,
does not admit that the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is
upon Defendant but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of denials and/or by reason of relevant
statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses
and/or the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defenses is
AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR
JUR Y TRIAL - 2

000067

04188007014934661

upon Plaintiff. Moreover. Defendant does not admit, in asserting any defense, any responsibility
or liability of Defendant but, to the contrary, specifically denies any and all allegations of
responsibility and liability in the Complaint.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
PlaintitT is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the
applicable statute of limitation, I.C. § 5-219(4).

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
PlaintitIis barred from maintaining this action against Defendant by reason of
compromise and settlement of the claims upon which the action is based.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Plaintiff's
injuries, if any, were proximately caused, in whole or in part, by the conduct of parties other than
Defendant, who are not parties to this action.

FOURTH AFFIRl\fA TIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant based upon the statute
of frauds.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because evidence of
any oral agreement upon which this action is based is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant because Defendant's
acts were justified.

AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR

lUR Y TRIAL - 3

000068

04188.0070 14934661

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is barred from maintaining this action against Defendant in Ada County, as the
only appropriate venue for any dispute is Cassia County.

RULE 11 STATEMENT
Defendant has considered and believes that he may have additional defenses, but does not
have enough information at this time to assert such additional defenses under Rule II of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants does not intend to waive any such defenses and
specifically asserts his intention to amend this Answer if, pending research and after discovery,
facts come to light giving rise to such additional defenses.

CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Defendant has been required to retain the services of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
LLP to defend him in this litigation and should be awarded his reasonable attorney fees and costs
incurred in defending this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 and § 12-121, Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54, and other applicable law.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendant hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues so triable and will not stipulate
to ajury ofless than twelve (12) jurors.

PRA YER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendant W. Kent Fletcher prays for entry of judgment as follows:

1.

That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed and Plaintiff take nothing thereby;

2.

That Defendant be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily

incurred in defending this action; and
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL - 4

000069

041880070 1493466.1

DATED THIS

/If-!lJ;;-Of April, 2009.
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
1

AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR
JUR Y TRIAL - 5

000070

04188.0070 14934661

"
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of April. 2009, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564

AMENDED AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT, AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL - 6

000071.

04188.0070.14934661

Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL E1'.l'NIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,
Plaintiff,
VS.

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

--------------------------------

)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLP, and respectfully submits this Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an
order from this Court dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.
This Motion is brought under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
The basis of this Motion is that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute of
limitation and under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and because Defendant did not breach any

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 000072
041880070 1554541.1

duty to Plaintiff, thus Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim of professional negligence against Mr.
Fletcher..
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment and the Affidavit of
DA TED THIS

. Kent Fletcher, both filed concurrently herewith.

+--L-

HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

oints, ISB No. 622
. Defendant W. Kent Fletcher

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

000073

04188.0070.1554541.1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

thi/~une,

2009, I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below,
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Craig L. Meadows, ISB No.1 081
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

Case No. CV 2009-517
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

--------------------------------

Defendant W. Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher"), by and through his counsel of record, Hawley
Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of his Motion
for Summary Judgment. Through this motion, Fletcher seeks an order dismissing Plaintiff s
Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.
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I.
RELEVANT FACTS

Zachary A. Cowan was a client of Fletcher's trom approximately 2000 through 2006.
Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher ("Fletcher AtT."), ~ 2. Fletcher did some estate planning for Mr.
Cowan, which included the drafting of his Last Will and Testament ("Will"). !d., Exh. A.
Mr. Cowan executed his Will on May 24, 2005.
During his lifetime, Mr. Cowan was the beneficiary of a trust created by his mother,
Leonarda A. Cowan, of Riverside, Calitornia, known as The Leonarda A. Cowan Trust. fd.,

~

3.

Clause 6 of the Will directed the residue and remainder of the Mr. Cowan's estate, other
than beneficial interests in trusts, be given to the American Cancer Society, and that all
beneficial interests that he had in any trusts be given to "Mary Killings", the Plaintiff in this case
fd.,

~

4.
Prior to finalizing the Will, Fletcher asked Mr. Cowan about his interests in any trusts,

including his mother's trust and Mr. Cowan informed Fletcher that he had received the
disbursements from his mother's trust. fd.,

~

5. Fletcher then asked Mr. Cowan ifhe wanted to

keep the language in Clause 6 regarding the Plaintiff in the Will in light of the fact that he had
received disbursements from his mother's trust. Mr. Cowan told Fletcher that he was uncertain
as to whether or not all of that property had been disbursed, and that he wanted to leave the
language in the Will. fd.
The Will was duly witnessed and attested to by the required number of witnesses.
Fletcher Aff,

~

6. The Will is a validly executed testamentary instrument, and Mr. Cowan was

competent at the time he executed his Will. fd. No party has presented a challenge to the
validity of the Will. !d.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FORSUMMARYJUDGMENT-2

000076

041 BB. 0070.1554566 1

Mr. Cowan died on the October 20,2006. /d.,

~

7.

Mr. Cowan's Will was admitted to infonnal probate on November 3,2006 in the District
Court (Magistrate Division) for the Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County, Case No. CV 2006
1234 ("Probate Adion"). /d.,

~

8.

Pursuant to the tenns of the Will, Stephen D. Westfall was nominated and duly appointed
to be the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mr. Cowan. /d.,

~

9.

The Personal Representative filed an Inventory of the estate on January 23, 2007. /d.,

~

10.
In his Will, Mr. Cowan directed that all of his personal property be distributed according
to a written list of items and intended recipients, if such a list was in existence at the time of this
death. ld.,

~

11. A written list of items and intended beneficiaries could not be found and it was

concluded that a written list did not exist. Id.
At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any interest in any trusts. ld.,
~

12. The testator's Personal Representative determined that the residue of the testator's estate

should be given to the American Cancer Society. ld.
Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation of the Will in the Probate
Action, claiming that she was entitled to certain monies derived from the Leonarda A. Cowan
Trust, and that Clause 6 of Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous, thus, Plaintiff claims that the
Magistrate Court should allow and/or consider parole evidence to aid it in detennining the intent
of the testator Mr. Cowan. Id.,

~

13. Plaintiff submitted a number of affidavits in the Probate

Action which said, in effect, that Mr. Cowan had made representations that Plaintiff would
receive a substantial portion of his estate upon his death. Id.
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The Magistrate Court in the Probate Action found that there was no latent or patent
ambiguity concerning the Mr. Cowan's Will, that Mr. Cowan's intent was clear and
unambiguous on the face of the Will document, and that Plaintiff's challenge to the Will was
without merit. /d.,

~

14.

Based on the Magistrate Court's decision, the residue of Mr. Cowan's estate was to be
paid American Cancer Society. Id.,

~

IS. Plaintiff tiled an appeal of the Magistrate Court

decision in the Probate Action. /d.
On or about September 9,2008, the parties of the Probate Action entered into a
"Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for
Construction of the Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter
"Stipulation for Settlement"). Fletcher Aff., Exh. B. That Stipulation was signed by Fletcher
and Plaintiff, among others. !d.,

~

16.

In consideration for Plaintiff signing the StipUlation for Settlement, she dismissed her
appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of $100,000. /d.,
~

17.

II.
LAW APPLICABLE TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is only proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter oflaw." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323,
106 S. C1. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FORSUMMARYJUDGMENT-4

000078

041 BB. 0070.1554566 1

The moving party has the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of material
fact. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). To meet
his burden, the moving party must challenge in its motion and establish through evidence that no
issue of material facts exists for an element of the nonmoving party's case. Smith v. J\-/eridian

Joint Sch Dis!. No.2, 128 Idaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). The nonmoving party
"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's
y"sponse, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
.nat there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.c.P. 56(e).
If the moving party initially establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the
bL;,rden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. Smith, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588. When presenting
affidavits, they "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein." I.R.C.P.56(e). The nonmoving party must submit more than just
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. Coghlan v.

Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300,313 (1999). "[A] mere scintilla of
eviuence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
for purposes of summary judgment." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz. Inc.,
Idaho 84,87,996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).

III.

LAW APPLICABLE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM
The elements of a legal malpractice action arising from a civil action are: (l) the
existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer;
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(3) the failure to perform that duty; and (4) the failure to perform the duty must be a proximate
cause of the injuries sutTered by the client. Lamb v. J;fanweiler, 129 Idaho 269,272,923 P.2d
976. 979 (1996); lHarias v. Alarano, 120 Idaho 11, 13, 813 P.2d 350, 352 (1991). In such an
action, the plaintiff has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the attorney as well as
proving that the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss of a right to recovery in the
underlying case. Samuel v. Hepworth lVungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88-89, 996 P.2d
303,307-08 (2000); Murray v. Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Idaho 224, 227, 796 P.2d 101,101 (1990).
IV.
ARGUMENT

A.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred By The Applicable Statute of Limitations.

Plaintiff s claims are barred by Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (2009) because Plaintiff was
damaged at the time of drafting the Will in 2005, or, at the latest, upon the death of Cowen in
2006, making the complaint filed in March of 2009 untimely. The statute of limitations on a

professional malpractice claim is set forth in Idaho Code § 5-219(4). That section provides that
with regard to a malpractice claim, "the statute oflimitations ... expire[ s] two years following
occurrence, act or omission complained of, barring fraudulent or knowing concealment of the
injury, and will not be extended due to any continuing consequences, resulting damages, or
continuing professional relationship." Rice v. LUster, 132 Idaho 897, 899, 980 P.2d 561, 563
(1999) (emphasis added), see also Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399
(2002) ("An action to recover damages for professional malpractice must be commenced within

two years after the cause of action has accrued.").
Although the statutes purport to create strict "occurrence" rule for accrual of such an
action, the Idaho courts have interpreted the statute to allow for a cause of action to accrue once
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the PlaintifT has suffered "some damage." Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 178, 706 P.2d 63, 67
(1985).
This rule, known as the "some damage" rule, was further clarified in Chicoine v. Bignal!,
122 Idaho 487, 835 P.2d 1299 (1992). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court found that a cause
of action accrues when there is objective proof that would support the existence of some actual
damage. However, there is no requirement that PlaintifT has knowledge of the damage but that
the existence of records showing alleged damage suffered by Plaintiff was sufficient to constitute
accrual of the action. Lamphan v. Stewart, supra.
The Idaho Supreme Court has uniformly held that "some damage" is not a potential or
theoretical injury, but rather, has to somehow equate to an objective or actual harm to a plaintiff.
Although Idaho courts have held that until some damage occurs, a cause of action for
professional malpractice does not accrue, this does not mean that the damage must be objectively
ascertainable to the injured party, as this would simply reinstate a discovery rule, which the
legislature has rejected. Lapham, 137 Idaho at 585, 51 P.3d at 399 (citing Hawley v. Green,
117 Idaho 498, 788 P.2d 1321 (1990».
Most recently, in the case of City of}v1cCall v. Buxton, et ai, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629
(2009), the Idaho Supreme Court reiturated that the statute of limitations for professional
malpractice begins to run when the plaintiff has a cause of action against the professional. In

Buxton, the City of McCall sued their attorneys in part, for allegedly negligently advising the
City of McCall to release its lien against 1-U-B Engineering. The Idaho Supreme Court held that
the date on which the City of McCall released its lien was the date on which the damage
occurred, because that was the date on which the City of McCall lost its opportunity to recover
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against J-U-B Engineering. Id at 663,51 P.3d at 636. The date on which the party loses its right
to recovery is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to accrue. Id.
In this case, even in the unlikely event the Court were to find that Fletcher negligently
advised Mr. Cowan in the preparation of his Will, Plaintiff would have incurred "some damage"
at the time of the preparation of the Will in May of 2005 because there was objectively
ascertainable evidence that the Mr. Cowan did not have any interests in any trusts at that time;
thus, Plaintiffs action for legal malpractice brought in 2009 would be barred by the two year
statute oflimitations set forth in Idaho Code § 5-219(4).
Alternatively, if there is some question as to whether Plaintiff sufTered "some damage"
when the Will was drafted in May of2005, there is no question that some damage occurred at the
time ofMr. Cowan's death in October of2006, as any other opportunities to amend the Will
would be impossible.
The Complaint in this case was not filed until March 25,2009, nearly a year and a half
after the applicable statute of limitations passed. The Court should rule as a matter of law that
Plaintiffs complaint is barred by the statute of limitations and dismiss this litigation.

B.

Fletcher Did Not Breach Any Duty Owed To Plaintiff, Therefore, Plaintiff Has No
Cause Of Action Against Fletcher.
For a plaintiff to have standing to sue based on attorney malpractice, the claim must

include (l) the existence of an attorney client relationship, (2) a duty owed by the attorney to the
plaintiff, (3) a breach of that duty and (4) a demonstration that the negligence of the attorney is
the proximate came of the plaintiffs damages. Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136,90
P.3d 884, 886 (2004).
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Plainti ff was not a client of Fletcher. Generally, an attorney will be held liable tor
negligence only to his or her client and not to someone with whom the attorney does not have an
attorney client relationship. Wick v. Eismann, 122 Idaho 698, 838 P.2d 301 (1992).
The Idaho Supreme Court has carved out from the general rule requiring the existence of
a direct attorney-client relationship, a narrow exception where "[a]n attorney preparing
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identlfled therein to prepare
such instruments ... so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary
instruments." Id at 139,90 P.3d at 889 (emphasis added).
Where such a duty exists, the attorney may be liable to the beneficiary if "the testator's
intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part and the
beneficiary's interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, or unrealized .... " Id. Ifthere is no
error made by the attorney that frustrates the testator's intent in the document itself, there is no
breach of duty.
Attorneys are not subject to lawsuits by person who simply did not received what the
believe they should have, or did not receive what the understood the testator indicated they
would receive. /d.
Even where a duty is owed to a third party beneficiary, it is limited because "[t]he
attorney's duty to his or her client must remain paramount." /d. at 138-139,90 P.3d at 888-889.
Thus, an attorney has no duty to inform, notify, or consult beneficiaries when a testator changes
or amends the distribution of his estate. Id. at 139, 90 P.3d at 889. Moreover, an attorney may
not attempt to "dissuade the testator from eliminating or reducing their share of his or her estate."
Jd
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For example, in Estate o.lBecker v. Callahan, the Idaho Supreme Court refused to extend
an attorney's duty in preparing a will to surviving spouses except to extent an existing duty is
owed to a client to draft the documents according to the testator's intent. 140 Idaho 522, 96 P.3d
623 (2004). In Estate a/Becker, an attorney drafted a will for Ms. Becker who was dying of
cancer. Id. at 524,96 P.3d at 625. The initial draft was approved by Ms. Becker's sister and
Ms. Becker's husband, and at the first meeting with the client the attorney asked about the
disposition of the farm to which Ms. Becker responded with her daughter's name. Id. Thus,
Mr. Becker received something akin to a life estate and brought suit against the attorney alleging
a direct duty was owed to him as the surviving spouse of the testator. Id. at 525, 96 P.3d at 626.
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed stating the attorney "fulfilled any duty to the beneficiaries in
giving effect to Ms. Becker's intent as expressed in the will. He owed no further duty to
Mr. Becker." Id. at 526, 96 P.3d at 627. Even where an individual is named in a testamentary
document, so long as the attorney drafts the document according to the testator's intent and does
not negligently make and error or otherwise frustrate that intent, the attorney has fulfilled any
duty owed to named beneficiaries. ld.
Like Harrigfeld, a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as the
Plaintiff, to draft a testamentary document according to the testator's intent. Clause 6 of Mr.
Cowan's Last Will and Testament fulfills any duty owed to Plaintiff because it devises to
Plaintiff "[a]ll beneficial interests that I have in any trusts beneficial interest" to PlaintifT. Had
Cowan died with any beneficial trust interests, PlaintifT would have received exactly what
Cowan had intended. The fact that Mr. Cowan had no interest in any trust at the time of the Will
is not relevant to the adequacy of Fletcher's drafting according to Mr. Cowan's intent.
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Because Fletcher satisfied any duty owed to Plaintiff as a named beneticiary by
accurately drafting Mr. Cowan's Will according to his intent, Plaintiff's claim fails to
demonstrate a breach of duty. The Court can make this finding as a matter of law.

C.

Plaintirrs Claims Are Barred By The Doctrine Of Judicial Estoppel.
Plaintiff settled all claims she had related to Mr. Cowan's Will by executing the

Stipulation for Settlement in the Probate Action and is therefore judicially estopped from
pursuing this malpractice action against Fletcher.
Specifically, the Stipulation for Settlement provides that the parties, inclusive of W. Kent
Fletcher, and Mary Killins Soignier and her attorneys, stipulated and agreed to the following:
"[ a Jll claims of Mary Killins Soignier under the Last Will and testament of Zachary A. Cowan,
as heir, devisee, or holder of power of appointment ... are settled for the sum of One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000)." Fletcher Aff., Exh. C.
The Stipulation for Settlement further provides that, with "the exception of the payment
made to Mary Killins Soignier pursuant to the Settlement described above, the personal
representative's petition for construction of the Will of Zachary Cowan and for the approval of
the personal representative's plan of distribution of the estate shall be granted by the Court."
Fletcher Aff., Exh. C.
Through the StipUlation for Settlement, Plaintiff agreed to settle all claims related to her
claim as heir or devisee to Mr. Cowan's estate, as well as to approve of the personal
representative's plan for distribution of Mr. Cowan's estate.
In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,937 P.2d 1222 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that a party who is taking an inconsistent position to a position taken in an underlying action, is
estopped from bringing a legal malpractice claim against an attorney who represented them in an
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underlying action, "when the party maintaining an inconsistent position either did have, or was
chargeable with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position." Id.
at 155,937 P.2d at 1229. Although Fletcher did not represent Plaintiff in the underlying action,
that application of the doctrine is analogous.
In lvfcKay, the plaintiff, Ms. McKay, brought a legal malpractice action against her
attorney and the guardian ad litem appointed to represent her child in an underlying medical
malpractice action. Ms. McKay argued that the settlement was made without her consent and
that the settlement amount was insufficient. Notwithstanding Ms. McKay's representation in the
attorney malpractice case, in the medical malpractice action, the claim was settled, and all parties
agreed to the terms of settlement, and the Court approved the settlement. Id. at 149,937 P.2d at
1223. Ms. McKay later stated in the attorney malpractice action that she was never satisfied with
the settlement and that she never really agreed to the settlement. !d. at 150,937 P.2d 1224.
The original attorneys filed motions for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel. The
District Court granted the respective motions for summary judgment and also ordered
Ms. McKay'S counsel to pay attorney fees and computer research costs as a sanction under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision to
grant the motions for summary judgment based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The
Supreme Court, in surveying decisions from appellate courts from other states, held that judicial
estoppel is applicable in the context oflegal malpractice claims. Id. at 153,937 P.2d at 1277.
In McKay, the Supreme Court, consistent with the District Court, found that because
Ms. McKay, as the litigant, stated in court that she agreed to the settlement, she was judicially
estopped from taking an inconsistent position in the attorney malpractice litigation.
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Similar to the facts of this case, Plaintiff agreed to the settlement of all her claims related
to any claim she had to Mr. Cowan's estate in the Probate Action, and obtained an advantage as a
result of the settlement. Plaintiff cannot "repudiate" her earlier agreement, and by way of her
inconsistent position, obtain recovery from another party, arising out of the same transactions."
See e.g., AfcKay, 130 Idaho at 155,937 P.2d 1229.
Plaintiffs claim against Fletcher is barred under the doctrine of judicial estoppel and the
Court can make such a finding as a matter of law.
Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred Under The Doctrines Of Waiver And Quasi-Estoppel.

D.

In the event the Court finds the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not applicable in this case,
Plaintiff's claims are nevertheless barred under the doctrines of waiver and quasi-estoppel.
Waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage.
Record Steel & Construction, Inc. v. Martel Construction. Inc. 129 Idaho 288, 923 P.2d 995
( 1996) (citations omitted). Similarly, quasi-estoppel applies when a person asserts a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken, with knowledge of the facts and his or her rights, to
the detriment of the person applying the doctrine. Id. Put another way, the doctrine is designed
to prevent one party from gaining an unconscionable advantage by changing positions. Id.,
(citing Mitchell v. Zilog. Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994) (other citations
omitted).
Plaintiff is asserting a "right" through this litigation for attorney malpractice inconsistent
with the position she took in executing the Stipulation for Settlement, to the detriment of
Fletcher.
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Plaintiff should be prevented from gaining an unconscionable advantage in this case,
when she already settled all claims related to Mr. Cowan estate (or all claims she had as an heir
or devisee of the estate), which by definition must include her claim of attorney malpractice.
The Court can find as a matter of law that Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrines
of waiver and quasi-estoppel.

v.
CONCLUSION
There is no issue of material fact and this Court can find as a matter of law, that
Plaintiff s complaint against Fletcher is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, or
alternatively under the doctrines of judicial estoppel, waiver or quasi-estoppel. Moreover,
Plaintiff has no standing to bring a malpractice action against Fletcher on the basis that Fletcher
drafted Mr. Cowan's Will based on his intent, and made no error in drafting the Will.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.

RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED

THJS~JUne,

2009,

EY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thil. Clay of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

V/ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564
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Craig L. Meadows, ISS No. 1081
MichelJe R. Points, [SS No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Sox 1617
Boise, TD 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517
AFFIDA VIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER

-------------------

W. KENT FLETCHER, being flTst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as foHows:
I.

I am the Defendant in the above-entitled action. I have personal

knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and can testify as to the truth ofthe matters contained
herein jf called upon as a witness at the trial of this action.
2.

Zachary A. Cowan was my client from approximately 1998 through 2006.

During that time, r did some estate planning for Mr. C.owan, which included the drafting of his
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Last Will and Testament ("Will"). Mr. Cowan executed his last Will on May 24, 2005. A true
and correct copy of the Will is attached as Exhibit A.
3.

During his lifetime, Mr. Cowan was the beneficiary of a trust created by

his mother, Leonarda A. Cowan, of Riverside, California, known as The Leonarda A. Cowan
Trust.
4.

Clause 6 ofthe Will directed the residue and remainder of the testator's

estate, other than beneficial interests in trusts, be given to the American Cancer Society, and that
all beneficial interests that he had in any trusts be given to "Mary Killings", the Plaintiff.
5.

Prior to finalizing the Will I asked Mr. Cowan about his interests in any

trusts, including his mother's trust, and he informed me that he had received disbursements from
his mother's trust. I asked him ifhe wanted to keep the language in Clause 6 regarding the
Plaintiff in the Will in light of the fact that he had received disbursements from his mother's
trust. Mr. Cowan told me that he was uncertain as to whether all ofthe trust property had been
disbursed, and he wanted to leave the language in the Will.
6.

The Will was duly witnessed and attested to by the required number of

witnesses. The Will is a validly executed testamentary instrument, and Mr. Cowan was
competent at the time he executed his Will. No one presented a challenge to the validity ofthe
Will.
7.

Mr. Cowan died on the October 20, 2006.

8.

Mr. Cowan's Will was admitted to informal probate on November 3, 2006

in the District Court (Magistrate Division) for the Fifth judicial District, Cassia County, Case
No. CV 2006-1234 ("Probate Action").
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9.

Pursuant to the tenns of the Will, Stephen D. Westfall was nominated and

duly appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Mr. Cowan.

10.

The Personal Representative filed an Inventory of the estate on

January 23, 2007.

11.

In his Will, Cowan directed that all his personal property be distributed

according to a written list of items and intended recipients, if such a list was in existence at the
time of his death. A written list of items and intended beneficiaries could not be fuund and it
was concluded that a written list does not exist.
12.

I have been unable to locate any beneficial interest or powers of

appointment in any trust held or possessed by Mr. Cowen at the time of his death. The Personal
Representative detennined that the residue of the testator's estate should be given to the
American Cancer Society.

13.

Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation of the Will

in the Probate Action, claiming that she was entitled to certain monies derived from the Leonarda
A. Cowan Trust, and that Clause 6 ofMr. Cowan's Wi]] was ambiguous, thus, Plaintiffclaimed
that the Magistrate Court should allow parole evidence to aid it in determining the intent of the
testator, Mr. Cowan. Plainti ff submitted a number of affidavits in the Probate Action which said,
in effect, that Mr. Cowan had made representations that Plaintiff would receive a substantial
portion of his estate upon his death.

14.

The Magistrate Court in the Probate Action found that there was no latent

or patent ambiguity concerning Mr. Cowan's Will, that Mr. Cowan's intent was clear and
unambiguous on the face of the Will document and that Plaintiffs challenge to the Will was
w itho ut merit.
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15.

Based on the Magistrate Court's decision, the residue of Mr. Cowan's

estate should be distributed to the American Cancer Society, Plainti iT tiled an appeal of the
Magistrate Court decision in the Probate Action.

16.

On or about September 9,2008, the parties of the Probate Action entered

into a "Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary KiJlins Soignier, Approval of Petition for
Construction ofthe Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter
"Stipulation fur Settlement"). A true and correct copy of the Stipulation for Settlement is
attached as Exhibit B. That StipuJation was signed by myself and Plaintiff, among others.

17.

In consideration of Plaintiff signing the Stipulation for Settlement, she

dismissed her appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of

$100,000.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County ofAda

)

~

) ss.

~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

L

day of June, 2009.

&L~
!auf:; - - - -

Name:-15.~ 1tu..

Notary Public for; dah
Residing at --.5;~~~'¥::----7r~-h.--;:-rr-I~
My commission expires +-if-----!u..::~:::..:.=-..!...J._--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

thi/~une,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
2009, I causod to be servod a true
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each ofthe foJlowing:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701 ~0388
(Attorneys for Pfaintifi]

/

_'_

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564

AFFIDAVIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER - 5

000094

04188.0070.1554550.1

LAST WILL & TESTAMENT
OF
ZACHARY A. COWAN
I, ZACHARY A COWAN, of Declo, Cassia County, Idaho, publish and declare
this to be my Last 'Will and Testament revoking all other and former 'Ivills and coclicils that may
have been made by me.

CLAUSE 1
DECLARATIONS
I am single. I have no children.
All of my property is my separate property. It is my intention by this Vlill to

dispose Dfall property which I am entitled to dispose of by vvill, community and separate, real,
personal and mixed, which I may own or have any interest in whatever at the time of my death.

CLAUSE 2
APPOJNTM:E1\TT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
I nominate and appoint Stephen D. Westfall as the Personal Representative of my
estate. In the event Stephen D. Westfall should predecease me, or fail for any reason to act as my
Personal Representative, then, in such event, I appoint Mary Killings, Heyburn, Idaho, as the
Personal Representative of my estate. I direct that the Personal Representative and alternate
Personal Representative appointed in this paragraph shall serve without bond.

Initials~

-1-

000095

EXHIBIT
A

CLAUSE 3
PUWERS OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
My Personal Representative is authorized and empowered to exercise all powers
in the management of my estate that any reasonable and pnIdent individual would exercise in the
management of sL,'uilar property owned in my Persona1 Representative's own right, upon such
terms and conditions as may seem best to my Personal Representative, and to execute and deliver
any and all instruments and to do any and all acts which my Personal Representative may deem
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this Will.

CLAUSE 4
DIRECTIONS TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
I direct that my body be cremated vvith no services, I direct that my friend, Bob
Soninger, shall be responsible for the ashes, My ashes shall be spread oyer Carson City, Nevada

brothels.
CLAUSE 5
DISPOSITION OF CERTAm PERSONAL PROPERTY BY SEP.ARATE \t.!RITWG
I order and direct that certain items of my personal property shall be distributed
according to a written list of items and intended recipients thereof prepared either in my
handwriting or signed by me, if such a list is in existence at the time of my death.

CLAUSE 6
RESIDUE
All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property which I own or have any

Initials~
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interest in \vbatever at the time of my death, other than beneficial interests in trusts, I gi ve,
bequeath, and devise to the }unericCln Cancer Society. .AJJ beneficial interests that 1 have in any
trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary Killings. I exercise any power of appointment that 1
might bold and appoint Mary Killings. If for any reason Mary KJJliugs predeceases me, her
interest and the power of appointment shall pass to Stepben D. Westfall.

IN WITNES S 'WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and sea] this .?::-f

+A

• 2005.

The foregoing instrument, consisting offou! (4) pages, including the page signed

by the undersigned witnesses, was, on the date thereof signed, publisbed and declared by the
above-named Zachary A. Cowan, to be his Last Will and Testament, in the presence of us, who,
at his request and his presence and in the presence of each oilier, and on the same date, bave

Residing at

----

--

STATE OF IDARO

)
) S8

County of Cassia

)

Bo_TI_a_Ra_e_D_a_v"l_'s_ _ __
We, ZACHARY A COWAN, the Testator, and _ _
Hi_
tt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , the witnesses, respectively, \:t,rbose
_ _ _ _and
_ _Kalli
___

-3-

000097

,;

,-,.........'t"....,,,~"'!.-'i'."W1

,~

.. , .... ,

,.f1(i~-:r"f~,!"·"'·

I . ---... . - - - - --.

Sf'I'OiaJ Col.NeI for PenonaJ R.epr.elltaUV'

..

_ _ J:tAGISTRATE COURt..--CASSIA COUNTY /0
FILED _ _ _ __

IN rim DfSTRJCT 'COllaT 01' THE FJFTH JlJDlClAlZlIJtj~k!r 6P ~
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND POI THE t"O~/~ f~LSEH
MAOtSTRA TE DJVJSION

IN THB MA nil OF THS
. eSTATEOF:
ZACHARY A. COWAN

.

)

C-. 'No. CV~2ON-12M

)
)
)

smULAnON 'OR IKTTLIMINT

01 CLAIM or MARY KlLLIN8
SOIGNDR. A.PPROVA.L or PlfM'lO-fJ-ON

)

JOJl CONITIIUC110NOJ'WIU AND
PLAN C1I DIITJlDJIJ'l1ON AND
J)IIM~AL or Al'PkI"

)

)
T"

;' ';_ NQJ

L·· "~T(

.

.... ))

Come ROW Sttphll D. WoSltiU. mo pWso.naJ. representat1ve

of,.. Estae

of ZaclUIry A.

Cow'." by aDd thtoqh bis 'peeleJ ~""t DonIld J. ChJ.hofm) and the edtOft\ey rot aile ostate.

William rclQt Fletcher, Mary Kllbt Solpicrt by ad ~ her .-m~... WDHam Whitehead.
In. UlfI SluJey O. Co..... the A.mertoan Cancer Soclety,. b)' and tIaroqi its ~~ William
A, p~ to /JdpuJfItt and .... u roIlowt~

Of"

I. All . . . oI'Mary U....,.,........, the Lilt Will .... TrstuIaIInt.ot~ A.
Cuwan,. hair. ~
!loWer ofa power of...,1attnent (IUbject to tlte
pn)Ykrlotll otPlrlaiIlJh '1 hll1Unlftlr)..... settled tor the suna at ene H'uadrtcl
TboU8Iftd DnUan.(llOO,OOO). The t\usdJ paid will not IncJade Ill)' lAcomo of the
__ wbWt·would be bI:UI:Ito to Mary KUtllil
sum dial! be paid hm
dIe·"otdtl·. . 01 1.aday Cowan upon IDCUtba ofdaiB ~a ad ttdr;. .
.,r apptoptfeto estUerl of tho oourt Ifvlftg eft'eot tc tJsilltlpu1acloll. The petti.. will
u.'ie lIlalr be. d'orfl '" finalla the .fAt.lememt and dfstributlr,Use uctIonaeat proD" 1M III
to·Mat7 K.J1Jibs Sol.......... attonwys tty Septem.....208I. M.uy KUIlnt
Sotp_..-ow......
net ......... ,WII1-....n aclaim II a .
crtdJto, of'fJae . .te.
., ..~,. .

Sol...... saw

thaI_ ....

l. ""iIs dte~ Oldie payn8It mru:Je:to-Mity KUla ~ipllr ~ to the
!Cddcibdt 4elwt1bcd.1lkWe,.wfCllOlJlJ ~'I pedtloa for COII8trt.aioll of
tho will t)( .z.c:t.r ,Cowan and tor
die .......1represenl8dve'. pl. of
dlstrfb"tJQn CJtthe . . . nil bt ...Ud by ibt court.

wrovaa 0'

, ".

,. n..,..1IIbiI by M.y KJ1U. Solpi.".1h* ~ jud..... on pcdCioo tor

. ". COft~ ofwiU Met

...----.....

approvai ibr I plM 01 dtdutloa ~ by Honorable

••

EXHIBIT
B

-.- MJt1Ytll 01-. ....... qu d1t ~1It dar at "-DW, ~Ol)". uct".. Ctt
0IdII' oI'tu ~ LIIr)' I . Du~.llilf"" on
pof;k1'la.l mt'ltfOlll

~~ 4. . . . .-0.,. ......

the.r.,..

Yti. ~

4. ~ KIlDM ~iw"'" ~ ofkft) ftJttMr " ......". I, "'. r.-. of
~ A. CfNU'" .rtt..lfle ..~fnAi ny 1M,.,.,..! l'~fIUvI.
J F.. . ~ -" f'It iWMowa.,....M ...... r.i

.-

000099 .

,

. SSt'L9B9~5£

CD/CD

~O

'd

'X\\1...1

a.,:L 't

9BBZ:JG9/G9

]HxVd "'3snoHl~no~ }..LtmO~ Ij I SSVJ ~d £E: 20 G3M 6002-£ t -AlJ~

E00l9L8Wt T

·

,

Craig L Meadows, ISB No. 1081
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P,O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208,344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954,5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,
PlaintifT,
vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517
NOTICE OF HEARING

)

)
)

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendant W. Kent Fletcher will call his Motion for
Summary Judgment for hearing before the above-entitled Court, Burley, Idaho, on the loth day of
August, 2009, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, before the Honorable

YJ-!J_ ~
DATED THIS J2~~ of June, 2009.

Michael R, Crabtree.

,

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1

0001-00

04188.0070.15699371

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on

this@.~ne. 2009, I caused

(0

be served a true

copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF HEARING by the method indicated below, and addressed to
each of the following:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2

0001.0 1.

/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564

0418800701569937.1

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
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L
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,

W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Case No.CV 2009-517

)

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
WITHOUT CAUSE Rule 40(d)(l)

)
)
)
)
)
)

Comes now the plaintiff, through her attorney of record, and moves the Court for
disqualification without cause of the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree pursuant to Rule 40(d)( I) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 29th day of June, 2009.

Allen B. Ellis
Attorney for Plaintiff
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE - 1

0001.02

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 29th day of June, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000

P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

Allen B. Ellis

MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE - 2

000103

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
-X- Telecopy (FAX)
954-5238

j

,

,~

)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

)
)

MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,

)
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2009-0000517 0

)

)
)
)
)

Vs.
W KENT FLETCHER,

NOTICE OF HEARING
Motion for Disqualification without
Cause

)

Defendant.
----------------------------

)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above entitled matter is set for
hearing on Monday, July 20, 2009, at 10:00 AM. in the District Courtroom of the
above-entitled court.

DATED this 1st day of July, 2009.

0001.04

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:

1.

Allen BEllis
Ellis, Brown & Sheils
P.O. Box 388
707 North 8th Street
Boise, 10 83701

_ _ U.S. Mail

2.

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, ENnis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, 10 83701-1617

__
~_/ U.S. Mail

0001.05

· ...

.___
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

IS

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,

W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.CV 2009-517
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
WITHOUT CAUSE

)

Comes now the plaintiff, through her attorney of record, and withdraws her Motion for
disqualification without cause of the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree
DA TED this 1sl day of July, 2009.

Allen B. EllIS
Attorney for Plaintiff

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE - J

000106

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 1sf day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
--X... Telecopy (FAX)
954-5238

Allen B. Ellis

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE - 2
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COCRT OF THE FIFTH JUDIClAL DISTRlCT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,

W. Kent Fletcher,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.CV 2009-517

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Nature of case: In this legal malpractice case, plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier alleges that, as
a proximate result of the negligence of the defendant attorney, she has been denied her testamentary
entitlement as a named beneficiary in the decedent's Will. The Will, which was drafted by defendant
attorney Fletcher for the testator Zachary Cowan, provided, inter alia: "All beneficial interests that
I have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and deviS{: to Mary KilEngs (sic). I exercise any power of
appointment that I might hold and appoint Mary Killings (sic)." See Exhibit A to Fletcher affidavit.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

0001- 08

The trust referenced in the Will is the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust, a copy of which is attached
to the affidavit of Allen B. Ellis as Exhibit 1. There are two notable provisions in the trust. First,
the trust does not extend a power of appointment to the decedent Zachary Cowan; rather, in the event
he does not survive the trustor Leonarda Cowan and leaves no issue, the trust assets go to Ms.
Cowan's niece, Sandra Eileen Keller. See Trust, paragraph 4.2 (d)(i). The second notable feature
of the Trust is that when Zachary Covlan reaches the age offiJty years, the Trust will terminate and
the assets are to be distributed to Mr. Cowan "outright and free of trust". See Trust, paragraph
4.2(d)(ii). It is undisputed that at the time attorney Fletcher drafted the 2005 Will Mr. Cowan was
past his fiftieth birthday and the trust had terminated, i.e., MI. Cowan turned fifty in November,
2003.
Defend~t' s

alleged

negli~:

At the time the Will was drafted, defendant attorney

negligently failed to review the Trust document or, if revie',ved, did so in a cursory, negligent
fashion. This faiIllIe to review is undisputed because the Will references a power of appointment
in the Trust, which, in fact, did not exist.. Had Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have
ascertained that the Trust would terminate or had terminated upon Mr. Cowan's fiftieth birthday by
the express language of the Trust document. Given the inevitable termination of the Trust, attorney
Fletcher was on inquiry notice respe:cting the following issue: whether Mr. Cowan had reached fifty
years, and, if so, his intention as to those assets which had previously been held in the Trust.
The Will provision, as drafted by attorney Fletcher in 2005, purported to dispose of Mr.
Cowan's "beneficial interests" in trusts. This win provision i3 without force and effect because the
testator's beneficial interest terminated on his birthday in 2003 and, from that time [om-ard, he
owned the trust property "outright". See Trust instrument (Exhibit 1, pp. 5,8,9).
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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As is noted below five years earlier, attorney Fletcher had drafted a will with an identical

fonnat for the decedent Cowan (with a different beneficiary). which sought to bequee:th the same
assets held in the Trust. At that time the Trust was in existence, and the bequest of "beneficial
interests that I have in any trusts" was a valid bequest. See Exhibit 2 to Ellis affidavit. :n using this
superseded will as a cookie cutter for the Will naming plaintiff Soignier-Killins a beneficiary,
defendant attorney inadvertently re ferenced the testator's beneficial interests in a trust which did not
exist.
Proximate causation: Following Mr. Cowan's death, the Will was placed into probate and
plaintiff here claimed an interest in those assets which had been held in trust. The residuary
beneficiary, American Cancer Society, argued that, because no trusts existed in which the decedent
had a beneficial interest, plaintiff, although a named beneficiary, should receive nothing. The
magistrate judge accepted this argument by summary judgmerlt filed September 17,2007. That is,
because decedent had no beneficial interest in a trust, there is nG ambiguity, reasoned the magistrate,
and "the testator's intent is clear and unambiguous on the face of the Will document", i.e., plaintiff
Soignier, although a named beneficiary, should take nothing. <Exhibit 3 to Ellis affidavit, p.12).
As reflected in Exhibit B to the Fletcher affidavit, plaintiffKillins Soignier settled her claim
against the estate for $100,000, substantially less than the value of the trust property given to the
decedent Cowan outright at the time he turned fifty years of age.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMIIA TIONS a.C. 5-219(4))
Summary of argument: Where the existence, or not, of any aBeged negligence depends on
the outcome of litigation, there is no objective proof of actual damage until the litigation is
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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concluded. City o/l\;/cCallv. Buxton. 146 Idaho._, 201 P.3d 629, 636 (2009). In the case at bench,
until the magistrate ruled on September 17,2007 (Exhibit 3) that plaintiff should take nothing under
the Will, any claim against attorney Fletcher for malpractice would be: specu:ative. The complaint
herein, filed on March 19,2009, within two years of the magistrate's decision, is timely under Idaho
Code § 5-219(4). Even negligence which increases the risk :hat a client will be hanned does not
trigger the running of the statute of limitations until harm actually occurs. Parsons Packing v.
Massingill. 140 Idaho 480, 482, 95 PJd 631 (2004). To hold otherwise "would foment future
litigation initiated on sheer

sunnisi~

of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequence

of seeing actions barred by the statute of limitatjons". City a/McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho at 201
PJd at 636, citing Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 3, 12, 720 P.2d 191, 195 (1986),
Thus, attorney Fletcher's foorly drawn Will did not ereate the inevitability that plaintiff
would be damaged; and the fact that the Will increased the likelihood of fina.:'1cia! loss :Ioes not, in
and of itself, trigger the limitations period.
The Idaho Supreme Court 11as consistentlx held that in order for a claim for professional
malpractice to accrue, there must be "obiective proo:that would support the existence of!lome actuaJ
damage". Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho at 487. Defendant argues that the statute of limitations
was triggered either (1) in 2005, at the time the Will was drafted, or (2) upon death oftest.:1tor in
2006 (Defendant's Brief, p. 8). Had suit been brought on either ofL'1ose occasions, i.t would be
subject to dismissal given the absence of any objective damage.
As observed by the Supreme Court, it would be "nonsensical to hold that a cause of action
is barred by the statute of limitations before that cause of action [for professional malpractice] even
accrues". City of McCall v. Buxton, 201 P.3d at 634 (bracketed material explanatory), In most
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
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instances, such accrual cannot occur until the underlying litigation has been resolved.
In Fairway Development Co. v. Peterson, Moss, 124 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957 (1993), the
client retained an attorney to chalknge the assessment of its property. The district COlUt denied the
client's motion for partial summary judgment, and the client sought an interlocutory appeal which
the Supreme Court initially granted; but the appeal was subsequently dismissed as having been
improvidently granted.
The case was remanded to the district court. The district court dismissed the client's
challenge to the assessments, and the client appealed again. The Supreme Court reversed the
dismissal and remanded the case to the district court. On remand, the district court dismissed the
client's claims on November 3, 1988, based upon the failure to exhaust its administrative remedies
years earlier. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.
On December 12, 1991, the dient sued its attorney for professional negligence. The case was
dismissed based upon the statute of limitations, i.e., Idaho Code section 5-2]9(4). The Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the malpractice claim accmed on the date of dismissal of
the underlying claim, November 3, ~ 988: "Accordingly we hold there is objective proofthat Fairway
Development [the client] suffered some actual damage when the district court dismissed Fainvay
Development's claim on November 3, 1988". Id 124 Idaho at 869,865 P2d. at 960.
Likewise here. Plaintiff's claim for professional negligence accrued when the magistrate
dismissed her claim that she was beneficiary under the Will. Until that point, any claim against
attorney Fletcher would have been premature, i.e., there was no "objective proof that would support
the existence of some actual damage". Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho 482,487, 835 P.2d 1293,
1298 (1993).
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5
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In Chicoine, an attorney rep resented the die nt in a suit li)f damages, resulting ina j ur;: verdict
of damages against the client in 1983. The client's attorney Iiled a timely motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict G.n.o. v.) and later filed a motion for new trial. The district court granted
the motion for j.n.o.v. which was reversed by the Supreme Court. 0 'Neil v. Schuckardt, 1J21daho
472, 733 P.2d 693 (1986). On remand, the district court granted the motion for new trial which, on
a second appeal, the Supreme Court on July II, 1989, reversed on the grounds that the new trial

motion was not timely filed. O'Neil v. Schuckhardt, 116 Idaho 507, 777 P.2d 729 (1989) (O'Neil
II).
In December 1989, the client brought a malpractice action against the attorney based upon the
dilatory motion for new trial. The district court dismissed the suit as not timely. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "there was no objective proof of somea.ctual d.:image to Chicoine until this
Court reversed the order granting a new trial in 0 WeilII on .1uly 11, t 989. 122 Idahc· at 487, 835
P.2d at 1298.
That is, in Chicoine, the mere allegations by the client's adversary that a motion for new trial
was dilatory did not trigger the statutory period. Tn the case at bench, the al1egations by the American
Cancer Society that plaintiff was not an entitled beneficiary under the Will did not trigger the statute
oflimitations. Until those allegations were adjudicated agaimt the plaintiff, the limitations period
did not commence to run. That adj udication occurred on September 17, 2007; plaintiffs complaint
was filed March 25,2009, clearly within the two year limitation period of Idaho Code section 5-

219(4).
In Mack Financial v. Smith, III Idaho 8, 720 P.2d 191 (1986), the clients

allt~ged

that an

accounting firm was negligent with respect to audits performed on a prospective borrower in 1978
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
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through 1980. In reliance upon the audits, the client extended credit. Subsequently, the borrower
went into bankruptcy, and on April 23, 1984, the client filed a malpractice action against the
accountants. The district court ruled that the claim for malpractice was time barred. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that it was not until 1983, as a result of a bankruptcy ruling, that the claim
for malpractice accrued. It was not until the bankruptcy ruling that "it then became apparent that
Mack Financial [the client] would not be able to fully recompense from the bankruptcy estate the
amount which it had loaned to Sho-ernaker [the debtor]". Id.lll Idaho at 11 (explanatory material in
brackets).
Again, only upon a clarifying adjudication iII the underlying bankruptcy action did there emerge
"objective proof that would support the existence of some actlJaI damage". Chicoine v. Bignall, 122
Idaho at 487.
The most recent analysis of Idaho Code § 5-219(4) in the professional malpractice context is
City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho_, 201 P.3d 629 (2009). The City of McCall had entered into

a contract with St. Clair Contractor's Inc. ("St. Clair") for the construction of a storage lagoon to hold
treated effluent. The City was represented by the defendant attorneys throughout the construction
project. St. Clair encountered various delays, and the City, UIJon the alleged advice of its attorneys,
terminated the contract in February, 2001. The bonding company for St. Clair hired a replacement
contract to complete the project. The City concluded that

tr.e replacement contractor's work was

deficient. On the alleged advice of defendant attorneys, the City withheld payments to the bonding
company for its replacement contractor.
In December 2001, the bonding company filed suit against the City :or wrongfully demanding
payment on its performance bond and withholding payments. The defendant attorneys represented the
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
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City and in January 2002, the City began incun:ing defense costs in the litigation. On May 4, 2004,
the jury awarded $4,955,096 in breach of contract damages against the City. On May 3, 2006, the City
filed a malpractice action against the attorneys, alleging Legligenc,e in recommending the City
terminate S1. Clair and withhold payments from ':he bonding company. TI1e attorneys l::loved for
summary judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that the complaint was barred by the statute of
limitations. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed. In explaining its dicta in Chicoine that "the existence of the damage did not depend
on the outcome of lawsuits", the Court opined:
Although we stateo in Chicoine that "[t]he existence of the damage did
not depend on the outcome of the lawsuits, sinl;e only 'some damage'
is necessary for the action to accrue lUlder LC. § 5-219(4)," in that case
the existence of some damage actually did depend upon the outcome of
the lawsuit. We held, "Chicoine asserts that the action against Bignall
did not accrue pursuant to I.C. § 5-219(4) until July 1989, when this
Court reversed the nial court's granting of a new trial. We agree." 122
Idaho at 487,835 P.2d at 1298. The negligence: of Chicoine's attorney
had occurred years earlier, but there was not objective proof of the
damage until this Court later reversed the grant of a new trial,
terminating the lawsuit.
Id 201 P.3d at 635.

Likewise in the case at bench. Whether attorney Fletcher's will drafting impacted the plaintiff,
a named beneficiary in the Will, could not be ascertained until the magistrate judge had ruled on her
entitlement as a beneficiary. That i3, as in Chicoine, the effec'~ of any alleged negJigen<:e "depended
on the outcome of the litigation", as it did in City of McCall:
Under the circumstences of this case, the existence or effect of any
alleged negligence on the part of the City's Attorneys regarding their
legal advice and strategy depended upon the outcome of the litigation
against the City by \Vausau and st. Clair. There would not be objective
proof of actual damage until that occurred. (Citations omitted) To hold
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8
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otherwise in this case "would [onent future litigation initiated on sheer
surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequencl:!
of seeing actions barred by limitations (Citation omitted). Clients
involved in lengthy litigation woad have to file protective lawsuits
against their attorneys when following their advice and strategy,
without yet having any objective proof of actual damage or being able
to prove a cause of action for professional malpractice.
[d. 201 PJd at 636

To summarize the above holdings as well as a decision not referenced above, Treasure Valley

Bank v. Killen & Pittenger, 112 1e11ho 357, 723 P.2d 326 (1987):
Underlyingj"itigation

SJ)L Accrual poim

Mack Financial v. Smith
III Idaho at 8

Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy ruling re
payout to creditors

Killen v. Pittenger
112 Idaho at 357

Bankruptcy

Judicial confinnation of Ch. 13
plan without award of postconfirmation interest

Chicoine v. Bignall
122 Idaho at 482

Appeal re grant ofmotion
for new trial

Reversal of grant of new
trial by Supreme Court

Fairway Development
124 Idaho at 866

Appeal to district court
re administrative ruling

Dismissal of suit
by district court

City of McCall v. Buxton
201 P.3d at 629

Suit vs. City for
breach of contract

Verdict on contract breach

In each of the above cases, a judicial decision triggered the statute oflimitation!l. Until each
such decision, whether the plaintiff had been "damaged" was speculation. Likewise here. Until the
probate court ruled in September Jf 2007, fmding that plain.tiff was not an entitled beneficiary,
plaintiffs legal injuries remained speculative. The herein suit, which filed in March of this year, is
timely.

MEMORA~DUM

IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9

000116

01127/2009 MON 15:28

~Oll!019

FAX 3459564

A'ITORNEY FLETCHER OWED A DUT): TO NAMED BENEFICIARY KILLEN TO
PREPARE THE WILL_TO EFFECTUATE TESt~\TOR COWAN'S INTENT
PreliminarY note: Defendant appears to argue that (I) he owed no duty to plaintiffbecause she
was not a client, and (2) even ifplaintiffwas an "identified beneficiary" who was owed a duty under
Harrigfe/d v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), attorney Fletcher has "fulfilled" that duty.

(Defendant's brief, pp. 9, 10). However, defendant has not proffered any evidence to support the
conclusion that his conduct conforned to the applicable stancard of care for Idaho attorneys. Out of
an abundance of caution, plaintiff has filed the affidavit of attorney John F. Magnuson who opines that
certain conduct of attorney Fletcher did fall be1cw the applica~le standard. Thus, there is no basis to
impose summary judgment on the grounds that attorney Fletcher has "fulfilled any duty owed to named
beneficiaries" (Defendant's brief, p. 10).
Inherent defect in Will: Defendant Fletcher authored a will which contained a provision,
purportedly for the benefit of an identified beneficiary (plaintiff Killins Soignier), erroneously
describing the property devised to plaintiff Killins Soignier as held within a trust and erroneously
attributing to testator Cowan a power of appointment as to that property. It would be cynical (and
speculative) to conclude that testator Cowan intended to include a provision in his Will that purported
to given beneficiary Killins Soignier a bequest but which bequest, in actuality, gave her nothing.
On the face of it, a reasonable conclusion is that attorney Fletcher failed to read the trust or,
if he read it, failed to remember the provisions at the time h(! drafted the will. This eonclU3ion is
confirmed by reference in the Will to a power of appointment which the trust instrument does not have
(Exhibit 1). As a result of his failu;e to informjimself as to

'1

key testamentary document prior to

drafting the Will, defendant attorney did not recognize that the testator's trust interests temlinared at
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10

000117

01/27/2009 MON 15:29

~Ol

FAX 3459564

age fifty years and the testator owned the trust assets outrig.'fIt at the time the Will was drafted.
The only other conclusion:s that the testator Cowan, intended to name plaintiff as a beneficiary
but, for whatever twisted reason, intended that :;he take nothilg under the Will.
Applicability of Harrigfefd:

The reference in the Will to a non-existence power of

appointment in the trust is evidence that attorney Fletcher failed to read the trust. That failure resulted
in his ignorance as to the relevance aftestator Cowan's age as it related to his devisable assets and how
those assets should be described. TIIis breakdow1 0:1 ~1r. Fletcher's part resulted in bene.5ciary Killins
Soignier taking nothing under the Will. This is precisely the scenario contemplated by Harrigfefd v.

Hancock wherein a duty is owed by the attorney to the named beneficiary:
Considering those factors, we hold that an attorney preparing
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or
identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the
testator to have them properly executed, so as to effectuate the testator's
intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments. If, as a proximate
result of the attorney's professional negligence, the testator's intent as
expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in
part and the beneficiary's interest in the estate is dther lost, diminished,
or unrealized, the attorney would be liable to the beneficiary harmed.

Id. 140 Idaho at 138.
Because the "testamentary instrument", i.e., the Will, rethenced testator's "beneficial interests"
in trusts which no longer existed (because he then owned the property outright), the magistrate was
guided by the plain language of the Will and concluded that plaintiff should take nothing. That is, the
"beneficial interests" devised to her did not exist. This ci:'cumstance is precisely the scenario
addressed by Harrigfeld wherein a duty resides in the attorney to a named beneficiary.
/
/
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PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NQT BARRED BY
THE DOCTRINE OF JUDrCIAL !~SIOPPEL
Defendant argues that the plaintiff's claims are judicially estopped by virtue of her having
executed a stipulation for settlement with respect to the probat ;! action. Defendant's analysis involves
f

a profound misunderstanding andlor a misapplication ofthe doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. The doctrine
is intended to prevent a party from playing "fast and loose" WIth courts. Plaintiff's settlement in the
underlying probate matter is not inconsistent with her malpra.::tice claim here.
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general
considerations of the orderly administrations of justice and regard for
the dignity of judicial proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to
protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts . .
McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148., 152, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997) quoting Rissetto v. Plumber and
Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,601 (9 th Cir. ] 996).
The most recent pronouncement of the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel is contained in Heinze v.
Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597 (2008). That case involved an action against an attorney by his
client arising from a di vorce. The di vorce action was primarily concerned with the division of property
and the custody arrangement pertaining to the couple's child. Following the commencement of the
divorce trial, the magistrate broughT. the counsel for the parties in their chambers for an off the record
meeting concerning the parties claims. The parties began discussions concerning a possib::e settlement.
Following those discussions, the settlement was pres.ented to the court with some, but not all, the terms
of the settlement discussed by the magistrate. The magistrate then placed the parties under oath and
Heinze acknowledged that he agreed with the tenns of the settkment ar.:d would abide by them. Two
days after the settlement, Heinze sent Bauer, his attorney, an email expressing misgivings about the
settlement. Bauer thereafter filed a motion to set aside the settlement and the magistrate denied the
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12
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motion. Heinze then brought suit alleging damages for alleged negligent representation of him in the
divorce proceedings. The court began its discussion by noting that judicial estoppel applies when a
party makes statements in open court:
Stated another way, the concept ofjudicial estoppel takes into account
not only what a Pa.Jty states under o{lth in open ;;ourt, but also what that
party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position was
adopted.
145 Idaho at 235-236, citing McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997) (emphasis
added).
The court noted that Heinze made his st3tements in oren court while he was under oath:
In the settlement, Heinze received a fmaldivorce, secured joint custody
of his child, and a division of the community estate, by which he was
able to retain the marital home to preserve a sense of continuity for his
child. This advantage was obtained through sworn statements. Under
oath, Heinze was asked ifhe was in agreement with the settlement, to
which he replied: "1 am."
ld. 145 Idaho at 24]

In reaching its decision, the court discus3ed the elements ofjudiciaJ estoppel:

Judicial estoppel is applied when a litigant obtains a judgment,
advantage, or consideration from one party, through means of sworn
statements, and subsequently adopts inconsistent and contrary
allegations or testimony to obtain a recovery Of a right against another
party, arising out ofthe same transal::tion or sul:gect matter.

ld. 145 Idaho at 240.
The court also discussed the considerations to be alleged in determining the application of
judicial estoppel:
First, a party's later position must be 'clearly inconsistent' with its
earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has
succeeded in persuading a court to acce,Pt that party's earlier position,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13
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so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later
proceeding would create 'the perception that either the first or the
second court was misled.' ... A third consideration is whether the party
seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair
advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not
estopped.
Id 145 Idaho at241, quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742,750, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1815,149
L.Ed. 968, 978 (2001) (emphasis added).
It is clear from an examination of the decision in Heinze that judicial estoppel has no

application to the facts of this case. There has be,~n no represen:ation in open court; nor has there been
any "sworn statement" by plaintiff; nor has there ',een any inconsistent positions taken. The settlement
agreement signed by her only provides that she is resolving all daims as against the estate of Zachary
A. Cowan. Defendant does not appear as a party to that action but simply as an attorney for the estate.

Affidavit ofW. Kent Fletcher, Exhibit D, p. 2. Far from making any statement in open court, plaintiff
simply resolved her claims against the estate. P1.aintiffhas not obtained any advantage vis-a-vis Mr.
Fletcher, nor has Mr. Fletcher been disadvantaged. Rather, defendant is attempting to obtain
consideration which was not bargained for and concerning a transaction to which he was not a party,
i. e., a dismissal of any claims against him personal1y for his legal malpractice.

Plaintiff also cites McKay v. Owens, supra. Like Heinze, this case involved stat<~ments made
in open court concerning settlement. Plaintiff was a mother of a child who had been born with severe
birth defects. She hired Houst and Owens as her attor:1eys with Howard Manweiler being a.ppointed
guardian ad litem for the child. Plaintiff McKay argued that she was forced to accept tile settlement
on her own behalf as well as minor's compromise on behalf of her son due to the alleged malpractice
of attorneys Owens and Manweiler. Prior to the minor's compromise hearing, McKay tiled objections
to the proposed compromise, ManweiIer's appointment as guardian and other matters. However, she
MEMORANDUM IN oPPOSmON TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 14
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agreed in open court to the settlement at the minor's comprom2se hearing based upon the ac vice from
her attorney. Following the acceptance of the settlement, McKay brought an action against Owens and
Manweiler alleging negligence in settling the case without her consent and on the basis that the
settlement amount was insufficient. In rejecting McKay':; argument, the court noted that the
statements made in open court were to be afforded substantial credibility;
The sanctity of court proceedings is something that cannot be trifled
\\'ith, nor will we permit a party to play fast and loose with the courts.
To allow McKay's argument that Owens' ard Manweiler's alleged
malpractice "forced" her to lie in court, desecrates the sanctity of court
proceedings, and impedes the administration of justice. 11 order to
properly carry out its duties in approving a minor's compromise, a court
must be fully infomled of the nature and status of the agreements. To
mislead the court by stating that one agrees to a settlement when one
does not, adversely affects the court's ability to discharge its duties, and
impedes the admini3tration of justice.
Id Idaho 130 at 154

The court held that McKay was judicially estopped fran alleging malpractice in the settlement
because of these statements:

In contrast, McKay's legal malpractice claim goes to the heart of the
settlement itself: that Owen and Manweiler settled the case without her
consent, and that the settlement arnOlmt is insur:icient. The case would
not be "settled," as a matter of:aw, without ':he compromise of the
minor's claim being approved by the court. A:: discussed previously,
McKay assented to the settlement without reservation or objection, and
now is complaining about the very conduct she clearly approved at the
minor's compromise hearing.
Id 130 Idall0 at ] 55

In the instant case, we have no representations in open court, nor do we have any
representations that are at all inconsistent. Defendant is not a party to the settlement; he appears only
as attorney for the estate. Plaintiff is not judicially (~stopped from bringing an action against him for
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15
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his own personal malpractice in drafting the last wiU and testament and the estate planning for Cowan.

See Middlekaufv. Lake o/Cascade, 110 Idaho 909, 719 P.2d 1169 (1991) (party to be estopped must
have obtained a judgment, advantage or consideration from another party in order for estoppel to
apply).
Finally and of equal importance to the above points, the plaintiffs in McKay and Heinze, were
challenging a prior in-court settlt~ment which they themselves had approved. Plaintiff here is
challenging the adequacy of the settlement with ~.he Cowan Estate. Had plaintiff refused to settle with
the Estate, defendant would likely argue that plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages.
It is clear from review of Idaho case law that judicial estoppel is not implicated in this case.
Plaintiff has not received any advantage from Mr. Fletcher ir. his individual capacity. Plaintiffhas
made no representation or sworn statement concerning Fletcher. The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel is
inapposite and has no application to the facts in this case.

NEITHER THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER NOR THE DOCTRINE OF
QUASI ESTOPPEL BARS THIS ACTION
Defendant states that if the court finds the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not applicable,
that plaintiffs claims are barred on the doctrines of-w-aiver and quasi estoppel. Defendant cites

Record Steel and Construction, Inc. v. Martel Construction, 129 ldaho288, 923 P.2d 995 (1996).
Quasi estoppel is a doctrine designed to prevent one party from gaining an unconscionable
advantage over another by changing positions. Under the facts in the instant case, there is no
evidence of a change in "position" with respect to Fletcher. He was not a party to the

~ettlement

and there are no representations in the settlement which have nny bearing upon his conduct.
With respect to waiver, the court in Record Steel stated that waiver will not be inferred.
MEMORANDUM IN oPPOSmON TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT· 16
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Instead, the intent to waive must 1~learly appear. Id 129 Idaho at 292. TIle court also stated that
the party asserting waiver must show that he acted reasonably in reliance upon it and that he has
altered his position to his detriment. There is no evidence in :his case of any fact that would
clearly indicate to plaintiff that, by releasing her claims against the estate, she was also releasing
her claims against Fletcher. Moreover, Fletcher has offered s.ny evidence showing that he reHed to
his detriment on any alleged representation by plaintiff. The monies paid to plaintiff i :1cident to the
settlement from the assets of the estate, not Fletcher himself. Fletcher Affidavit, Exhibit B, p. 1.
The doctrine of quasi estoppel and waiver !:ave no app lication to the tacts of the instant case.
CONCLUSION
None of the grounds asserted by defendant merit entry of summary judgment in defendant's
favor:
t. Statute ofIimitations: Until the probate court ruled upon plaintiff's claimed entitlement as

an heirto the Cowan Estate, plaintiff's malpractice claim was speculative. The requisite "damage"
was not incurred and the statute oflimitations was not trigger;:d until the September 2007 rilling by
the magistrate judge. The herein suit, filed in March 2009, is within the two year limitation ofldaho
Code section 5-219(4).
2. Defendant's dun:: As a named beneficiary in the te:;tator's will, defendant owed a duty to
plaintiff to effectuate the testator's intent expres8ed in the Will, i.e., that plaintiffi'beneficiary receive
that property which had been held in trust.
3. Judicial estoppel: The doctrine ofjudicial estoppel has no application to these proceedings:
(I) plaintiff's position in the probate proceedings is not inconsistent with her claims against defendant
here, i.e., she is not playing "fast and loose with the courts"; and (2) plaintiffmade no sworn statement
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17
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in open court or by affidavit that is inconsistent with her posi tion in this litigation.

4. Quasi estoppel/waiver: Plaintiffs settlement in the underlying probate matter and the
alleged malpractice of defendant attorney are tnmsactions separate and apart from one another. That
is, there is no detrimental reliance by the defendant nor are t:tere statements or conduct by plaintiff
which can be construed as a waiver.
Dated this 27 th day of July, 2009.

Attorney for Plaintiff

:2ERTIFICATE OF SERV!~
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 27 th day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, E1lllis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 8370 I - I 617

X

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
TeJecopy (FAX)
954-5238
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ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

\

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F1FTH JUDICV\L DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Mary Killins Soignier,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

W. Kent Fletcher,

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No, CV 2009-517
AFFIDA VIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON

)
)ss.
)

I, John F. Magnuson, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
1.

r make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge and anI competent to testify

to the matters contained herein.
2.

I am an attorney at law with offices for private practice located in Coeur d'Alene,
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Idaho. I was admitted to the Washington State Bar in 1987 and worked in Seattle, Washington for
the firm of Lesourd and Patten UIr:iI June of 1991. In 1991 I returned to [daho and took e'le Idaho
State Bar and was admitted to the practice oflaw In fdaho in 1991.
3.

Since 199 J I have been a sole proprietor in the practice of law.

4.

I have a general civil practice with ':he exception that I do not practice i:l the area of

domestic relations, bankruptcy, or criminal law. A portion of my practice has involved probate
matters, both litigation and non-litigation ..
5.

I have been retained by the attorneys for the plaintiff to act as an expert witness on

plaintiff's behalf In that connection I have reviewed the foHo'n'1ng documents:
Document
Petition for Informal Probate of Will & Informal AppL Of PR

11113/06

Claim of Mary Killins Soignier

01107/07

Inventory

01123/07

Petition for Construction of Will and Approval for PI:::n

04/06107

Order Setting Hearing and Establishing Method of Service

04111107

Opposition to Petition for Construction of WiJI
& Approval for Plan of Distribution of Estate

05125107

Memorandum in Support of Mtn. For Summary Judgment

07106107

Affidavit (Steven Dalton)

0711 1107

Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen D. Westfall

07/13107

Proposed Findings of Facts & Conclusions of Law

08/14/07

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

08/07107
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Opinion Regarding Summary Judgrnem

09118/07

Order Dismissing Appeal without Prejudice

01122/08

Motion to Withdraw Judgment on
Petition for Construction of Will

02/01108

Letter to Sam Cowan from

7~c

Cowan

02/05104

Letter to Zac Cowan & Frederick Mack from Idaho Trust

03105105

Message to Zac Cowans Kent F[etcher

05/I0/05

Letter to Zac Cowan from Kent Fletcher

05/20/05

Letter to lac Cowan from Kent Fletcher

05/24/05

Letter to Kent FletcherfMkhael Saenz}
Stephen Westfall from William Whitehead

02109/07

Letter to William Whitehead from Kent Fletcher

03/08107

Letter to Kent Fletcher from William Whitehead

03108/07

Letter to Trevor Roberts from Stanley Foma..l1der (Idaho Trust)

03109/07

Letter to F. Mack/Stephen Westfall from Fomander (Idaho Trust) 03/29/07
6.

In my opinion, which I hold with a reasonable degree oflega! certainty, the conduct

of attorney W. Kent Fletcher in the preparation of the 2005 will for testator Zachary Co'.van fell
below the applicable standard of care for attorneys practicing in the state of Idaho in 2005. J hold
this opinion for the following reasons:
a.

The will drafted by Mr. Fletcher refers ta a power of attorney held by testator

Cowan which power of attorney is not granted by the trust. This discrepancy tens me that Mr.
Fletcher either did not read the trust, or did so in a hasty fashion, missing the fact that no power of
attorney was created in Mr. Cowan's favor.
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON - 3
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b.

Had Mr. Fletcher review.ed the trust or llad he done so in a careful fashion he

would have learned that upon attaining the age of SO years the trust property would revert to Mr.
Cowan and he would become the outright ovmer oftbe property.
c.

At the time of the preparation of the 2c{)S Will. Mr. Fletcher had a duty to

inquire of Mr. Cowan whether he had attained the age of fifty years and to modifY the langu;age of
the Will and reference the subject property as property owned ou1right by the testator which had
previously been heJd in trust
d.

II

The fact that the Will references "all beneficial interests that r m.ve in any

trusts" indicates that Mr. FIetoher failed to inquire of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property,

previously held in trust,. devised.
e.

t

!i

The portion of the Will which refers to "all beneficial interests that rhave in

i

any trusts" is of no force and effect given the ab.sence of such trust or trusts.
7.

i

Under these circumstances. drafting Ii wiJI, a portion ofwhicb has no force IU1d effect

i

and which fails to effectuate the intention of the testator, constitutes a deviation from the standard

I

of care and falls below the standard of care of attorneys practicing in Idaho in 2005.

'({¢_4~.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this

KRYSTI CLIft
Notary Public
State of Idaho

I

8-+ni1ay of July, 2009.

I
I.

f#g-

~ ~ .---+~---
-!Y

Not1lY Public for :Idaho
Residing at '~IU..L\

Commission Expires:

d

I

\ 1I

!

~~
l ~ ( I J.(

I
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07/27/2002__ ~9N 15: 03

~009/00Sl

FAX 3459564

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
r HEREBY CERTIFY That on this

q

day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addT<!ssed to the
follo\\1ng:

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
-1L TeIecopy (FAX)
954-5238

Michelle R. Points
Craig 1. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

AlleD",~

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN F. MAGNUSON - 5
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01/27/2009 MON 15:02

f4jVVj/ VVlI

FAX 3459564

Allen B. Ellis, ISB No. 1626
ELLIS, BRO\VN & SHEILS
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
Telephone: (208) 345-7832
Facsimile:
(208) 345-9564
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
Ca~:e

MARY KILLIKS SOIGNIER,

No. CV 2009-517

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER

vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss
County of Cassia
)

Mary Killins Soignier, being first sworn, states:
She is the plaintiff to this action and makes the following statements from personal
knowledge.
When she entered into the s.ettlement of her claims against the estate, she had no notice that
anyone was asserting that, by releaslng her claims against the estate, she would also be releasing her
claims against defendant Kent Fletcher in this action. No document that she signed purported to
release Fletcher in any capacity.

AFFIDA VlT OF MARY KIlLINS SOIGNIER - 1
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UI(LIILUU~

MUN

L~:UL

2009-07-24 10:14
•

~7f24/200'

FAX

i4tl004/009

j4~9~b4

3459564

PRI 11:06

P 111
/1JOQ:JI002

7

Affiant made no statement in court, sworn or otherwise, to the etrect that she intended to

release Fletcher by dismissing her claims against the estate.
Affiant has received no r,onsideration from Kent Fletcher for any release of claims against
him. She nev« told Fletcher t.llst, by releasing he.r claims against the estate, she intended to release
her claims against Fletcher himself
DATED this -l-+~y of July) 2009.
'-hi

.

~U.l~ - ~~~

~llins Soignier

Mazy

SUBSCRn3ED AND SWORN to me on this z.q-rn day of July, 2009.

!

!

I!

~~i<M~®

!

Residing at: oca;te"(A.D I~O
Commis;sion expires: q .""::\-- we

i

1
I

1

CERTlFICAIE OF S2RV1(;;E
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1-:\day of July, 2009, I caused a true and com:ct copy of
the foregoing docwnent to be served upon the foUowingindividu.al(s) by the method indicated below
and ad~ as follows:
Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows

Hawley. Troxell, Bn:nis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main St.~ Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617

[] U.S. Mail, po!;tage prepaid
[ ] Hand Deliyered
[] Overnight Mail
ft-By Facsimile

Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

I
I
f

II
Ij
I

I

i

(

1

I

AFFIDA VIT OF MARY KIUINS SOIONIBR 2
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I

!

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
Attorneys for PlaintitT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,
vs.
W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant.

ST A TE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.CV 2009-517
AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN B. ELLIS

)
)

)
)ss.
)

I, Allen B. Ellis, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
I.

I am the attorney for the plaintiff in the herein matter and make this affidavit upon

m y own personal knowledge and am competent to testify to the matters contained herein.
2.

,

~

:..

That attached hereto as exhibits are true and correct copies of the following

AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - I

0001.3 3

•

,

,>

documents:

DOCUMENT

EXHIBIT NO.

Leonarda A. Cowan Trust
Zachery Cowan Will dated 2000 . .. . .... .. ... . .................. 2
Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment dated September 18, 2007,
Cassia County Probate Case No. CV 2006-1234 . .... . ..... . ... . ... 3
/

Alleni~

Attorney for Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 27th day of July, 2009.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise
Commission Expires: 1/5/12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 27th day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

AFFIDA VIT OF ALLEN B. ELLIS - 2
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
~ Telecopy (FAX)
954-5238

.-- -

"

,U9~_~

of the

ot
LBQD.RJ». A. ~

0001.35

)

EXIUBIT 1
S3j\:lT~ ..... - -

Il0

~d

.-.--~--

(
J.992~

July 1.9,

Ott

Truat.ee,
Pu;r$WlJlt

1.982

~

~f

exacut.ed. tha 'r%'ust Aqreaant
to Article

r.r

o~ Aid

u

~tcr

Le'oncda A.

Cavan.

written
.
'l'he!L'rUst ~euent waa

ilwt.l:'a:iumt tiled with ~ ~...
:aestated 0%1 July 13,

rm4

Agreeaent,' the ~ %asel:"V'8d to

1:.0 a'IMnd t:b.a ~ AgreeJlL8nt, by

hal:.al.f the right.
Dl\d,

C~~

A.

.b4'l1d..cl

and the

1988,

II

~..t&t.d

.lgre.ant. vas

u-=nded on JUly ZO, 1.989 and ~.U1 GJIlendoc1 on septeaber 1.2, 1991 •

.'l.ba

~

COW'OUl,

(

)

~

herebY. eua.cnd.s tho batata4

IUld r . .tatee .llid Agreacnt in

of IAonarda A.

its .ent:J,ret:y, to read u

.%'01.J. ows; :
·1992~
or~

'!Bl1S~~

or
L'£01QlmA. A. cow.a.N

He, LZOHAlU)A A. COWAlI' and ~

cuamnf, .us T'tUStaes,

~.tor,

hu t;:re.nsfu-rad IUld

4eole.ra tlult. LEONARDA A. COWAlt,

c!alivarcd to.

'Wi

as

'll'UStaQ6,

eJiJ

EXlnBn A, attaeha4 to th.i. 1.nAtraDoZ\t.
thi&

trust shall

ba

itald,

. '

.

in , truSt, the property listed in
Al.l. prope..rey .,-a])jeet to

edDfnister&d

and

diatrib~

:ill

2!.ccordlance wi1:.b. the provisions ot t.h.ia 1992 RestatezQ%It ot the
2

0001. 36

C~
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...... T"""'-'--· ·

.

·

,

This trust shall be

'fiW5't: AqreelDe.nt.

mown

as LEotQ.lU)A A. 0JmJJ

'rlmST 01 1982.

CEAlW:'l'BR 07 PROPERTY '1'1U..RSP'ElUlED
1..1.

creation.

AJ.l propca.rty trDl:1Iit'a.n-a4 ato t:.h8

tharao~

t.ru.t

upon the

and held thereandar lit, t.l:d.a till. coruliat.a ot thG

~'"

IHlpa%'llt. property and

Bhal.~

chnl:lCt.a:r

while h4t1.c! ~JI'Q&n't: to the ter.aua O~ the

re.tain its separat& prap.rty

a-uat.
,

,2" • .1.

rG'VOke t:hi.a

~ ~ :reserve~ 1:ha

r!ght >to alter, e1Ml'\d or

trust in vbo14 or in part dUrillg her
"...

l~lil't;;i:ma.

Such

alteration, ZUMnd¥eat: or '%'av~tian whall be 'by \nPitteta i.nsi:rulaent
'II igneCl

~ the T':I:WIi:.or :md. delivera4 to Ule TrUstees.
.2. 2

-' )

~ ~tor ~. .

trans:ferred to the trust astate.
w1thdrawn proparty

had

~

its
2.3

l"ol~otdn9

~l. ~nu. tQ

tran..~er

t.o vit:hdrav prC?~
asuc:b vithc:h1lWZll., the

retaa 1:.ho ebaraeter that it

into the t:nlat.

Upon the c5eath ot tha Trwstor I th..iJI trust aba.ll be

irre.vocablA Illld
2."

tha right:

duLl.~ n~i: ~ aubject to

The 'l"rUg.'r!or ruervea the

Itltaration ' or BlD e ndMl1t.
ri~t

to traIuiter property

to the t%'U$e utate at z.ny 1:m by '!:i:J.1. or otherwise.
Such
property aha1l b.cc~ II. pZl..~ ot ~d dubject to the provisions ot
this trast.

3
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DIS'l'JUBl1l'IOlI OORIl(G 'l'RD'STOR'S LIl'B
While the TrUstoX' is l..ivin9, the '1"rU&5tces 1Ib.al.l pay

3.J.

to or

~pply

'for the benefit ot the 'lru.t:or the net incoma ot the

~t 8$QtG,

qua.rter-ennual.J.y I or at more frequent intervals.

additicn, the -'l'rUat.aas shall
pay
,
.

~o

apply' ror the benetlt of the
.
the principal. ot t.b.e trust estate
the '1'rCat

TrUstor au lIUch oj!

Ol;"

,

IUJ

r"rom thM to tille, direct in vr:j:t:iJ1g_

~,

In

determine

that

strch

d.is'tributiona

'l'rtlstor's

proper hQltll,

support,

ar~
~e.

the 'lrWItaoa

U

1msU!ficie.nt
~

tor the

.a!nta%U!!l'lC8,

tho

shal.l pay: to or apply for the RfUlefit ot the 'rrWJtQr so

'%'ru5:ta~

;

2IIucb

ot the trust eata.t. u

the TrWIt. . . de. . llacessaxy t.o so

..

provi.da -r.oi: the 'l!:1.ls'tor.

.

DIV:[Sron 01'

4.1.

~

4e;bb

as a

gv.4

'

~

~

,the 4eath ot t:l1e 'r;t'Ua'tcri the

0%

.

sale

~

1Ia.Y pay

a.ate
ot,
.

or

of 1:2::uat.,

or

(other tban , pX'Ollisco%y DOtes,

~ic:h art s~ by mortgages,

~~eGlM:llta or

~.

'by 't:hU ~, or. J:¥y the !l"raatoJ:, at the

conseqwmaa ot her death,

~aY1lant

'%.'Ht7:F.1' JtS"J.!&TB

de6<38

raa.1 propart:y), inclt141llg

eXpelUS4l8

. o~ last iJ lness, ~al experua •• , and tb.e- coots of e.cta i nistret.1011

ot this

of T:rUstor'. probata Il5tat:.e end

:UacwEt-ap'lcU.t1ad 'debts

\lh.1c:h

are

t~st.

Paymant: ot tha

obliqation. ot tlla T%'\l.atOr / ..

probate G8tata ahal.l b_ lDiILd. in tho .ole 4.i~t1on

ot the Trustaes

in th. event th6t: the UMta ox TrUstor' G probata astate ara
aClsquAUs

to

~y .-qcb

obU9'lli:lona I and

the trust astat.e only in the

GVIIU11:

a~ beOCJll8 &%l

end to the extant that tha

)

0001.38
S31\1T~

/99
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In

,--

-

oDl;i.tJation ot

l.U5sets or 'l'rUstor'a probata e.ste.ta are insutticiellt to d.1scllal:'qa
~ch

oDliqationa.
4.2

4l.1ocata

Upon the °death of the 'rl;Ustor I

and/or

satis~aetion

distr1J:)ute
~.

ot

the

sect:.on •• 1

01:

atte4:"

rJ.ma.ininC;

estate

tx"WIt

p~i • .io~

tha lr'rUsteu .hall.

of

TrU.6t

thi5

AqreeJllent as toll ow. :
fa)

In the ovent that the 'l.':rUator'. eon,

the
.

.

tl1e !t'rU!Itor
.. I

CODll, shal.l. have Duxvive4

distribute to t:ha 'rru.5tor'a said

IJqn

~y

'h"wIteas ahall
.

1lhatavu- in1:e~t i . h~ld

.

in the trust 8.tate at or by :rea-.on ooi' tho TrUstor's duth in

.

.

.

;

that: CI!rt~ real. property CCARDOlllY known as 3 stev°ena eourt,
'the
0%

Sprb9'~

Country Club, ttancho lUraqD, CA, outrl.-;rht and free

t.:rust end trea

ot:hor daat:h t.ax.a.

~

aU t:ranaJt.r,

%A th.

avant

i:nb.er1tanc:a, aaU1:e or
'the 'l'rustor'. -del .on

~t

ahe.l.l not haTe survivecl the Tl:WItcr. V1.thcut reqard to his

~ssu., the qi~t pursuant to thi. aub.aCtion ~.2(a)
4iatr;1l)ut~

to

Iilirvived.

the

lSub~ection

4.2(a) Abell tail.
(b)

&tU:Y'ived.

the

"ttLn .u

S»mR1 ll'l'X:aJf

'J!rwIt:ar

5l1a 8hal.J: not have

this

the

l"n. 'the v-voni: tba.t IaAJflUmCB

T~tor.

tho

aball be

TrU.ste...

c::H.AZEH &ball bava

shall

distribute

to

LAWRENCE onzmf vbat*VOX' interest 1. held in the trwst *stilt.

at or by rea.on ot i:.h.

'l'2;-wst.O<t'o'lS

deatll

1n that cart:.aita

:residential. real property located. on ~e.n Antonio Road ))etween
Seventh and

~iqhth

stroot., carmel, CA, outr1C;ht and trae of

trust. and :treQ of all trans;!er, inheritance, 85Ult.e or other
5

0001.39

In the Gvent that J..A11ImEN'c:2 c::RlZ'D shall not he.VQ

dea.t.i1 taxes.

not

crurvlve<1

lI'\lb$ectiOtJ.

the

".2 ('b)

ahall:-

purawmt

q.1.n

to

th.1.

~ail.

!he Txuste6a shal.l e.stab11sh a trust ahara;

(0)

daaignatad

th..

'1'rUato-x- I

nuTS'!'

I, to

b~

tl:!"4de4 v1.t.h ONE

smttmED

'J!BOO'S.Ul) Jm)

00/100 DOI,IoARS ($1.00,000.00) tor eac:h beneticiuy.at ~orth in
SUl)paragraph ~.2(c::) (1),

(11), an4 (iii) wbo 1N%:V1va. trustol;'

tor a

~ TJiOl/SABD llU)

ot 'l'ERD:

"axi)qDI

00/100 00I,t·1lt$

($300,000.00).
~1:%:Lbuta

t:h. . .saU o~ TmJ'ST I

lUI

a

aepara:t:. tJ:wrt sa

herainaftar provided!

(i,
b~:rlt

'l'lUJST X

~~. .

...

~ 'rl.S2!

of

.... t:h.

~or

. in

i:.heJ.r

41acrat1on,

tha prOper health,

c:a.r& alMS

~ o~

pa~

ot inccZa AhaU nO't. 'ax~ ' n:vB

C~5, QQQ. 00)

'.

in

Any

as

~saa.ry

'the

.uch l:um.~i.cia.ry,

d.aa:III

~,

prooridac! .1ldl

~00SUI1) DOLLiES

qivan QIl.IlnC1Al: YMr;

.

(11) 7!ho ~i:. . . IIball pay to or Apply t.or the

bena:!it ot LOPE
~T 1:

~or

so muc::h' cd the nat· inc:o:IIe of

~.a,

nacesHZY or d••irable

abal.l pay to or applY

~

.0

the 'l'rUSt.8S,

auc:b at" the ne-e Ulcome of

in

their diaoret:ion,

d~

.

or lI.sUable tor tha proper haal.th, suppo:r'C,

.

.
.
paym811ts ot incaac shul not exceed PIVlS TROU8U1D DOLI.:ARS
(~~/OOO.OO)

in

~y

given

o~ender

000140
S3J\1T~

.... . ,- -

yOQr;

..

~'.,

,'

..

..

.

(~ii)·

~

of !t!lmST I

The T.rustee:: shall pay to or apply

the '.lrIu&taaa, in t:he.ir dUoret.1on, dea.

nec::2ssuy or duizahla for'

~ ~roper ~th,

care and mtint-.enaJ'2ee at! lNob

be.nc~1c1ar.f,

&upport,

prov1de4 Cluch

payments o~ inCODl4 £hall not exee~ l"IVB'mOUSAJ1'D DOLLARS
($5,000.00) in

any givon calendar y.ar,

t
..
.
not paid or appUed as he:re;S.uabove prov14ad each year i
(iv) Ally bcll.1Ul~. of t;be net illcOlle of mlSf!'
'

sh.al.~ h. accc::uma.1ated and aMid to.

o~

dUth

oal::u..ct.icn

:r

TRt1S~

o~

each

".2 {c:l

I

abal.~

'h'Wlt...

to TRUS'.r IX (as prov14e4 in sUbsection

r

'r.RUB'.r

~ •• thi.

tx'anafe:r

<me-third (V3) D~ th. val.u. a~ tlao X"OU~
\

tJ'pot1 the

);)e.nc1!1a1ar1aa 11Q8d

the

the

Principal..

(all

,.:z (d) )

a.a.ts ill

then coft;8tituteQ} ... 'l1he TrU.ReOIlJ, in their

cUacretion, .bal.l choose whic:b a.s_ta to tnna~c.

...

.

the death

o~ all

(d)

tho

IlII.sets

o~

,TORt1S'r X,

s.ction

".1.

Th. TrUsta6S

trust:. as

ot thie

~~

A9X".. e=a:::a~

~.a

ba.lUICe ot' the

t:ha provisions of

..ul;IaectJ.ona (a)

T!le 'l'rusi:ae:s shall hold,

a.ncl diatr1buta the a8sats of 'rRUS1' II ISS a 8I1pU'a:t:e

herai.na.~'i:ar

p2:'OVidod.

000141
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~

roz=; nin9 arte.r &atiS~actiop ot

7

'89

tbI!ul

shal.l ~l..il!Sh A ~4 'U'WSt

throuqh (e) ot thi. Section 4.:2.
~dmi.nister

as

aba.1l be t:rancaf'erred to 1'l«JST II.

share, ca.ignat:ed TImS'! ·XX, to eonsii;t qt

truat 6lItilte

Upon

of i:l:I.e b~:1c:J.a.ri. . na:aeCl in thiJs

~ion 4.2(<:) ~
~'t:1tutad,

troa

_

.

{

( 1)
ZA~

thea went

III

~t

'l'rUstor I 8

the

50%1,

COWllt I ahe.ll have survivee!. tn4 TrU.:IItoX', end prier

to the the lIben he .hall have att.aJned the age of fitty
y~,

tb. TrU.staes Shall pal to or apply ror. the benetlt

o't t:ha ~/. A.id _on C4I'9'en'ty percQhi: (70",'

o~ the

nat income ot TRUST U, qa.ut.u-e.nnually or at aon
~::~e.nt

intarvala.

III addition, the '1'rWrtae • .maU pay

to or apply tor the benefit
. of t:he
.
much ot tho principal of
aevonty

puocent

n'

~'r

o't,

[70%]

~r/. ad.c1

lion 80

(but not ill ~l!IS o~
pr~ipal

tha

as

them
~

constituted) as th._ '1.'J::'I1st:. . . , in theh
the

necliIsaaxy .'for
lDoClintanzmc:e
~l p&y

heal.th~

the 'T;Uato.-' s

o~

t.o or

proper

appl~

far the

4i.c:::ei;~on,

INPpcrt,

said .on.

d.,e:a

oar. and

The T:;'1latees

bentd.it:. of! '.f2:'Wl1!.ox'e niec:e,

. ~ BUiRD ntJ.ft, or he' .~ '1~ aha shall not than
"be

:living',

.

th..!.rty pel:O.nt

(30'">

TlWST n quaxt.r-:armWtlly or

.

~

of th4 n.t inCCll.e of

m.ore 'traquant 1ntorvUs.

III addij:ion, th• . ~~.. ahal.l. P2lY to or apply for the

llanar.1t ot the 'rrUstor'.
pr1l1c1pal.

of TRUST Xl:

percant [30%]
~.

~

(but

niec.

80

lIIUCh ot th.a

not· in exee..

ot· the principal. ... than

o~

~

c;:o~tuta4)

as

'1'rWst.ea, in their cUsoreticn, deeqa necessary for the

proper haUth,

support,

cu. end

~intan&llCa

ot the

Txustor's .a.id niece.
(J..1) When tho 'rrwitcr's

son, ZlClUltt COW1N,

shall attain the ~. or fifty yfU!r!l,
B
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,..--.--

TRU'S'r 1:1

~l

.... _-. -----'.

taJ:1d:o.ate, and saventy percent
o~

(7~') o~

4iSt2:~1l

the tru.5t

TR06T :II than on hlU'lC! anal1 be disU'il:utad to t.ha

Trustor's !laid lSon autriqbt

(30~) at

percent

hand 5ha11

})e

~ ~.

of t+ust, and thil:ty

th. trust estat:.. ot TmlsT II thel1 on

distributed to TrUstor's 'niac:8, SJU1'DRA

EII..E:lm gT.XU, oatr1Q!1.t and trta* of trua1: _ ':h.e TrUateea

hava

shal.l.

discr.tiOll to

c:hoose

the

as.at.

to

be

distribut4d to ea.dl.
(ill)

Xn

.

,avant th. T:tU.stor'. · son,

t:ha

ZACB1RY COUlt, Ilball 4ia p:J:'ior to atta.1n.1ng' lige Q~ t1~
,

yu.ra,

l.aving then. livillg iasua, 1:ha 'frust. .s

distributo tho entire traat

8Sta-=~ 9~

...

IiIhal.l

TWST IX the:l on

band Mvenq pe:rcant (70') to th. t:han living issue of

ZAamRY 00WAlI;, by right of reprasent:at:.iOll, tr... ot Trust,
and tbirt:::y percent (30') to t:be

UI.Tui

JUT.lQ'N

TrUS"COr

l

~.nr

•

providad,

~or'lI

:turt:he.r, in

n1ac:., B.UDRA

tlw oVct that. the

8~ n1ece ehAl-1. not be living at: 'the date ot

di.i:.r~b.ution

. pursuant

to

this

IiUbparagrapb 4 ~:l Cd) (iii), her shere o~ the trust esta'ta
0% ~3'r XX .h&l.1 bQ

.by

d1str1l:1a.tad to her the l.1v1ng J.ssue

riqht o:t r.p:a:'8Selltat.ion tne of trust,
(i-v) :In t:ha ave.nt that ZA~T COWA!T ahall die

prier to

a~taUdnl:t

the ago. ot' fifty years, w1tllout 11v1.llg

issue, the Trustees sllall d.istx-ibut:e tha entire trust
e:rt~te

an~

of '!'RUST IJ: to SANDItl eUiUN lQ:LLER tree of trust

if

abe

shall

not

be

11'Ting

9

0001.43

at

th.

data

ot

.

(

I

dizstr1l:lution, tba

~

...tate shal.l be distributed to

t=be then l.iv1ng 1asu. ot SI.N1lR1. flT,gm Ut1i,RR by right ot
rep%'G$GJ\ution, tree 01: trust.
It, ..t the tilae ot the

4.3

~r/.

dee.tb, or at e.ny

It.t.ter the betora ~l dilitributicn of the't1"WIt elSblta, r:ACHARY

COWAN',

~

and

o~

IlQ

JUl,lUUI QLl.zR ' and a11 of' t:.hair i.au. ara 4ec.acseQ,

diGpos1tlon of the trust Qstate i. directed henin,

t.h.e 1:rUst 6$1tate,
thereupon

or the portion

~ dist.%:-:ibata4

o~

re.lUin.f..n9,

11; t.b:cn

to on. or IlOre cba.rit:i._

chosen.

1Ihal1
i.n the

discretion of the 'l'rUst:ees, eulTjact to th6 lbdt..tion on .ueh

dJ.sc:retj.on that

.

1I1lc:h

Seeticm 1.10 01: the
~

, •,

"contz;ary

....

.

c:haritiaa be qua1 1 fi.a c:hAritiu as clafined ill

Xnt:una+

.

.provi.ion.. of'

.

tJ:U.. 'rr118t

Ag'r~t

to the

in the .vra:rt that any a. ••ta of ..

notwj.~,

he14 pu:nsu.a.nt
. . . to the

.

Revenue Ccx!a ot. 1986 •

~%"oviIS10IUl '
~

of! thi.ll '%rWrt

.~t

~t

b6e0ae

di...trll:ra:t:abl.a to ' .. bcD';t'iciUy Uhder ~ 11'9'- of' tvfU'1ty-otlAl (23.)
y~, ~e:r:ruotow.

IIlu:ll.l r.ta1.n aud:l . . .at. in a further t:rwrt:. tor

t:ha. ~etit of. auch beneficiary.
apply to'%; th.a :bane:fit of'
.i.nCC>CoA,

IJU~

The TrUatees sh4l1 pay to or

benefieia..-y

~ t h . pri.nc.1)jJD.J. o~ the

trust.

t:lleir diacrat.!on, 4Ml1l ~ •• ary.

%0:;'

..ut.

.0

lJl1lCh of the Jlat

as the

'J.':rWIt.e.. ,

j.n

the :;>ropor l:l~tb. aupporr.,

oare .lU.i:ltenanc:a a%ld education of ~c::h ~~iciary, litter taking
int!o e.cc::oun'C, -t:.o th. ext.ut the TrUat.. . daa proper, ~ inc:oz.e or

other re5curce.

the TrUstaes.
(2J.)

or

aqch baneticiary outside thi& t!rust, known to

When such bene:t'iciary at.ains the aile ot twenty-one

yc.a.rs, the Tru.st.ee .hAll distribute to such :benefioiuy the
10
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enthe ~t c:atato than held for his or her ~e."e:tit,

trsQ 0'1

If 81lcb beneticiary shall die before r-caivlnq

cOllpl~e

tl:"lat.

c1istrihtltiOll
ot the ~t: estate Bet aa1da tor his br bel: beneti t
I
I

hereunder, the rru.steas ShaJ.l distribute the balance of the trust
estate

to tnlch peraons or antities.

,cQlldltions, either outrl.;ht. or in ttust, u

.ncb

em.

aJ'ld

t::eJ::UI

~

the ban~iciary lithall

hi. or her ·l.ut Will aait:te4 to prob«te by a court ot

cl• • iCjDA"bs ill

competent: juri84ict:.ion, lMJrjnq

e~rlc %'P.:t~ce

t:o 'th.!a power of

:In t:be avent 1;hat S"QC:h. beneficiary' shAll ;tail to

appoirit:laent.

.xarci:s~ aucb pow.%'

or appointlaent:,
the 'J!X'uBi:.etas
sJ1al.l dUctribute
,
.
.

,..

the ~lanc. o~ t:he ' t:ruBt . .tata 1:0 the than l.iyi.nq uuswa o~ 8llCh

right; . bt re~nta"on,
or,. in tlw de~e.ul.t
,..
to the then liv1n9 ra.tae of' th.$ p~t5. trail whom such

l:I-eDGfic!ary,
~:f,

by'

'benefioia%)" wa.a d . .ce:aded, by right

o~

:opr. . e.nta.t.ion •

•w:m::RAL ::Pf(OVJ:Sl:OBS

5.1

It tb.e ahare or .~te

tl::ust

bUd f.or any ihoOllle

, be.nOficiu:y of. a ~ bela pW:auant h.ix:.to bAa, at any ~, in
the

OPinio~ o:f 1:hA ~,

raJ.ation to the ooets

ot the t::tust
ilIIpai.r

tQl:1ll.inate

in

such

ot the purpo5e~

their d.i.cratiQn,· but

t-~

d.iet..-1bute

~,

the

reqZlrd1us

pr1nc1pal

ot' the t.:rust,

the

not nquirad

to,

ar.
o~

e.n4

the

1m'.!

0001.45
~d

low, in

't:hereo:t=, 'thAt continuance

l~

'll

GO '

pursttzmt to its ttmu 'trill ct.teat or subGtahtially

uy,

ben.o.tie;il:.ry I

%a1r lIIIlrbt val.Uti

a~.-t:rD.tion

o.CeOaapl.~t

th,&

~lite . .

or

Ii

~e

o:t!

e.oerlled

such
or

unc1iotributa4 income theraor to suob be.llU1cilS.I')", or his qua.:!'dian,

ccmeerv:ator, ox other ti®c::iary.

s .2
prov1sions

l1nJ.ea. IIOOne:r' tel:ldnabtd ill eccord.nce with other

hereot' I

each truat bald
d~t:.h

twenty-ohc (2l.) years a.fto±' the

h~.Ull4er

ahall t:end.nat.,

of the la.tlt wrvivor of the

TrUstor I the 'rrwstor'. niece, SANDRA BIIZEN or,l,a, and tholie 01!

the 1&sue. ot UCIi7Ua' COKAK or SUllRI.. 1$lL'!l!:H, DtrIrD who an 11v1.n9
at: t:ha 4aatb

income

o~

the 'trust.or.

ot any tru.t

110

ll). ;p.rinci.))al
,

t.arminabad

and. andi.tributad
"

sb.aJ.1. be

c11at::1.butad to the then

i:nCl~ bC1.~i~i•• of tha~ ~ in the ~~~OM

'a.re, at the tiDe or tem1na tJ:oO: • .mt:.1tlad
5.3

~e

~t:._

1:.0

rae.1ve the

authoriEe'the usa

...:aay

in vhic:b they

or

~a.

~tor'

•

reaic1euC1t 1oca.1:.ad on £an AntcidQ Road, CUllel, eal.1torr:Lia, and the
' fUl:'uitw:e an4 ~1Ihing. the.r.o~, at. such

tila.ee, 1!or .uoh peri0d2s,

and on lIuch te%'RS and ~itiODtl OIl the ~_ may c!etanine, by

( "')

~

any oj! t.ba 1!allow1.ng:

~c:HAU

COWMr alJd hi&

~lDIUy,

SAlmBA xtIaDN'

JaLLER and ~ ~Ulily, aM' ~t:2 CRlLZ1CH and. h:b taaily.' At. any

tille

~t

A9rSaent,

LQll(DtCZ CBA.ZD ia .
,

~itura.

~tat.e, ragardl . . . of any
?:I'f

~%'U.JItaQ

be is harahy epeo.1~1caJ..1y a..ut.bof1ted

residence a.nd it.

SU1:rer

ACt.1n9 as , a

a1: tb.!. Traat

to r-eta1n _aid

a:n<l fW:n1abfn9'1I as asse.ta of tha tru:st

10. . . . .

t.b. trwat

OJ:'

it. b.met'iciariea 1IIaY

v1rtue ' or said retention, to occ::upy said ru:1dence and

utilize 11:e 'furniture end hJ:'n1ah.in9D, -ror hi. p.raonal.

WI.

a.nd t.ha.t

of other Ile:m.bars ot his tully, e.nd is :rel1evad of the effect of

e.ny

Imel a1.1. provl..81oru; ot ll:.w t01'n1d41ng' !l 'rrUatee :lro2ll diU!.l1llS'

with the assets of

I!.

t.:rust estate tar 11is Pel:"8cn!!l acco\mt and
12

000146
'El

39\1d

S31\1I~
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r~l hing

of law

any iUn or px-ot'1t UQDl aUCh deal1:lgll, a.es suCh

~al~ta

prov1sior~

to said residanee.

6.1

,
~. int:ereR o-f a.ch bellaticiary in ~ :tnoo.. alld

principal o-t any trust held purwant bareto shall bo :rree 't'rc1IIl the
central or 1nt~e.ranc::. ot any creditor at' suah ben.ficiny eM

ot othe.rB including any .~ o~ &:\lcrh benG~ioia;q.
The interest. ot aacb benat.iciery ~l not be subj ect to
Clttcch-.nt, axacutiOD.1 qarniamaent., cl.aw ci_inc.; rrom proeecd.ilJqs
:tr01Il the cle.ills

.

' .

in barlla:upiey or any other torm
'l!he

o~ l.aqal.

'

...

, '"

"

lien.

"

ancs any attalapt 1:0 anticipate or

't:raIu;f«r a t.niJt ihterut .hal..l. be voict a%Id
(

gr

illtcrest. c~ each ~icia.ry Ilhal.l. not. bo IJU.5ceptible to

lalt:lc:J.lNltion or al.lenation

l

.. I·

or eqti!.tu1a 1...".

iJ:l.~t.ot.i.va.

\

JO.immt e'V
7. ].

ben.t.1ciaxy
t:.o

TrU:st i.ncolM

-:ri "

M~,*

aD4

principal.

paid directly to

a: l;I.nCl~ic 11U:l'" e

uau

Ii

cUlri::rilmtah1.

to

..

.benetioia%y or ~ be appli.d

aM 'bAlnat1t.

as

the

TrUatcq

d84'll

app:r;opriat.. Any beneticiDl:y who 1. ince.paoitated thl:0U9'h -ill.n. . . ,
age

Or other

~ may ha~ the income an4 principal. to ~ch be is

Q1'l~it:.lod applied to

t.o a b.naf1eiary wbich

reQeived
bane:t.1t:;.

on such

by

IncOIIle or ~inc!p41 cUstribut@l..

biB l)enat1t.
1Ill!!y

be .ubj.ct .to a!Cecuticn or

the beneficiary

~y

:ury ouch Clppl.ice.tion

oc~icns !l;d

in auch

bo app1.1ed to such

~

~avy

when

benc~ici~~5

inCOJII4 or principal Ab.I.l.l be made

~e:r

/:.9 tho

~t.es

1.3
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dOeD a.dVisen1e

r ....

e..nd

lIlay include pa~t to

Il ~~f1c1~

pe.rs.onally or to other
'!'he :r• .,.J.p~ o~ the

persons dGGGd appropri!lta by the Tl:'UIrtee5.
be.ne~ieiary

a. cOJllt'l.at4

or other persons to wexa distribution is udQ shall be

b:uat_.' Z1IapoIWibUities.

~. 0% tb.

MIlfGI.:I::W OJ' 1SSJr.l'S

e • 1.

Ea..ch 0% tho

truat IIhu'e8 8hal.1. be a .epal:1lt. t:ust

~or tl!"\l.St, IldOoa.n1:ing' , tax and al.1 .ot:hlll:'
o~

however, lDZLy Jdnqle th. property

pai:pocurs.

Tho TrUlteea,

the.••pe.uto 1:z'wIt, uaet8 aJ1I! :

•

interallt:ai in ·th. lIl1l1q~ed pro~.
always ~ equal to that

t%Ust'.

.

I

said 'C:ldivided .i:.nteres1: ahall. :

.

proporticma.t::e contr:U:nlUou

'

~o

the

1I1inc;l.ec1 asaata.

9 .1.

'l'h.i. t:rwJt 1- . .de 111 cal i%oXTlia. and .hA.l1 be

qcwarnod~ ooncb:1l~ and" ~ acc:ordinc;l. 'to c.l1~orna lay

" even though adJIiniate::.d el •

..m.n.

_hall not illcl.udo. any priftoipl. .
choice

o~ l.a~

The oaJ.U'orn.:ta ~II applied

1.".

OX'

~at.iJ:1ct"

to

ccmn.i~

_.

ACCO'tDl'rlNC
10.1. "Wh.i.l.e

BY

1'lm'S-:raS

the 'nUator is" livi=1c.iJ,

J:'Qndsr to TrUstor a writtan account

o~

the Tl:'Uatau shul

tha trust adain1atration.

Such e.CCQtmt GhL!.l be _de Well requ.t!5ted by the Tl:Uator.
1:11e daai:h

accounting

o~

to

~e

TrUStor,

e.ac::h

tlle '.r:I:'UsttHaa shal.l

benet1ci-.ry to

wh~

at

J:'andar
t.h*

14
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or

Uter

1m ~uAl

tbe

o~

i;be

'.
aeeOllI1tinq trust income le.Y be di.t:ri.hutad.

entitled t.o em account:..inq are llinorlS, their
:r~

delivered
t.o their pue2lU or gaa.rdian.
,

~re ~pac1ta.taCl,

to an account.ing'

(65)

~~

da.yw

~

.

the aecount sh4l.1 be

ac::eount1.n9
incl~in.g

)1"0

a11 ~c:t::.i~

to

ma~l be.

"the power to
/'

aCOOUJlb.,

shall

~

t:h. perSon c.ar~ tor

Ol:'

alt:ar

d~

~o

~

.

1l:!t~

are not Jc::nown or

....

tb..

..me

"

"

~

rendered to the

in t:h. t.\C:X~CJun~.

eonj\USc::1:1.Ol1 v.i1:h 'the

Ol:' QIe:1~

to vhaDl the

t:ina.l and CC:locluai.". in

bindintJ on a.U. per1Ions

.
~

~ .. ~

~ccpunthlgv

cU.o10.e.4

.

banafieiarl. .

bene~.ici.ary

benefic:itriea entj:tlad

aa.U.ill9" to tb.

ac:oounting- is to b. rendered (except
Trwstor),

Clhail b4I

trnlua the acoountinq i . objectad to in writing

.suc:h beneficiary.
aixty-:f.i..,.

~c:count:!og

th.oh

de1btQ:rad to t:.heir COD8~tOX', ~an

It b.ne"fioie.ri....

,

'J."be

in the 't.ru..t,

are not y_t born •

~

1tbal.1 havo

by ap~rovor.l. ot an aQCQUntiDg.

'1!Ri:7~

U.1 LZO~ A. "C01IAJf a.nd U1GCSNCl:1 CIi:AZEN are designated
AS

th& ~e~ o~ the

..

1.1.2

.

. trIl:ri:

the

On

hereun4o.r •

duth,

r . .igl1at ion

L:!ONA:.aDA A. COWAN I IAWll!l!fCZ CRBIJ5Elf obal.l lServ.

he.raun4or.

On tlle

or
CUJ

inoap&eity

O~

the aole TrUstee

4eatll, resignation or inca.pacity ot taAWlUDtO

<:::UAZmr, ROBERt' lDTOOlOll ah.al.l sarva a. a. Tru.8t:.. . h&raundar.

on the

death, :r•• iqn.ation or incapacity ot. ·.1other LEOKI.RDl. "A.. COV..lJ or
ltOBlmT. MNOOnN, at ~ tiJle when
Trtlst•• heratmdar,

LAWltl!:Rc:s

CHAZ!!1f is not. .erving a.s e

the WBLLS PlUlCO B.J.N:lt,

N.1-.

Trustee I or e.s the 501e Tl:U6tee baretmd er •

000149
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on

----

ahLll s.a:rve as

Il

'.
t.rust,

1.1. J 70r P\Ul'OGo:a of the int6::prctation 01: this

the incapacity ot the TzUrtor, or of
be

ahall

TrIlstee,

ocmel:asIvely

,certification ot two

&

'1'rU!Itae to lSel:'Ve a.a suci1

.stablished

.

by

the

vri~te.n

phYD1cians attend'nC] SUell TrWJtor or

(2)

'l'ruatoe that such 'rrU.ata.r or Tl'\l.Iitaa i . unable 'to 1I1Ul8qe his own
~taira

or tho.. ot the trust.
Trwst;ee 7f4I'-.y raai9l'l

1.1.4 .A.

resignation to all ot

~ans

or

~

rr.t,

9iving'" written notice ot

carrct. inCOlZl4 beneficiaries or their
"

by

~111nq the approPriat;a pet1t!on vith the court
:rn'the avent ot r . . icanatioft,
•
convey the t:.rua1:. estate to the

b.aviDq ju:r.illdJ.c:t1on aver tha 1:l:Us1:..

the resigninc;· 'trwst:.ee shall
daaiqn..ted

~.or

Truat:a.es.

11. $ Bo :bond

.bAl.l.' be

req:a.1red ot any

~..

name4

"herein.
11.6 lto IlJUCcesaor'rr11stee ahall be' obligated t:.o

41%,, 1I1n e

O~ ravi." t:ha ~,' .-.corda or ac;ta g;e ~.Y pz:wv1oaa -rru.'te6.

A Trwrtee shall be re.ponaJ.b~e onlY' tor

his ow aet&l or omi•• ions

which
. a:re ~.li
' . neqliqent or JI.Ilde .in bad faith.

u- 7

Jro

ana

c:t.&l.i»g with

~e

~

concerning the nlidity or any act1cn8 ot IIU.Oh
11.8

~

inquire

1'rUtItSO$.

The T'rUstees JUly receive rauonable c:ol!lpeJlS4t.ion

r.i:lllbUl:fS~t: tOl:' tI¥pCn:se8.

~cI:l ~~UOD ~

reulI):nu:-aement

fo!; e:x:penae$ llhal.l. be paid. troJQ .md Iihe.ll be a px-oper' expense
the tzust.

1.6

0001.50

'L t

39'\.1d

C":lI .... T----·

-

~

ot

12.1 The

property
I
\lhatbar
I

TrUstee&

shall

with

hav.,

all

or personal, \lh1ch uy at any time be held

~l

includ..ing iU'fY property hel.d

,hertJUllde.r t

to

raBpec:t.

ror a Jnor,

Whether

constituting principal. or a~u1o.t:4K! inOCZ18, the toilovin9 povoru

and riqht.5, Wfch may.be exerciacd in the 'rrtbrtau' discretion at

any 'CilIle an4
he:reUllder

%'rclI 'C:i.lM to

~

tilDe dur1.nq the contJ..nua.nc:.
dUtr1b~ion

until. Il<:tual

C-)

TO

retain

o;t al.l property:

Illy part 9t the trwrt

1nt.o the1.r po •• e.81.on, tor ~=' l.~

dee:m a~l.•. and

or

property

comincI

t:1JIua ... ~y .ay

without d1varait;Cl!.tion.

To vote,,.. ,aM.to Cliv8 praxi- to

(b)

any truat

o~

.

~ota,

any

.

secur1Uu having votiDq ripta, to pay any U.UIlDCl't..ltrliad
upcn

stoolt

and

~

to

O~

right

any

option

to

lJ'W:)8c::ript1.on, convarc1on or otherwise Which Jl&y at any t.ilae
Qttach,

belopg or' ~ g1Y11n to

the

ho1dtarll D~ any

.toclCa,

bonds, sec:arl1:iu, or other iJlst:t:Wll.eJi't~ ~ any natura theraOf
toX':lll.1lig put of th. truat
'ro

(0)

consol.i.d.ation,
torecl.oaur.,
~~~

join

or

pl.cn

Dny

.1n

eOlDl:lination,

cb«:AC;8 ot

ot

estate.
reo~zation,

capituiza1:ion,

anTCQr,po~~tiont

1.liSC.ae,

'trust, or

lDOrtqcga.

dilS801tttion,

or other

.

chang-A

orqaniz~tion,

of

or th$

property or o.lnse.ta thereof; to depocsit. 'banda I lft.ooka, or at:her
se.C1ll:'ities

he.ld by

oo=mJ. t.too,

~

them vith

t.o t.a.M CJ'W.

any

ho~d

pl:'Otectiva

ally ••c;u:ri t..10.

or siJDil.ar
J."Duad .in

connection therewith end to pe.y ~y ~ ••••ualUlI1ts thereUnder.

17
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(d)

pledge beld

~

enforce ally 1II.Orlqas-e or deed 01: b.-ust or

h~e.r and.

t.o purchase at e:ny .ala taenunde.r

any pzoperty subject thereto.
(e)

To p\U:e.base

.~it.i&8

or o1:h@

pr~ ~rom,

and ~o JU3aa loana azd adnJ'lC91llent., ••c:ure4 or unsaau.ra4, to,

1:.he mc.autor ' or other rapresentative of the '1"rU5tor'e estI:.ta.
C~)

'l!o ~9&, OOJl;t;,:':Ql, 50U at p@1ic. OX' pr;1Vll~

eue for

~ OJ:'

convay,

eXdJ a nga ,

aj~ w1~

on c:redit.,

partition;

or w1th?Ut notic., to
asabdivid.,

cU~ide,

lI1OX'tg'aqe,

~e&:tQ. i.zprov., aM ~pah, ~o ' ~t opt.!.au.; to l.eaae ~ar

.

. .

.

te'7:ID.IJ· v:{th.1.n

07; ,

.~.

.xtendi~' beyond the ~ti~ ot any trust,

~or ~y p\h:pca., :tncl.udhg' exPl.or.:t:1Q~ to~ 'cmd raacva.l. o~ ~
~

c;tas or oil,
r.l.~

then or

( ')

to

~ 80

thare&~

(g)

favor ox

Wich .ay

.w:...tt. to a,rblt:raUon, ral..• .aa.
or ot.l1enri•• adj'Ut clailda in

any t:.rwst, to

actiolul arxl

i21tp~y_eut.

be IInoted thereon. '

OOMid~tion,

~t

(11)

l . . .ed or any

To ~.,

wit:.b er vithout

d.~and

to .nt..r into a.ny covan&n-e. ox- ecp-ae:mant:s

alld

inzrt:itut., eo=prollti•• ,

Ilhd

~B ..

'ro, carry SUCh :l.naura.nee as the 'l'%"\USt.eaa lIU'!ly

deem adVUeble u

am u:pensa

other assusments on

ally

o~

l!:!e

tbAa t:J:wIt:." to pa.y prai'lmS and

ins'1lran~&

COlltrad wb.iab JLe.Y' at

a:ny time ~. held b~.uuder.
(i)

'!Io

invest

~d

reinvliSt.

any property hal"-

ine~,

in lIU~ 1!UIl000U "he!

he reun4er • includinc; aCCUlIlu1aeed

18
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in IIUc:ll property, r61U or

pc;arGlo~l,

us the- TrUst~s shall deQ

tit e.nd proper.
To borrow aoney fro. any FersOJl ,

(j)

~o~:rut1on, :illcl~

the 'l'ra.taas

h~ert

purpose, tIpoJl auc:h t.erJu Gc! cotlditic:n8 a.
~

proper,

~c:umbar

to 0bl1tlilte the truat

and

or

'tor e.ny trust

th.

~or

finl,

~t~ 2Il.e.,Y

r8.p4~J

any of! the t:.rtt.t property by .ortgag.,

to

ot traai:,

~

pledge, or otherwi•••
~

(k)

hold

1'l:Ustat!S, or in i:l:l.

cy

~.:J'

own

1llSJDQJI,

.

the

'l!ra:ri:.~1

no-i'llce, or

in

property

their

naJl.s

or in th.

as

at

JlAlI,I!I..S
;

~1ste.red

.-

in such

eOlUli~io~ t:bAt

t1tle shall pua by del.ive:ry.
,

'1'0 .-ploy CO~8l.

(1)

and to pay the:zIa. II ~0XUlhl.
CO\.1.nfItal.

and co1:pOrate or other

compensatiQTll to act on

and. 1nc:ur no l1ability

~ra.ined

b:am.

I

•

~Ol:

adv1~

of'

tU1Y a.ction taken or
•

a~ic..

t:o eut:h

pa%'1J11ant

..

a941lI1ts

- (a) . ~ect:·to tbll c~tion that'the consol.1C!a1:.10n
,.sludI. .nat deil'troy tha

consolidate,

~or

tb. property

o~

separa~.

id,entity

o~

the trusts,

to

purpoces ae aami.IlJ.atration and. iJlveotmant,
the &avera.l

a.1l:~~e ul'ldj:~1ded

truat.s

~~ad

hereby and to

interests in auc:ll eon.ol.i4at.ed rund to the

several txu.ta.

(n)
n~tur.,

'fa bUy, GeU. e.nd trade in Dacurii:1ea of any

1nc~uding

opt1onG, short sales, on uarqin,

such purpos•• to DllLi1'lt:ain

IUld

C;-=lII;1T~ -

39Vd
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for

operata. lIar9in accounts with

0001.53
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~

bl:'okers. and to plec1g. c:ny securities held or

them with such b~e

lOanA ~d

.ecurity t'or

U

~cJ:ued

by

e.c1¥anc:es.

To ~o eUl such acta, take all wah proceedintJ.

(0)

end exsrei. . all sucb rights and privil8C1ca, although neither
con.t~4

specifically herainbet'ora man1:iotwd. nor
121tl

~th

tharaof

upon them by

relation to sUCh property ... it the absolute oYn4n
in

aM

<=OVGllants

connection

ac.;re~a

or

1.2.2 l:~,

~er

th8l:'eVith

bind1 -qq the

c:onsul.tat.1'o~

t.o

into

any

"anotbu,

the

ente;t"

~ eCltato.

.
'
with "one

,

Trusteea are u:nabJ.o to agree with one
a.not:har regarding
any aattar
,
"
.
.

a.:r~eotinq tlw '.1 l4ldniat:n.t1on

the. decision
. or LEOtQlUlA A..
• ball. qc::rvarn..

'her, in

ar

diat:rlbutioD o~ the trust

cowAN,
While
.-

as

~.a,

LB~ A. CCWA!T ahaJ.l a.4Vl •• the ~ruatee ArVing

wri.t~,

o:r bar 4ec:ia.:t.otl,. &ld such

v1.th the dec:1Jdon

ot

LEOlQ~

A. C01QlI.

15ha.1.l %lOt be .l..iabl.. t:o'; ony ~on
C019AH

ISba lIS .servin9

~

esn:at.e'-

!rru.8teo .h&11 c:c2Ipl.y

Eowevar,.uc:h !raatee

ro: the action o:r

L20J0.ltt1A. A.

as Trustee pursuant to :such decision.
~ot.vi1:hata.nd1 11'1 t:h.ia Secti.on 12..;i,

the trust Gbal.J. b6

bound to third parti.. by tb~ a.c:t!ons of any 'l"rulltco ot
held ~t to 1:.h.i.- !rrust lIql:aeme.nt.

~ing'

q&ne.rality

t'oreqoiDg r

of

the

trust

AnY aob;i.on 'Ul.keu by

r.rwstee aball be binding upon the t:..l:'wat estate and DAY
upon by t:llird part.ies

Ii

with the tl:nIIt.

~

eo

relied

WithoUt limiting tJ1a

the" 'lXUste..

are . ~c1fiee.lly

authorized t:.o deposit and witbdn.tt tlmds troa bank, RVin9"s and
~oan

~

other ....cooun-t:. -....inta..inec1 by the t.:rwJt, e.nd to ae11 o.

20

c-:Jt ...... ~--- -

,

.
purcha.Se assets ot the tl:U5t estate, upon the authorization Q~ lUll"

one Truatee
•

~o~.

12.3 On

any div.t.iolJ ot the b:wrt

or partial or

&81:ate

~.

.final. dist::r:ihution of' the tl:'wIt aatate,

'rrUStcJ JUly a.1l.OC&te
•
the trust. ~ta in undivi4adintereat:. OT' in kind,' a.r partJ.y ill

a.t. ~lua.tiC)NJ naaonably d.etandned by the

lIloney and partly in kind

required to JI8.ke a pront.

~
,

a non-pronta

c!i~ibu~ol1

ot" the trust

~loc:aticn p~idoc1 ~o' ~ ••'t.
.

6Sta.ta bat lIIay

aJ.l.odata4 to

~oh

,

12.4- AllllLlltt.ere

~

deterJainaticne ot I allocations

..

t:cS and c:::barqaa ac;ainst:., principal IIl'Id inc:cze dUring the lUet.ime of
the. '.r:r:U8tcr

~1

ba gmrarn4W:i ' ~ 'tb4 »r:1nc:lipal. uw! D1c::ome Act

'thea State of ca.lit'onrla. i:A -.~~~ at t:lM
det.erllination inaotar u

)

IJUch- Act i.8

r~ de1::el:'Jllinat~ Q~,

aM

principal

incazM

Q~

~

of Neb auch

appUc::a])le..

All lIIAtters

al.loea:t:!ol\c i:.o aM cha.2:vo. apJ.:aat:

~ollc:n.r.1.ng'

the

'l!rUator,,,'

,death

'gov~d:by the PriDoipal atxt :Income Act o~ the state
.in affect: at t:he date of her cieat:h,.

:In!sof'ar aa

fShal.l

~

or.Cal1~ornia
llUeh 1ct

i.JI

applicab1 ••
l2.5 Any Trusteell by

tUing

vri~

o-t the t:ruat e.ncl gi-vinq not;ica to all currant
tru!lt lZllly

surrender I

discretion g:ranted to

di$cleim or
s~id

re1~.

1'l:Ustees

o~

2l.
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·

bel1eticie.~i.es

eny ri¢t.,

this bust.

shul. be in-evocable as to cuoh !l':rnsrtaGIZ.

III

notic:a in the records

I

of tb-

powers or

such bction

I.

.

.

.
12.6 The

ot the Tz"Uator'a
At ~ent

TruIIt08:J

are

~uthori%ec!!

Genera.tion-Ski~1ng

'rra.na:t.r

26~1

au1;.hor1s:e4 lly Seot1on

to c.llQC4U · any portion

ot

th~

TalC

eGoS'"')

belIption

A

Intal:nal Revenue. Coda,

which re.maills unal.loc::atad at: tho 1:na. of! th_ Tl:Uator's 4ea.tb.

12.7 1'he 1'rUstee9 are aut.hol:'izad to divide any t:.ru3t.
created
GS~

hereunder into sepe.l:"l:Lte t%usts

and prcpe.rty INbj.et to

Q~

property axampt troll the

QS1Wf.

.

.

dUcretion to P'lY cr apply 1.ncQIIe or. princ1pal of any trust so

P.l.YJI:EN'l! OP 'DDS
J.3.J. Al.~

any

g~Uon-~ppi.nq ~~a%"

"dqth ot
02:"

inhex-ita.llce·, estate or other death taxes, and

~r,

any pgrt.1.on

t:-xa... , t:h4t 1II4Y, by raaaon at the

:be a:ttr1D\1t.able to the 'rrUstor' _ probab estate,

oj!

1.t

~

I

to lUll' property. beld l'urauant

~

or

becOlling subj act to the' teraa ot t:hi. ~ AVr~'t a.t tUG t1llle

oX'

a8

a Clomsequence ot tha ~r'. deGtl:t, sbal] be ~ by the

~.

:froa the

lUUUtU

of the tl:u$t ..tat. 1ll1oea.t04 to 'l.'RUS'l! U.

DBl'Dtt'l'IONS· I.HD RI1L.'BS 01' CONS"l'lm'cn:ON

For purposu

terms and

o~

t.h1. iluJ1:l::'taIuu:lt, da:tinitiona ot 'c:artun

J:Ul.4US of construction are pl:OVidad.

14.1

Re~ere.noes

to 'IIi.sue- mel!pl le.watl descendants in the

:firat, a.oc~d or any othar <1eyreo ot tho ~c.stor dea1gmlte4.

1.4 • 2 A laga.lly. adopted

edoption under the.

~'1a

chi~d

pt ei9'hteen

0001.56
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D.-e the data or

(18) yeu-s and sw:h adopted

22

S/£l

who vas

•

I

child'S l.aWful deaoendant3 by blood or
AS

~c!opt.ion

shall l>e oona1deX'ad

lavful deseandanta of the e.dopt.itlg paren:ta and ot e:nycme who 15

by blood or adoption an ancestor
•

1.4.

~ :R.e~.:rencsca

to

ot tha adopting parents.

"tillare"

henaficdary' _ proportional inta1"aS1:

&II

or

.portionfl

J&e4D.

a

d.et:U"JIlined bY' the 1:.e:rID.s 8l'1d

conditions of this inatx:u:llent.
14." Ra:t'e.l:"~

execc:trix~

executor,

to "'oxecuto:" or tfexeC\1t0ts"

lI.dla..1.niJ;t:rator I

lII8a:n

.adllr.inUt:z;a.tttx,

other pers.on or persons

an

perao!Sal:

re.prasenta't.ive

or

~.SPOlUSt..bUiq-

for t:.he a~t.iort o;f the cr:r:ust~'. prQ!:Iat •

charged

vith
.

the

~

esta.te..

14. 5
eol1e<]e,

b:l!~c..

1::0_ "educa.t.ion" .aha.J.1. weem ••CQ~,

g:raClua.'b. C1l4 poat--gradUat:a st'tldy at public or

px-ivate

"inat:..1tut1olW•
1.4 .. '

trnl.eas

the

c::ontext

clearly

requires

another

<:anstl:Uction, 1::b.o JllBoc::;a.l.ine, ;Cftm1n:i n e Dll4 neutar geMe:1l &bAll. each

include the others, ADCl the aaingular cm4 plurfll. Dtimbtu:'s sha.11.
incl1l4e the other ..
14 ", X:I! mlY prov1Giou or prov1.S1ol:.S of 1:.b1s in.-t::.:r:aa-.nt 111

inve.lid or unenforceable, the rellUli.ninl;; Pl:'oviaions

to be tu11y
1:

.ha..l~ co~t:::inu.

op~tiv•• •

cel:t:.i.t'y

~t.

I haVe read. the 1.992

~a8tat4lUUOllt

of the

Leona.rd.a A. Cowan T':r:uet ot 1982 anct that it eorreetly'''stl!!:tas the

23

IE/V?;

39\1d

•

J

1m, I.ol!:OHUDA.I... COWAM 1U:l4 ~ClI

of' tho TrUst ~t

t:.anlS.o: the t.x"UcIt,

0:

an ZEN I tlle T.tUSteae

Leonarda. A. "ccwa."'l, bavUq revi.wed th.

. . coutaine4

in th.

.

~1nt

~

and

.

Restatement. therao~, bm:~ aoc.~ aM agx.. to' be :b01.In4 by tl1e

tarllfi

o~

sa..id t.rwrt..

-

..
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III

•

•

WI'l!NESS WI halJd

and otfic1a.l seal.."
.

tYrt4s·d..~
Not:ary Public

25
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'

,

If

... ..,

._- ..----- .. ---

I

i

,"

l!
iI
I

I
I

.

or

All u.eta now held in 1::he naJae
I.:EO~ A. COWAN, CUll
,
'l'%uct_ of! the TrUItt Agreement of Leonal:'da A. Ctnnul.
i

,~

.

.1,.

0001.60
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?£Nd

.

.:L:EON.AlU>A A COWAN and. LAWRENCB'CBAZBN. as Tm..~ of the Trust Agreemeut
dcscrihed a.b<m:, hereby ack:Dowledse aDd accept the ful~ TltIt Amt:ndmem..

DUed:

'5t:pip"J')r&r ?ti

1997

r

ot;ifI, ~c

;
I.ecn:sarda. A. CO'1fU1

rfo~~
STAlE OP CAUFOlilNl'A)

) as.

COUN'IY.OE~

• 1/'

')
)"COlJ'NTY OF SAN P'ltANCISCOl

)

000161

...
FIRSt AMENDMENT OF 1"H3
1m:RESTATEMENT OF THE '!'RUST AGREEMENT
OF

LEONAlilDA A COWAN

Punaam to tba applicable proYisioas ofthe 1m ~ew:ut oftbe Trost Agrer.meat of
LeonardI. A. ~ executed 00. Oc:tob« 2. 1m.. wbicb re:sbd:es in its eadRty the I.EONA!.DA
A COWAN'IlUJ'ST all982, Itld wflcttinLcoDuda A. COWJ11 reservtd tbe~ to alter, amend
or rcvob the trust in whole or m. p2rt..lb:Iaanl A. Ccnnn bcRby pertW1y ~ Iafd Ttwst

.

~asmnowr.

~ me p:rOvisfoos of~ -i.:z(d) t;n: hereby deIea:d in Wit euthtty,

SECQND. IiDcemtJST I.,..., dimbrue4 by ~lnRST ~ tho ptovUWl1 of
Section <4..1(d) are hetCIby darificd to iadi~ &: 'IRIJST II ia dip oaly trust required to be
ombliabed \JJIdw tho 1'nlft Ap~ md its t.-ma are b:n:by p!ti5ed _ co",6. llwA; azsd

LASI.. ia. the 1eIeOQd'm1 third kDftJ~ of Section 11.2..
RpIaced by BENllY WINE'ISKY.
.

:BiJ:Bmu' MNOOICIN is heRby

In doth« ~ the ~ atAid Tnla ~ arehcRby fISitiec1 and
CUnei!! wed

I

.

oeni:fY ~ 1 bavC read tbcI fOrsoiD& F&rIt '.A~ 1o.~ 1m ~ of11lo

Trust ~ ~A. CawmaDd tbatit ~ Ibtef b cbaosea I'WiIh to make. I
approve 5ZdYnt AmeDdmoeat in .n JI~ _ ~ dat thO ~ ~ it.
Sipdu C4mId, Califomia. thiI:1'1th rJayof
-

:-,

--yO

et'.......

5tr~tur

r./).4

1

000:162

~d

16'l
UZ!

1l

l!J91•

/'-A'VJ~--:,
I

I
- _._-.------

..
I

LEONAltDA A. COWAN TRUST OF 1982·

1ANUAlcr 1. 1999 TO DECF.M6ER 31. 1~9
(Sec~'

ASSETS

&m

CnmpilIliOSlRcport)
ON RAW ON DJ3<;El4n ;p 11 1239

I

~

Dcsmilztign

1

Cub bdd in Bank of America
~ mn:nbcr 00332-18170

2

I Amotmt
i21,2S0.S2

.

Cash held iD·Smith Hamer
InVt#tl2SrJ1I ~ IICC:OUDt DJI'alber 635-03186·H

33,854.71
3

144,000.00
UDdivid.cd ~'" ~ bI mcdi!f;4ll ~ a:od lot

629 Hamptonlload. A}amcda, CA act olS325.135
ofOakJand

martpg~ to Bank

s

UndiviW SO% imI=st iu 554 IClCS
6215 Oem- Valley Road, ~cx:b, CA

52,&64.60
337.940.00

6

194.460.00

7

Wt:Dior, AJabcm· ~ U.s. post o1ftce

431.000.00

8

Truz:tlC, Minnesota Main U.s. post: o1lico

162.100.00

9

Lewistoa" Mil'.lJ)CSOf;a Main U.s. poISt otftco

167,QOO.OO

9.650..00

10
11

Liznitr.d putDc:nb1p ~ mCa1c:ah 1982

23.749.00

12

Limited pannenhip intc:n::st in T~ Rainer Pattuea

2.0,000.00

Limited partDa:sbip iDtr.t"est in Mencm; L.P.

.

11,700.12)~
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LAST WILL & TESTAM F:NT
OF

ZACHARY A. COWAN
I,

ZACHARY A. COWAN, of Declo, Cassia County,

Idaho,

publish and declare this to be my Last Will and Testament
revoking all other and former wills and codicils that may have
been made by me.
CLAUSE 1
DECLARATIONS
I am single.

I have no children.

All of my property is my separate property.

It is my

intention by this Will to dispose of all property which I am
entitled to dispose of by will, community and separate, real,
personal and mixed, which I may own or ,have any interest in
whatever at the time of my death.
CLAUSE 2.
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
I nominate and appoint Stephen D. Westfall as the
Personal Representative of my estate.

In the event Stephen D.

Westfall should predecease me, or fail for any reason to act as
my Personal Representative, then,

{)\Q('~ K"'.~

~ e'd ~wN

Marieann Chris trnan, Meridian
Representative of my estate.

I

in such event, I appoint

Idaho, as the Personal

I direct that the Personal

Representative and alternate Personal Representative appointed in
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•

I

this paragraph shall serve without bond.
CLAUSE 3
POWERS OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
My Personal Representative is authorized and empowered
to exercise all powers in the management of my estate that any
reasonable and prudent individual would exercise in the management of similar property owned in my Personal Representative's
own right, upon such terms and conditions as may seem best to my
Personal Representative, and to execute and deliver any and all
instruments and to do any and all acts which my Personal
Representative may deem necessary or proper to carry out the
purposes of this Will.

)

CLAUSE 4
DIRECTIONS TO PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
I

direct that my body be cremated with no services.

I

direct that my friend, Bob Soninger, shall be responsible for the
ashes.

My ashes shall be spread over Carson City, Nevada

brothels.
CLAUSE 5
DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN PERSONAL PROPERTY BY SEPARATE WRITING
I

order and direct that certain items of my personal

property shall be distributed according to a written list of
items and intended recipients thereof prepared either in my
handwriting or signed by me, if such a list is in existence at
the time of my death:

Initials
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CLAUSE 6
RESIDUE
All of the rest, residue and remainder of my property

which I own or have any interest in whatever at the time of my (
f\~~ ~~V" SdC,.nt.. r~
death, I give, bequeath, and devise to Marieann Christman. All
interests that I have in any trusts I give, bequeath. and devise
to

Ma~nfr~stman.

I exercise any power of appointment that

fYltrr~ "til ,IJgS

I might hold and appoint Marieann Christman.

If for any reason

Marieann Christman predeceses me, I give, bequeath, and devise
all of my property to her children by right of representation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
seal this

day of _____________________ , 2000.

Zachary A. Cowan
The foregoing instrument, consisting of four (4)
pages, including the page signed by the undersigned witnesses,
was, on the date thereof signed, published and declared by the
above-named Zachary A. Cowan, to be his Last Will and Testament,
in the presence of us, who, at his request and his presence and
in the presence of each other, and on the same date, have
subscribed our names as witnesses thereto.
__-----______--_______________________ Residing at
________________________________ Residing at
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STATE OF IDAHO

)

) ss
county of Cassia

)

We, ZACHARY A. COWAN, the Testator, and
______________________________________________________ , the witnesses,
respectively, whose names are signed to the attached or foregoing
instrument, being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the
undersigned authority that the Testator signed and executed the
instrument as his Last Will and Testament and that he had signed
willingly, and that he executed it as his free and voluntary act
for the purposes therein expressed; and that each of the
witnesses, in the presence and hearing of the Testator, signed
the Will as witnesses and that to the best of his knowledge the
Testator was at the time an adult, of sound mind and under no
constraint or undue influence.
Testator
Witness
Witness
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by
zachary A. Cowan, the Testator, and .__________________________________
_____________________________ , the witnesses, this
___________________ 1

day of

2000.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Burley, Idaho
My Commission expires

0001.67
-4-

iJih

L

,

Craig L.

~tcadoVrs,
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ISB No. 1081

Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA. \VLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000

P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 8370 I ~1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxellcom

mpoints@ha\ov)e.>troxelI,com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
MARY KILLlNS SOlGr\IER,
Plaintift~

vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV

2009~517

REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell, Ennis
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this Reply ':0 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion
tor Summary Judgment.

As the Court is aware, and as set forth with dtations in Mr. Fletcher's opening
memorandum on this motion, this is an attorney malpractice action filed by Plainti ff in which
Plaintiff asserts that she was denied her testamentary "entitlement" as a named benefk:ary in the
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will of Zachary Cowan. See Memorandum in Opposition to ~1otjon for Stilllmary Judgment
("Memorandum"), p. I.
[n the probate case pertaining

tl)

Mr. Cowan's Will and Estate (Cassia County Case

No. CV 2006 1234), Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation

o-~the

WiJI,

claiming she was "entitled" to cCl1ain monies from the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust (hereinafter the
"Leomu'da Trust"), and that Clause 6 ,.)f Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous; thus, Plaintiff
asserted that the court in the probate case should allow and/or consider parol evidence to aid the
Court in determining the intent of the testator Mr. Cowan.
The court in the probate cas~ found there was no ambiguity in Mr. Cowan's Will and
held that the residue of Mr. Cowan's Estate was to be paid to the American Cancer Society.
Plaintiff appealed the court's decision.
On or about September 29, 2008, the parties in the probate case entered into a
"Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for
Construction of the Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter
Stipulation for Settlement").
In consideration for Plaintiff signing the Stipulation for Settlement, she dismissed her
appeal and received payment from the American C,meer Society in the amount of $100,000.
As a preliminary matter, PlaintEf misstates ;:he nature of the case in her opposition to
Mr Fletcher's Motion for Summ.ary Judgment. While it is true that Mr. Cowan had at one time a
beneficial interest in the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiffs claim that the trust referenced in Clause 6 of

Mr. Cowan's Will - - that Plaintiff receive "all benetIcial interests that [Mr. Cowall has] in any
trusts

is actuaJly referencing the Leonarda Trust. Clause 6 of the Will states in relevant pan

that, "[aJII beneficial interests that J have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary
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Killin[s]." The Will does not reference: the Leonarda Tnlst. Such an inference by PlaintifI is not
supported by the record. Because the Will does not reference the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiffs

allegations related to the power of appointment or that the Leonarda Trust terminated when
Mr. Cowan reached the age of 50, are irrelevant and (.'ertainly do not create an issue of fact
related to this Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Leonarda Trust could have been one of the trusts in which Mr. Cowan had an interest
at any given time, but it certainly was not the exclusive trust specified in Clause 6 of
Mr. Cowan's WiH, nor arguably the only trust in which Mr. Cowan may have had an interest at
the time the Will was drafted or at the time of his death.
Secondarily, Plaintiff asSI~rts that Mr. Fle:tcher was negJigent in allegedly not reviewing
the Leonarda Trust document. Again, the Will does not specifically reference the Leonarda
Trust. Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit on '\1r. Cowan's intent is clear - -- upon Mr. Fletcher's inquiry,

Mr. Cowan told Mr. Fletcher that he did not know if all of the property had been transferred to
him from the Leonarda Trust at the time the Will was drafted, and when asked if he w,mted to
leave the language in the Will to bequeath whatever interest he had as a beneficiary in "any InlSt"
to Plaintiff upon his death, Mr. Cowan stated that he wanted to leave that language in his Will.
Plaintiffs supposition is that she should have received something, or that Mr. Fletcher
had a duty to assure that she received something under the Will, but that is not so. Plaintiff could
only receive what interest Mr. Cowan may have had in "any trust. H 1t does not necessarily
follow that Plaintiff is to receive something if sht;' is named in the Will; Plaintiff can only receive
something if:\1r. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. There 1: nothing
specified in Mr. Cowan's Will that he intended Plaintiff to receive any interest specifically in the
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Leonarda frust. As Sl.!t forth below, W:r Fletcher did not have a duty to assure that Plaintitl
would in fact receive "something" under the tenns of the Will.
Mr. Fletcher unambiguously drafted

~1r.

em.van's Will as Mr. CO'Nan specilicaHy

requested, and Plaintiffhas not created any issue of material fact that would prevent this Court
from making such a findbg. The Will is unambiguous. as the Magistrate Judge determined. The
Will is unambiguous as agreed to by the Plaintiff, when she settled her Appeal There carmot be
any "malpractice" when from

thl!

beneficiary did not receive what

four ·;;omers of the Will, there is no basis for determining that a

th~: te~tator intendj~d.

Finally, Mr. Fletcher cannot be said to have caused Plaintiff to "recover substantially
[ess" than the value of the Leonarda Trust property, as asserted by Plaintiff, when the
unambiguous provision in the Will regarding Plaintiff did not reference the Leonarda Trust and
which provision was specificaJly kept in the Will at the request of Mr. Cowan to provide for
Plaintiff in the event Mr. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. Of course,
at the time of his death, Mr. Cm-van did not hold or possess any interests in any trusts; thus,
Plaintiff was not entitled to any interest under th,e Will.
In sum, Plaintiff settled her claim with regard to Mr. Cowan's Esulte for $100,000 .. - a
payment of which Plaintiff was arguably not entitled given the unambiguous language contained
in Mr. Cowan's Will.
1.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION

Plaintiff argues that her claim against Mr Fletcher is not barred by the statute of
limitation because "[ w]here the exis':en<:e, or not, of any alleged negligenc,~ depends on the
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outcome of litigation, there is no objective proof of actual damage until the litigation is
concluded." Memorandum, p. 3.
Plaintiff asserts that until the Magistrate ruled on September 17, 2007, that Plaintiff
should take nothing under the Will, an:, daim agabSl attorney Fletcher for

malpractic~

would be

"speculative" and the statute of limitations could not begin to run until that date. Memorandum.
p. 4, Plaimiffs argument is withom merit.
Plaintiffs claim in the probate case was lhat Plaintiff was entitled to monies yet to be
distributed to Mr. Cowen from the Leonarda Tnlst. See claim of Mary Killins Soignier, tiled on
or about January 2, 2007 in Cassia County Case No. CV 06-1234.
Tellingly, by Plaintiffs own assertion, in drafting Mr. Cowan's Will to include the
language in the fonn that Mr. Fletcher did, Plaintiffs beneficial interests in trusts was frustrated
because the Leonarda Trust had been unninated prior to Mr. Cowan's execution of his Will. See
Complaint and Demand for Jill)' Tlial, p. 3, ~ V. By Plaintiffs own account, it was

Mr, Fletcher'S act of allegedly negligently drafting Mr. Cowan's Will that caused her to be
damaged. Contlnnation of that "drunage" by a court (to commence the running of the statute of
limitations) misconstrues the applic:lbk: law.

In the probate case, Plaintiff was seeking a finding from the court that Mr. Cowan's WilJ
was ambiguous and that the Court should look to affidavits to detennine the intent of the testator
Mr. Cowan. in tenns of what he intellde:d to bequeath to Plaintiff. Quite differently, in this

malpractice action, Plaintiff is asserting that the inclusion of the provision in Mr.

COW<Ul'S

\Vill,

that Plaintiff be awarded any beneficial interest heJd by Mr. Cowan in "any trust" at the time of

rus death,

\V"aS

frustrated because the Leonarda Trust was tenninated. These are mutually

exclusive inquiries. Plaintiffs claim of damage in this case and measure and/or extent of
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damages is iU'guably entirely different than Plaintiffs claim of "entitlement" before the court in
the probate case.
nlC

harm 'to Plaintiff actually (lccurred when, according to Plaintiffs allegatiois,

Mr. Fletcher negligently drafted the Will, not \V;1en the court in the probate case ti:mnd that
Plaintiffhad no interest in Mr. (o,,·o,:an') Estate. Arguably, even if the court in the probate CJse
found that there was an ambigui1.Y in Mr. Cowan's Will and that he in fact intended to bequeath
to Plaintiff certain property of his Estate, the court could not have held that she had an interest in
the Leonarda Trust, as that trust was terminated at the time Mr. Cowan's Will was drafted by
Mr. Fletcher; Plaintiff, per her own argument, would still have been damaged notwithstanding
any finding by the probate court. Put another way, when the court in d1e probate case dismissed
her claim that she was a beneficiar~ under the Will. that holding did not affect her claj m fi)r
damages against ~fr. Fletcher.
Contrary to Plaintiff's asse11ions, a party does not have to have their claim for attorney
malpractice adjudicated by a trier of fact to trigger the statute of limitations. and City ofly/ceal!

v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), d.oes not support that unqualified propJsition.
Mr. Fletcher does not dispute, fbr the purpose of rhis motion, that in certain cases a
detemination of actual damages will depend upon that outcome of certain litigation. However,
where the existence of "some damage" does not depend on the outcome of a lawsuit, the statute
of limitations begins to accrue. See Buxton at 662, 20 I P.3d at 635.
Plaintiff misconstrues the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Bu.xton. There were two
distinct rulings in Buxton, wherein the City of McCall sued its attorneys based on allegations of

negligent advice. Two counts of the City'S complaint were based on aJlegations of negligent
advice by the City's attorney pertair. ing to termination of a contract and the withholding of
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certain payments to contJ6ctorS. T1C Idaho Supreme Court held that 'Jntil outcome of the
litigation related to this "advice" on the breach of contract claims, there ~0ujd nut be a
determination of damage; that is, the City could have prevailed in the litigation and arguably
suffered no damage. Id, 146 Idaho at 663,201 P.Jd at 636. The remaining claim ofneg{igence
in Bu.:rlon had to do with the City attorney advising the City to release a lien against J-U-8
Engineering. The ldaho Supreme Court held that the date
its lien was the date on which

th,~

011

which the City of McCall relea.<;ed

(i1mage occurred because that was the date on which the City

of\1cCalllost its opportunity to recover against J-U-B Engineering. ld. at 663,201 P.3d at 636.
Based on Plaintiff's allegations, there was no "speculation" that she had in fact been
damaged when Mr. Fletcher allegedly negligently drafted Mr. Cowan's Will in 2005; that is
when Plaintiff suffered some ascertainable damage, as there was objectivdy ascertainable
evidence that Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in the Leonarda Trust (which is the stated
basis of Plaintiff's claim). Alternatively, if there is some question as to whether Plaintiff
suffered "some damage" when the

wm was dralled in May of2005, there is no question that

some damage occurred at the time of Mr. Cowan's death in October of2006, as any opportunity

to amend the Will would be impossible.
The outcome of the probate case was not dispositive regarding Plaintiffs claims against
Mr. Fletcher and Plaintiff suffered som! damage prior to the commencement of that li1igatiol).
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute ofIimitations.

H.
MR. FLETCHER DID NOT HAVE A ))UTY TO PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Fletcher's actions, in drafting the Will of Mr. Cowan, fell below
the applicable standard of care and, :hercfore, breached a duty of Plaintiff Memorandum. p. 10.

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
:'vl0TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
04166

0001.74

~·~;,o

1611d37 2

As a preliminary, breach of the standard of care and breach of duty in an attorney malpractice
action (particularly in a claim by a third party bc:neficiary regarding a Will claim) are mutually
exclusive inquiries. nlllt is, simply because Plaintiff's purported "expert" is of the opinion that
Mr. Fletcher's actions allegedly fell below the applicable standard of care, such an opmion does
not create an issue of fact with n:gard 10 Mr. Flf~tcher's Motion for Summary Judgment on this
issue.
As set fortb in Mr. Fletcher's opening memorandum on this motion, the Idaho Supreme
Court has carved (Jut a narrow exception where, "[aJn attorney preparing testamentary

instruments owes a duty to the benl::ficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such
instruments ... so as to effectuate the testator's int,em as expressed in the testamentary
instrument." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139,90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004).
A beneficiary will not have a CHse against the la\\)'er for not receiving from the
testamentary instrument (in this case the Will) what they understood the testator had stated or
indicated they would receive. ld.
Plaintiff has no claim against Mr. Fletcher for what Mr. Cowen may have told her she
would receive, whether it was from the Leonarda Trust or othl!rwise. All Mr, Cowan (;hose to
express in his Will, in an unambiguous form (ac4:ording to the court in the probate case), was that
any beneficial interest Me. Cowan had in any trust would go to Plaintiff, and if he didn't have any
such interest, nothing would go to Plaintiff. See Opinion entered September 18. 2007, pp. 10-11.
As set forth in the affidavit of Mr. Fletcher, prior to finalizing Mr. Cowan's Wi!l,
Mr. Fletcher inquired about the interests he had in any trust, including the Leonarda Trust, and
Mr. Cowan told him that he believ~:d he had receive4 disbursements from the Leonarda Trust but
wanted to keep the language in the Will regarding Plaintiff in the event there were other
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interests. If the language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the testator is derived
from the v.ill as it reads on its filee. Allen v. Shea. 105 Idaho 31, 34 (1983). The :anguage of
Mr. Cowan's Will is unambiguous on:ts face and ac\:ure.tely reflect'> the intent of Mr. Cowan.

Arguably, follov.ring the jatiom;le ofPlaintifi's argument, had .\1r. Fletcher leamed that in
fact Mr. Cowan had no further beneficI.ary interest in the Leonarda Trust, there would be no
mention of Plaintiff in the Will at all. However, Mr. Fletcher believed Mr. Cowan's
representation that there may be some beneficial interests "out there" and if there were', he
wanted Plaintiff to receive the ben.efit of those interests.
In support of her opposition, Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of attorney John Magnuson
to opine that Mr. Fletcher's conduct, in preparation of Mr. Cowan's 2005 Will, fell below the

applicable standard of care because (1 ) Mr. Fletcher refers to a power of attorney held by the
testator, which power of attorney is not granted by the Trust (referring to the Leonarda Trust)
which "indicates" to Mr. Magnm;on that Mr. Fletcher did not review the Trust; (2) had
Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have leamed that after Mr. Cowan reached the age
of 50, his mother's trust property would revert to Mr. Cowan; (3) Mr. Fletcher had a duty to
inquire of Mr. Cowan whether he: had c(!ached the age of 50 and to modify the language in
Mr. Cowan's Will to reflect that he owned property previously held in trust; (4) Mr. Cowan's
Will references "all beneficial interests that 1 have in any trusts" indicates to Mr. Magnuson that
Mr. Fletcher failed to inquire of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property, previously held in trust,
devised; and (5) the portion of Mr. Cowan's Will that refers to "all beneficial interests that I have
in any trusts" is of no force and effect given the absence of such tmst or trusts.
In

Stirn,

Mr. Magnuson opines that "under these circumstances, drafting a will, a portion

of which has no force and etTect .and which fails to effectuate the intention of the testator,
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constitutes a deviation from the standard of cart: and falls below the standard of care e,f attorney>
practicing in Idaho in 2005.
Mr. '\1agnuson's affidavit is no'; relevant to the pending motion for summary judgment, as

it creates no issue of material fact which would prevent this Court to grant Mr. Fletcher's motion

for summary judgment.
As previously set forth, the error in Plaintiffs supposition is that the reference contained
in Me. Cowan's Will that Plaintitf rece:ve "all beneticial interests that [Mr. Cowan has] in any
trust.,", actually is referencing the Leonarda Trust. The Will does not reference the Leonarda

Trust. Notwithstanding that fact, Mr. fletcher's Affidavit confirms that he discussed the status of
the Leonarda Trust with Mr. Cowan and that MI'. Cowan indicated that certain properties had
been distributed to him from the Leonarda Trust, but he wanted to keep the language in the Will
pertaining to Plaintiff. in the event there were additional inteD~sts. There was no indication to
Mr. Fletcher at any time that Mr. Cowen intend<:d 10 give to Plaintiff anything other than
interests thal he may have in any trusts at the time of his death. Thus, at the time- of his death, if
there were additional interests in any trust, Plaintiff would receive said interests, and i:' there
were not any interests in any trusts, Plaintiff would receive nothing.
Like Harrigjeld, supra, a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as
Plaintiff in this case, to draft a testcunentary document according to the testator's intent. Clause 6
of Mr. Cowan's Will fulfills any duty owed to Plaintiff because it devises to Plaintiff "[alII
beneficial interests I have in any trusts" to Plaintiff. Had !vIr, Cowan died vvith any beneficial
trust interests, Plaintiff would bave ~eceived exactly what Cowan intended. The fact that
Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in any trust at the time of the Will, or at the time of his
death, is not relevant to the adequacy of !v{r. Fletcher's drafting, according to Mr, Cowan's
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOS1TION TO DEFENDANT'S
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intent. The intent of Mr. Cowan, ::i'om the Wilt is clear as to the PlaintitI :vir. Cowan' s intent
as derived from h:s \inll is dear and unambiguous. If Mr. Cowan had any beneficial interest in
any trust at the time of his death, those interests would pass to PlaintitT; if not, nothing goes to

Plaintiff.

Mr, Fletcher breached no duty :0 PlaintitT and her claim for attorney malpractice should
be dismissed.
III.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAI~ IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Through this motion, Mr, Fetc:ler asserts that Plaintiff settled all claims she had rdated
to Mr. Cowan's Will by executing the StipUlation for Settlement in

th,~

probate cas,;! and is,

therefore, judicially estopped from pursuing this malpractice action against Mr, Fletcher.
Ibe language of the StipUlation for Settlt:m.ent provides that the parties, inclusive of
W. Kent Fletcher (as attorney for Mr. Cowan's Estate), stipulated and agreed to the following:
"[a]H claims of Mary Killins Soignier under the Last Will and Testament of Zachary A. Cowan,
as heir, devisee, or holder of po\ver of 'lppointm(~nt '" are settled for the sum of One Hundred
'Thousand Dollars ($100,000):'
It is the position of Mr. Fletcher that by signing and sUbmittjng a stipulation to the court

in the probate case, Plaintiff reprl;!sented that any claim that she may have as heir to Mr. Cowan's
Estate was settled, That is, she effectively, and as a matter of law, agreed to settle all claims as
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate, which would include he!r malpractice action against Mr. Fletcher, as
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate.
In opposition to Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has submitted an
aflidavit which states that when "she entered into the settlement of her claims against the estate,
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she had no notice that anyone was asserting that, by releasing her claims against the e,tllte, she

would also be rdeasing her

c1aim~

against Mr. Fletcher." Plaintiff goes on to state in her

affidavit that she "made no statelTI~nt in court, sworn or othem;se, to the e-tfect that she intended
to release [Mr.) Fletcher by dismissing her claims against the estate." Affidavit of Mf.ry KiHins
Soignier.
Plaintiff also claims she

;'e,;eiv(~d

"no consijeration" from tv1r. Fletcher for any release of

claims against him. Id.
As a preliminary matter, there is no requirement under the doctrine of judicial estoppel
that there has been consideration for any inconslstent position (including release of claims) taken
in a preceding case by a party. In this case, Plaintiff took the position that she should have

received "more" from Mr. Cowan's Estate, through his Will in the probate case. Plaintiff
specifically alleged in the underlying probate case that Mr. Fletcher "made no attempt to

investigate the extent of trust int/!re.5ts which clearly exist" and that he had actively soughl "to
block the claim of devisee MARY SOIGNIER, and ha[s) refused to conslder the intentions and
the expectations of ZACHARY A. COWAN." See Opposition to Petition for Construction of
Will and Approval for Plan of Distribu:ion ofE5tate filed March 25,2007, by Plaintiff in the

probate case. Moreover, the court in the probate case confirmed Plaintiffs allegations in that
case that Mr. Fletcher had drafted an ambiguous Will, and that her entitlement to any beneficial
interests in Mr. Cowan's Estate were irustrated, based on the language in the Will. See Opinion

of September 18, 2007, p. 9.
Plaintiff clearly alleged and made claims in the probate case that Mr. fletcher was
negligent in his drafting of Mr. Cowan' s Will, that the Will was ambiguous, and that
Mr. Fletcher's drafting of Mr. Cowan's Will did not reflect the "true" intent of Mr. Cowan.
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Through the Stipulation for Seulement, Plaintiff agreed to set1Ie ALL CLAIMS related

t'J

1\1r. Cowan's Wi!l, as an heir of that Will. PlaintitTagrced:o lhe term.; of the settlement as did
Mr. Fletcher (who was listed as a party and a signe.tory), and Plaintiff should be ordered to abide
by that agreement, as she represented to the court in the probate case that she would, on .... hkh
representation the court relied. That the representation of Plaintiff was not made in Hopen court"
as argued by Plaintiff does not defeat Mr. Fletcher'g motion on this issue. Plaintiff clearly
represented by signing the stipulati:m 10 dismiss (and receiving the $100,000) that she would in
fact settle all claims related to proceeds from Mr. Cowar,'s Estate l which must include, as a
matter of law, Plaintiff s claim

t~Jr

add,tional proceeds due to her from that Estate based on

Mr. Fletcher's alleged malpractice.
In sum, Plaintiff is pursuing the same cj,tim against Mr. Fletcher in this malpractice
action as she was pursuing in the: probc:.te case (additional proceeds fwm Mr. Cowan's Estate)
- - which she agreed to settle. Plaintiff should not be allowed to take a position inconsistent \\ith
that position she took in the probate ca:;e, wherein she agreed to settle "aU claims" related to her
claim as heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate.
Plaintiff's motion under the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be granted as a matter of
law.

- - - - - .----Plaintiff has cited no authority to support the proposition t~1at judicial I;:stoppel doe:; not apply
if a party signs a written stipLilation and performs the terms of the stipulation. Nor is there
any requirement that Mr. Fletcher "detrimentally relied" on any representation made by
PlaintitT in the probate case in order to pursue a claim of estoppel or judicial estoppel.
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IV.

CONCLVSION

There is no issue of material fact that Plaintiff's Complaint is barred hy the applicable
statute of limitation, that Mr. Fletc:her did not owe or breach any duty to Plaintiff in his drafting
of the Will of Mr. Co\van, and that Plaintiff's claims are barred under the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. Mr. Fletcher respectfully requests that the Court make these findings as a matter of la\\'
and dismiss .Plaintiff's Complaint vr'ith prejudice.
RESPECTFULL Y SUB MfITED TIUS

,~?ta;of July, 2009.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

-'

By&2~,.~~

'l.-- MichelJe R. Poi

Attorneys for
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his ~day of July. 2009, 1 caused to he served a true
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDAKf'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:

r HEREBY CERTIFY trial: on

v;::"-

_ _ U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid

Allen B. Ellis

ELLIS, BRO\VJ\" & SHEILS, CHARTERED

Hand Delivered

707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388

____ Overnight Mail
..

Boise, ID 83701-0388
(Attorneys for Plainti:ff]

_ _ Tete-copy: 208.345.9564

v-r-mail

~ /f~~-

.r"

~~iC-h=e-lle-~R~.p-O-i~--~-----------------
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Allen B. Ellis, ISB No. 1626
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
Telephone: (208) 345-7832
Facsimile:
(208) 345-9564

..71r.C'
~ '.,

: - W :'\ S: I

Jeffrey A.. Strother, ISB No. 2014
STROTHER LAW OFFICE
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 342-2425
Facsimile:
(208) 342-2429
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
Case No.

MARY KlLLlNS SOIGNIER,

ev 2009-517

Plaintiff,

vs.

NonCE OF ASSOCIATION OF
COUNSEL

W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Jeffrey A. Strother, of Strother Law Office, 200 N. 4"

Street. Suite 30, Boise, Idaho 83702, is associating as attorney of record with Allen B. Ellis,
ofthe firm Ellis, Brown & Sheils, 70i N.

a'" Street, P.O. Box 388, Boise,ldaho 83701-0388,

for plaintiff Mary Kilins Solgnier in the above-captioned matter, and the clerk of court is
hereby requested to make such entries as may be required to record such association.

NonCE OF ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL· 1
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PM

LASERJET FA)(
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c·

DATED this ·2 - day of August,·2009.

l

\
\

ELUS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHTD.

STROTHER LAW OFFICE

C*-&~

Allen B. Ellis

CERTifiCATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of August. 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing dc)cul1lentto be served upon the following indivldual(s) by the
method indicated below and addreS$ed as follows:
Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley. LLP
877 Main St., .Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

[1 u.s. Mail, postage prepaid
[J Hand Delivered

[J

u.L
~(' .

AI

NOTICE OF ASSOCIATION OF COIJN~;EL - 2

Overnight Mail

[] By Facsimile

. Ell

L

/'l

.:,4' .
(i
"

\,
I

:

Craig L. Meadows, ISH No. 1081
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208 .344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
MARY KILLINS SOIGNlER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

--------------------------------

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

)
)

W. Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell, Ennis
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this RepJy to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment.
As the Court is aware, and as set forth with citations in Mr. Fletcher's opening
memorandum on this motion, this is an attorney malpractice action filed by Plaintiff in which
Plaintiff asserts that she was denied her testamentary "entitlement" as a named beneficiary in the
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\vill of Zachary Cowan. See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
("Memorandum"), p. 1.
In the probate case pertaining to Mr. Cowan's Will and Estate (Cassia County Case
No. CV 20061234), Plaintiff contested the Personal Representative's interpretation of the Will,
claiming she was '"entitled" to certain monies from the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust (hereinafter the
"Leonarda Trust"), and that Clause 6 of Mr. Cowan's Will was ambiguous; thus, Plaintiff
asserted that the court in the probate case should allow andlor consider parol evidence to aid the
Court in determining the intent of the testator Mr. Cowan.
The court in the probate case found there was no ambiguity in Mr. Cowan's Will and
held that the residue of Mr. Cowan's Estate was to be paid to the American Cancer Society.
Plaintiff appealed the court's decision.
On or about September 29, 2008, the parties in the probate case entered into a
"Stipulation for Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for
Construction of the Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal" (hereinafter
Stipulation for Settlement").
In consideration for Plaintiff signing the Stipulation for Settlement, she dismissed her
appeal and received payment from the American Cancer Society in the amount of$100,000.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff misstates the nature of the case in her opposition to

Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment. While it is true that Mr. Cowan had at one time a
beneficial interest in the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiff's claim that the trust referenced in Clause 6 of
Mr. Cowan's Will - - that Plaintiff receive "all beneficial interests that [Mr. Cowan has J in any

trusts - - is actually referencing the Leonarda Trust. Clause 6 of the Will states in relevant part
that, "[a]11 beneficial interests that I have in any trusts I give, bequeath, and devise to Mary
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
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Killin[s]." The Will does not reference the Leonarda Trust. Such an inference by Plaintiff is not
supported by the record. Because the Will does not reference the Leonarda Trust, Plaintiffs
allegations related to the power of appointment or that the Leonarda Trust terminated when
Mr. Cowan reached the age of 50, are irrelevant and certainly do not create an issue of fact
related to this Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Leonarda Trust could have been one of the trusts in which Mr. Cowan had an interest
at any given time, but it certainly was not the exclusive trust specified in Clause 6 of
Mr. Cowan's Will, nor arguably the only trust in which Mr. Cowan may have had an interest at
the time the Will was drafted or at the time of his death.
Secondarily, Plaintiff asserts that

~1r.

Fletcher was negligent in allegedly not reviewing

the Leonarda Trust document. Again, the Will does not specifically reference the Leonarda
Trust. Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit on Mr. Cowan's intent is clear - -- upon Mr. Fletcher's inquiry.

Mr. Cowan told Mr. Fletcher that he did not know if aU of the property had been transferred to
him from the Leonarda Trust at the time the Will was drafted, and when asked ifhe wanted to
leave the language in the Will to bequeath whatever interest he had as a beneficiary in "any trust"
to Plaintiff upon his death, Mr. Cowan stated that he wanted to leave that language in his Will.
Plaintiffs supposition is that she should have received something, or that Mr. Fletcher
had a duty to assure that she received something under the Will, but that is not so. Plaintiff could
only receive what interest Mr. Cowan may have had in "any trust." It does not necessarily
follow that Plaintiff is to receive something if she is named in the WiJI; Plaintiff can only receive
something if Mr, Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. There is nothing
specified in Mr. Cowan's Will that he intended Plaintiff to receive any interest specifically in the
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Leonarda Trust. As set forth below, Mr. Fletcher did not have a duty to assure that Plaintiff
would in fact receive "something" under the terms of the Will.
Mr. Fletcher unambiguously drafted Mr. Cowan's Will as Mr. Cowan specifically
requested, and Plaintiff has not created any issue of material fact that would prevent this Court
from making such a finding. The Will is unambiguous, as the Magistrate Judge determined. The
Will is unambiguous as agreed to by the Plaintiff, when she settled her Appeal. There cannot be
any "malpractice" when from the four corners of the Will, there is no basis for determining that a
beneficiary did not receive what the testator intended.
Finally, Mr. Fletcher cannot be said to have caused Plaintiff to "recover substantially
less" than the value of the Leonarda Trust property, as asserted by Plaintiff, when the
unambiguous provision in the Will regarding Plaintiff did not reference the Leonarda Trust and
which provision was specifically kept in the Will at the request of Mr. Cowan to provide for
Plaintiff in the event Mr. Cowan had an interest in "any trust" at the time of his death. Of course,
at the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not hold or possess any interests in any trusts; thus,
Plaintiff was not entitled to any interest under the Will.
In sum, Plaintiff settled her claim with regard to Mr. Cowan's Estate for $100,000 - - a
payment of which Plaintiff was arguably not entitled given the unambiguous language contained
in Mr. Cowan's Will.
I.

PLAIN'TIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION
Plaintiff argues that her claim against Mr. Fletcher is not barred by the statute of
limitation because "[w)here the existence, or not, of any al1eged negligence depends on the
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outcome of litigation, there is no objective proof of actual damage until the litigation is
concluded." Memorandum, p. 3.
PlaintitJ asserts that until the Magistrate ruled on September 17,2007, that Plaintiff
should take nothing under the Will, any claim against attorney Fletcher for malpractice would be
"speculative" and the statute of limitations could not begin to run until that date. Memorandum,
p. 4. Plaintiffs argument is without merit.
Plaintiffs claim in the probate case was that Plaintiff was entitled to monies yet to be
distributed to Mr. Cowen from the Leonarda Trust. See claim of Mary Killins Soignier, filed on
or about January 2, 2007 in Cassia County Case No. CV 06-1234.
Tellingly, by Plaintiffs own assertion, in drafting Mr. Cowan's Will to include the
language in the form that Mr. Fletcher did, Plaintiffs beneficial interests in trusts was frustrated
because the Leonarda Trust had been terminated prior to Mr. Cowan's execution of his Will. See
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, p. 3, , V. By Plaintiffs own account, it was
Mr. Fletcher's act of allegedly negligently drafting Mr. Cowan's Will that caused her to be
damaged. Confirmation of that "damage" by a court (to commence the running of the statute of
limitations) misconstrues the applicable law.
In the probate case, Plaintiff was seeking a finding from the court that Mr. Cowan's Will
was ambiguous and that the Court should look to affidavits to determine the intent of the testator
Mr. Cowan, in terms of what he intended to bequeath to Plaintiff. Quite differently, in this
malpractice action, Plaintiff is asserting that the inclusion of the provision in Mr. Cowan's Will,
that Plaintiff be awarded any beneficial interest held by Mr. Cowan in "any trust" at the time of
his death, was frustrated because the Leonarda Trust was terminated. These are mutually
exclusive inquiries. Plaintiffs claim of damage in this case and measure andlor extent of
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
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damages is arguably entirely different than Plaintiffs claim of "entitlement" before the court in
the probate case.
The harm to Plaintiff actually occurred when, according to Plaintiff's allegations,
Mr. Fletcher negligently drafted the Will, not when the court in the probate case found that
Plaintiff had no interest in Mr. Cowan's Estate. Arguably. even if the court in the probate case
found that there was an ambiguity in Mr. Cowan's Will and that he in fact intended to bequeath
to Plaintiff certain property of his Estate, the court could not have held that she had an interest in
the Leonarda Trust, as that trust was terminated at the time Mr. Cowan's Will was drafted by
Mr. Fletcher; Plaintiff, per her 0'M1 argument, would still have been damaged notwithstanding
any finding by the probate court. Put another way, when the court in the probate case dismissed
her claim that she was a beneficiary under the Will, that holding did not affect her claim for
damages against Mr. Fletcher.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, a party does not have to have their claim for attorney
malpractice adjudicated by a trier of fact to trigger the statute of limitations, and City of McCall

v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), does not support that unqualified proposition.
Mr. fletcher does not dispute, for the purpose of this motion, that in certain cases a
determination of actual damages will depend upon that outcome of certain litigation. However,
where the existence of "some damage" does not depend on the outcome of a lawsuit, the statute
oflimitations begins to accrue. See Buxton at 662, 20] P.3d at 635,
Plaintiff misconstrues the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Buxton. There were two
distinct rulings in Buxton, wherein the City of McCall sued its attorneys based on allegations of
negligent advice. Two counts of the City's complaint were based on aHegations ofnegJigent
advice by the City's attorney pertaining to termination of a contract and the withholding of
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEfENDANT'S
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certain payments to contractors. The [dabo Supreme Court held that until outcome of the
litigation related to this "advice" on the breach of contract claims, there could not be a
determination of damage; that is, the City could have prevailed in the litigation and arguably
sutTered no damage. ld , 146 Idaho at 663, 201 P.3d at 636. The remaining claim ofnegJigence
in Buxton had to do with the City attorney advising the City to release a lien against J-U-B
Engineering. The Idaho Supreme Court heJd that the date on which the City of McCall released
its lien was the date on which the damage occurred because that was the date on which the City
of McCall lost its opportunity to recover against J-U-B Engineering. ld. at 663, 201 P.3d at 636.
Based on Plaintiff's allegations, there was no "speculation" that she had in fact been
damaged when Mr. Fletcher allegedly negligently drafted Mr. Cowan's Will in 2005; that is
when Plaintiff sutTered some ascertainable damage, as there was objectively ascertainable
evidence that Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in the Leonarda Trust (which is the stated
basis of Plaintiffs claim). Alternatively, if there is some question as to whether Plaintiff
suffered "some damage" when the Will was drafted in May 0[2005, there is no question that
some damage

occurr~d

at the time of Mr. Cowan's death in October of2006, as any opportunity

to amend the Will would be impossible.
The outcome of the probate case was not dispositive regarding Plaintiff's claims against

Mr. Fletcher and Plaintiff suffered some damage prior to the commencement of that litigation.
Plaintiffs claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

II.

MR. FLETCHER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Fletcher's actions, in drafting the Will of Mr. Cowan, fell below
the applicable standard of care and, therefore, breached a duty of Plaintiff. Memorandum, p. 10.
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As a preliminary, breach of the standard of care and breach of duty in an attorney malpractice
action (particularly in a claim by a third party beneficiary regarding a Will claim) are mutually
exclusive inquiries. That is, simply because Plaintiirs purported "expert" is of the opinion that
Mr. Fletcher's actions allegedJy fell below the applicable standard of care, such an opinion does
not create an issue of fact with regard to Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment on this
issue.
As set forth in Mr. Fletcher's opening memorandum on this motion, the Idaho Supreme
Court has carved out a narrow exception where, "[a]n attorney preparing testamentary
instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein to prepare such
instruments ... so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary
instrument." Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884, 889 (2004).
A beneficiary will not have a case against the Jawyer for not receiving from the
testamentary instrument (in this case the WiJI) what they understood the testator had stated or
indicated they would receive. ld.
Plaintiff has no claim against Mr. Fletcher for what Mr. Cowen may have told her she
would receive, whether it was from the Leonarda Trust or otherwise. All Mr. Cowan chose to
express in his Will, in an unambiguous form (according to the court in the probate case), was that
any beneficial interest Mr. Cowan had in any trust would go to Plaintiff, and ifhe didn't have any
such interest, nothing would go to Plaintiff. See Opinion entered September 18, 2007, pp. 10-11.
As set forth in the affidavit of Mr. Fletcher, prior to finalizing Mr. Cowan's Will,

Mr. Fletcher inquired about the interests he had in any trust, including the Leonarda Trust, and
Mr. Cowan told him that he believed he had received disbursements from the Leonarda Trust but
wanted to keep the language in the Will regarding Plaintiff in the event there were other
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
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,

interests. If the language of a will is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the testator is derived

l'!.•.

1

from the will as it reads on its face . Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 34 (1983). The language of

\

Mr. Cowan' s Will is unambiguous on its face and accurately reflects the intent of Mr. Cowan.

.;:;.

;

:1

Arguably, following the rationale of Plaintiffs argument, had Mr. Fletcher learned that in

\

fact Mr. Cowan had no further beneticiary interest in the Leonarda Trust, there would be no
mention of Plaintiff in the Will at all. However, Mr. Fletcher believed Mr. Cowan's
representation that there may be some beneficial interests "out there" and ifthere were, he
wanted Plaintiff to receive the benefit of those interests.
In support of her opposition, Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of attorney John Magnuson
to opine that Mr. Fletcher's conduct, in preparation of Mr. Cowan's 2005 Will, fell below the
applicable standard of care because (1) Mr. Fletcher refers to a power of attorney held by the
testator, which power of attorney is not granted by the Trust (referring to the Leonarda Trust)
which "indicates" to Mr. Magnuson that Mr. fletcher did not review the Trust; (2) had
Mr. Fletcher reviewed the Trust, he would have learned that after Mr. Cowan reached the age
of 50, his mother's trust property would revert to Mr. Cowan; (3) Mr. Fletcher had a duty to
inquire of Mr. Cowan whether he had reached the age of 50 and to modify the language in
Mr. Cowan's Will to reflect that he owned property previously held in trust; (4) Mr. Cowan's
Will references "all beneficial interests that I have in any trusts" indicates to Mr. Magnuson that
Mr. Fletcher failed to inquire of Mr. Cowan how he wanted the property, previously held in trust,
devised; and (5) the portion of Mr. Cowan's Will that refers to "all beneficial interests that I have
in any trusts " is of no force and effect given the absence of such trust or trusts.
In sum, Mr. Magnuson opines that "under these circumstances, drafting a will, a portion
of which has no force and effect and which fails to effectuate the intention of the testator,
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
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constitutes a deviation from the standard of care and falls below the standard of care of attorneys
practicing in Idaho in 2005.

Mr. Magnuson's affidavit is not relevant to the pending motion for summary judgment, as
it creates no issue of material fact which would prevent this Court to grant Mr. Fletcher's motion
for summary judgment.
As previously set forth, the eITor in Plaintiffs supposition is that the reference contained
in Mr. Cowan's Will that Plaintiff receive "all beneficial interests that [Mr. Cowan has] in any
trusts", actually is referencing the Leonarda Trust. The Will does not reference the Leonarda
Trust. Notwithstanding that fact, Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit confirms that he discussed the status of
the Leonarda Trust with Mr. Cowan and that Mr. Cowan indicated that certain properties had
been distributed to him from the Leonarda Trust, but he wanted to keep the language in the Will
pertaining to Plaintiff, in the event there were additional interests. There was no indication to
Mr. Fletcher at any time that Mr. Cowan intended to give to Plaintiff anything other than
interests that he may have in any trusts at the time of his death. Thus, at the time of his death, if
there were additional interests in any trust, Plaintiff would receive said interests, and if there
were not any interests in any trusts, Plaintiff would receive nothing.
Like Harrigfo/d, supra, a duty may be owed to a named beneficiary of a Will, such as
Plaintiff in this case, to draft a testamentary document according to the testator's intent. Clause 6
of Mr. Cowan's WiJI fulfills any duty owed to Plaintiff because it devises to Plaintiff "[a]1I

beneficial interests I have in any trusts" to Plaintiff. Had Mr. Cowan died with any beneficial
trust interests, Plaintiff would have received exactly what Cowan intended. The fact that

Mr. Cowan did not have any interest in any trust at the time of the Will, or at the time of his
death, is not relevant to the adequacy ofMr. Fletcher's drafting, according to Mr. Cowan's
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intent. The intent of Mr. Cowan, from the Will, is clear as to the Plaintiff. Mr. Cowan's intent
as derived from his Will is clear and unambiguous. If Mr. Cowan had any beneficial interest in
any trust at the time of his death. those interests would pass to Plaintiff; jf not, nothing goes to
Plaintiff.
Mr. Fletcher breached no duty to Plaintiff and her claim for attorney malpractice should
be dismissed.

III.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Through this motion. Mr. Fletcher asserts that Plaintiff settled all claims she had related
to Mr. Cowan's Will by executing the Stipulation for Settlement in the probate case and is,
therefore. judicially estopped from pursuing this malpractice action against Mr. Fletcher.
The language of the Stipulation for Settlement provides that the parties, inclusive of
W. Kent Fletcher (as attorney for Mr. Cowan's Estate), stipulated and agreed to the foHowing;
"[a]lJ claims of Mary Killins Soignier under the Last Will and Testament of Zachary A. Cowan,
as heir, devisee, or holder of power of appointment ... are settled for the sum of One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000)."

It is the position of Mr. Fletcher that by signing and submitting a stipUlation to the court
in the probate case, Plaintiff represented that any claim that she may have as heir to Mr. Cowan's
Estate was settled. That is, she effectively, and as a matter oflaw, agreed to settle aU claims as
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate, which would include her malpractice action against Mr. Fletcher, as
heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate.
In opposition to Mr. Fletcher's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has submitted an
affidavit which states that when "she entered into the settlement of her claims against the estate,
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she had no notice that anyone was asserting that, by releasing her claims against the estate, she
would also be releasing her claims against Mr. Fletcher." Plaintiff goes on to state in her
atlidavit that she "made no statement in court, sworn or otherwise, to the effect that she intended
to release [Mr.] Fletcher by dismissing her claims against the estate." Affidavit of Mary Killins
Soignier.
Plaintiff also claims she received "no consideration" from Mr. Fletcher for any release of
claims against him. ld.
As a preliminary matter, there is no requirement under the doctrine of judicial estoppel
that there has been consideration for any inconsistent position (including release of claims) taken
in a preceding case by a party. In this case, Plaintiff took the position that she should have
received "more" from Mr. Cowan's Estate, through his Will in the probate case. Plaintiff
specifically alleged in the underlying probate case that Mr. Fletcher "made no attempt to
investigate the extent of trust interests which c1early exist" and that he had actively sought "to
block the claim of devisee MARY SOIGNIER, and ha[s] refused to consider the intentions and
the expectations of ZACHARY A. COWAN." See Opposition to Petition for Construction of
Will and Approval for Plan of Distribution of Estate filed March 25, 2007, by Plaintiff in the
probate case. Moreover, the court in the probate case confirmed Plaintiff's allegations in that
case that Mr. Fletcher had drafted an ambiguous Will, and that her entitlement to any beneficial
interests in Mr. Cowan's Estate were frustrated, based on the language in the Will. See Opinion
of September 18, 2007, p. 9.
Plaintiff clearly alleged and made claims in the probate case that Mr. Fletcher was
negligent in his drafting of Mr. Cowan's Will, that the Will was ambiguous, and that
Mr. Fletcher's drafting of Mr. Cowan's Will did not reflect the "true" intent of Mr. Cowan.
REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12

000196

04188007016116372

Through the Stipulation for Settlement, Plaintiff agreed to settle ALL CLAIMS related to
Mr. Cowan's Will, as an heir of that Will. Plaintiff agreed to the terms of the settlement, as did
Mr. Fletcher (who was listed as a party and a signatory), and Plaintiff should be ordered to abide
by that agreement, as she represented to the court in the probate case that she would, on which
representation the court relied. That the representation of Plaintiff was not made in "open court"
as argued by Plaintiff does not defeat Mr. Fletcher's motion on this issue. Plaintiff clearly
represented by signing the stipulation to dismiss (and receiving the $100,000) that she would in
fact settle all claims related to proceeds from Mr. Cowan's Estate l which must include, as a
matter oflaw. Plaintiffs claim for additional proceeds due to her from that Estate based on
Mr. Fletcher's alleged malpractice.
In sum, Plaintiff is pursuing the same claim against Mr. Fletcher in this malpractice
action as she was pursuing in the probate case (additional proceeds from Mr. Cowan's Estate)
- - which she agreed to settle. Plaintiff should not be allowed to take a position inconsistent with
that position she took in the probate case, wherein she agreed to settle "all claims" related to her
claim as heir to Mr. Cowan's Estate.
Plaintiffs motion under the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be granted as a matter of
law.

1

Plaintiff has cited no authority to support the proposition that judicial estoppel does not apply
if a party signs a written stipulation and performs the terms of the stipulation. Nor is there
any requirement that Mr. Fletcher "detrimentally relied" on any representation made by
Plaintiff in the probate case in order to pursue a claim of estoppel or judicial estoppel.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
There is no issue of material fact that Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the applicable
statute of limitation, that Mr. Fletcher did not owe or breach any duty to Plaintiff in his drafting
of the Will of Mr. Cowan, and that Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. Mr. Fletcher respectfully requests that the Court make these findings as a matter of law
and dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint with prejUdiCe;~
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED THIS

L

day of August, 2009.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
ay of August. 2009. I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINT FF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
~-mail

_-V_ Telecopy:
T
208.345.9564

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 15 0001.99
0.4188.0070.1611637.2

flj003/00S

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BRO\VN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL mSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Mary Killins Soignier,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

W. Kent Fletcher,

Case No. CV 2009-517

)

MOTION TO STRlKE AFFIDAVIT
OF W. KENT FLETCHER

)
)

Defendant.

)

Comes now plaintiff Mary Killins Soignier, through her attorney of record, and moves the
Court for an order striking the affidavit ofW. Kent Fletcher. This motion is made upon the grotmds
that the affidavit attributes certain statements to the decedent/testator Zachary A.

COWlill

which

statements are inadmissible for each of the following reasons: (I) such statements are irrelevant to
the issues presented in these swrunary judgment proceedings (statute of limitations, estoppel and
dt.ty); (2) there is no ambiguity in the subject Will WhICh would justify the admis~ion of extrinsic

MonON TO STRIKE AFFlDA Vir OF W. KENT FLETCHER· I
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evidence (see Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment filed September 18,2007, in the Matter of the
Estate of Zachary

COWall,

deceased (Cassia County No. CV 2006-1234); and (3) in malpractice

actions, an attorney cannot be "subject[ed] to lawsuits" based upon what a putative beneficiary
"understood the testator had statled". Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 PJd 884

(2004). Therefore, in the name of consistency and fairness, attorneys cannot claim that they did not
breach a duty to a named ::'cneficiary by testifying to "what they understood the testator had stated
or indicated" a beneficiary should receive. Jd 140 I<Lmo at 139.
This motion is based upon the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment, the affidavit of Allen B. Ellis, the pleadings and records in this action, and such other oral
and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing.
OATED this 6 th day of August, 2009.

Attorney for Plaintiff

MOTION TO STRfKE AFFIDAVIT OF W. KENT FLETCHER - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 6'1\ day of August, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_._ Overnight Mail
- L Telecopy (FAX)
954-5238

Boise, Ida.lJ.o 83701-1617
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,IN A FOR CASSIA COUNTY
COURT MINUTES
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher
CV-2009-0000517
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 8/10/2009
Time: 10:02 am
Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Court reporter: Denise Schloder
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Party: Mary Soignier, Attorney: Allen Ellis 1 Jeffrey A. Strother
Party: W Fletcher, Attorney: Michelle Points
Jeffrey A. Strother addresses the Court; cites Counsel would like to address the Motion
to Strike the Affidavit of Kent Fletcher prior to arguing the Summary Judgment Motion.
The Court has not received its copy of the Motion to Strike. Counsel provide the Court
this morning with a copy of the Motion to Strike (previously filed on August 06, 2009).
Time: 10:04 a.m.
Jeffrey A. Strother addresses the Court; argues the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit of
Kent Fletcher; cites considerations.
Time: 10:09 a.m.
Michelle Points objects to the Motion to Strike Affidavit; cites untimely filed; cites
considerations for the objection.
Time: 10:12 a.m.
Reply by Jeffrey A. Strother.
Bailiff returns to Counsel the copy of the objection to the affidavit.
Time: 10:13 a.m.
Michelle Points addresses the Court; argues the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment; cites considerations.
Time: 10:22 a.m.
Court inquires of Counsel re: issue of what facts are in dispute and what facts are not.
Time: 10:23 a.m.
Response by Michelle Points.

000203

'Mary Kif/ins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher
CV-2009-0000S17
Page 2

Time: 10:27 a.m.
Response by Jeffrey A. Strother re: issue of facts; offers plaintiff's response to Motion
for Summary Judgment; cites considerations.
Time: 10:50 a.m.
The Court inquires of Counsel for clarification re: duty.
Time: 10:51 a.m.
Jeffrey A. Strother responds.
Time: 10:52 a.m.
Reply by Michelle Points.
Time: 10:56 a.m.
Court inquires re: Supplemental Briefing.
Counsel have no request for supplemental briefing.
The Court takes this matter Under Advisement.
Time: 10:57 a.m. - Hearing concludes.
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IN TilE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH .JUDICIAL J)ISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER.

)
)

Plaintiff

)

)
vs.

)
)

W. KENT FLETCHER.

)
)
)

Defendant.

CASE NO. CV 2009-517 D

)

---)
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Allen B. Ellis of the firm Ellis, Brown and Sheils,
Chartered: and Jeffrey A. Strother.

For the Defendant:

Michelle Points of the firm Hawley. Troxell. Ennis and
Havvley LLP.

BACKGROUND
This case is an action by Ms. Soignier against Mr. Fletcher, alleging that Mr.
Fletcher was negligent and committed malpractice in the preparation of the Will of

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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I

lachary Cowan, deceased. Ms. Soignier was a named beneficiary in the \ViIL but did not
have a direct attnrney-clicnt relatinnship with \11'. F1etrher. \ls. Snignier asserts that she
was to rereive a gilt under the Will. but that Mr. Fletcher's negligcnre in drafting the
Will predudcd her from n:ceiving the gin.
There are two matters before the court at this time. Mr. Fletcher filed a motion
for summary judgment against Ms. Soignier on June 15. 2009.

Ms. Soignier filed a

Motion to Strike Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment
on August 6,2009. Hearing on both motions was held on August 10.2009, at which time
the court took the matter under advisement.
The judge assigned to the instant case in the district court was, before becoming a
district judge. the magistrate judge assigned to hear the probate case involving the Estate
of Zachary Cowan.

FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE
The following

t~lcts

are not in dispute, and are relevant to the motion for summary

judgment:
Zarhary Cowan \vas Mr. Fletcher's client. (Fletcher AfT

~r

Mr. Fletcher drafted a Will for Mr. Cowan. (Fletcher AfT.

2.)

~

2.)

Mr. Cowan executed his Will on May 24, 2005. (Last Will and Testament of
Zachary A. Cowan, Def.'s Ex. A, p. 3.)
During his life time. Mr. Cowan was the beneficiary of the Leonarda A. Cowan
Trust. (Leonarda A. Cowan Trust. P1.'s Ex. 1; Fletcher AfT.

~f

2.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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rhe Leonarda A. Cowan Trust terminated prior to \lr. C\man' s death. and the
corpus of the trust \\as distributed to \1r. Cowan. (Leonarda A. (\man rrust. I>l.'s Ex. I.
pp. 5. 8-9.)

Clause Six of 0.1r. Cowan's \\'ill stated "all beneficial interests that I have in any
trusts I give, bequeath. and devise to Mary Killings:' \vho is the Plaintiff in this action.
(Last Will and Testament of Zachary A. Cowan, Dcf.'s Ex. A. p. J.)
,\11'. Cowan died on October 20. 2006. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment.
Pl.'s Ex. 3. p. 3: Fletcher Aff.

~f

7.)

Mr. Cowan's Will was admitted to informal probate on November 3. 2006 in
Cassia County. Idaho in case number CV -2006-1234. (Opinion Regarding Summary
Judgment. PI.·s Ex. J. p. J: Fletcher Aff.

f: 8.)

At the time of his death, Mr. Cowan did not possess any beneficial interests in any
trusts. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment PI.'s Ex. J. p. 6; Fletcher AfT.

~r

12.)

The Personal Representative of Mr. Cowan's estate proposed that the residue of
the estate should be distributed to the American Cancer Society as directed by the terms
of the Will. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment. PI. 's Ex. 3, p. 6; Fletcher AfT.

·r

12.)
Ms. Soignier appeared in the probate proceedings and contested the Personal
Representative's proposed distribution of the estate. Neither Ms. Soignicr nor any other
person objected to. or contested. the validity of the Will on any basis. including that Mr.
Cmvan was incompetent or that he did not possess testamentary capacity at the time he
signed the Will. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment PI. 's Ex. 3 p. I; Fletcher Aff.

f:

13.) Furthermore, there was no objection offered that the Will was improperly executed
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by f\tr. Cowan. or that the Will '>'>as impruperly attested to by the witnesses to Mr.
Cowan's slgnmg and acknowledgment of his Will. (Opinion Regarding Summary
Judgment. PI.·s Ex. 3 p. 3: Fletcher Atr

~ 6.)

Ms. Soignier objected to the proposed distribution of the estate on the grounds
that the \\'ill was ambiguous on it's face regarding the beneficial interests in trusts. that
lvlr. Cowan intended to make a gin to her in his Will. there tore the court should
determine that the Will was ambiguous and permit parol evidence to be presented t()r the
purpose of interpreting the Will. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment. PI.·s Ex, 3 p,
6; Fletcher AtT. ~ 13.)

The court issued a decision that rejected Mr. Soignier's claims and determined
that the Will was not ambiguous on its face. (Opinion Regarding Summary Judgment,
Pl.'s Ex. 3 pp. 8-12.)
Ms. Soignier appealed the court's decision. (Fletcher AiT.

~

15.)

Prior to a decision in the appeal, Mr. Soignier entered into a settlement agreement
and dismissed her appeal for consideration. (Fletcher Aff.

fI

16.); (Stipulation for

Settlement of Claim of Mary Killins Soignier, Approval of Petition for Construction of
Will and Plan of Distribution and Dismissal of Appeal, DeC sEx. B p. 2.)
SUMMARY .JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IRCP 56(<.:); Bonz
V.

Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991).
When a court assesses a motion for summary judgment, all controverted

to be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party.

t~lcts

are

G & Al Farms v. Funk
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Irrigation ('0 .. 119 Idaho 514. 517. 808

Idaho }7, }lJ. 7..+0

P.~d IO~2

P.~d

851 (1991): TlIsch Enter. v. ('oj/ill. 113

(1987). Likewise. all reasonable inkrences that can be

drawn lj'OlTI the record must he drawn in the nOI1-movant's bvor.
('Iarke

I'.

(j

& .\1 Farms at 517:

Prenger. 114 Idaho 766. 768. 760 P.~d 118~ ( 1(88); Sanders v. KUlla Joinr ,,'(11

Dis!., 1~5lJaho 87~. 874. 876 P,2d 154 (CLApp,1994).

The burden of proving the absence of an issue of material fact rests at all times
upon the moving pm1y, .\[cCoy

I'.

Lyons. I ~O Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360 (1991);

C;

&

J[ Farms at 517,

Nevertheless. when a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported
with evidence indicating the absence of material factual issues. the opposing party's case
mllst not rest on mere speCUlation. and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create
a genuine issue of tact. Jfc( 'oy at 769; G & Af Farms at 517.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of that party's pleadings," IRCP 56(e), Rather. the adverse party must set forth
specific tacts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

If the party does not so

respond, summary judgment. if appropriate. shall be entered against the adverse party.
IRep 56(e),
Evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment must be admissible, Hecla JIining Co. v. Star-Morning ,\lining Co., 122 Idaho
778, 785. 839 P,2d 1192 (1992).

Supporting and opposing affidavits to summary

judgment motions "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show at1im1atively that the affiant is

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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competent to testify to the matters stated therein." IRep

S()( e).

This threshold question of

admissibility of e\idence mllst be decided "before proceeding to the ultimate issue.
whether summary judgment is appropriak." Ryan \'. Beisner. 123 Idaho -+2. -+5. X-l-l P.2d
2-l.

n

(Ct.App. 1992). The general rule that all inferences are drawn in

t~lvor

of the non-

moving party dOL'S not apply to the initial question of admissibility. fie cia ,\lining Co. at

]gS.
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Strike

Ms. Soignier tiled a I\lotion to Strike Mr. Fletcher's Affidavit in support of his
!vlotion for Summary Judgment.

Specifically, she objects to any statements in the

affidavit that purport to recount statements made by Zachary Cowan to Mr. Fletcher.
The Court finds that it is unnecessary to reach a decision on Ms. Soignier's
l\10tion to Strike the Fletcher affidavit, for the reason that. as set forth below, the court
has not based its summary judgment decision on any of the contested evidence protTered
in the Fletcher af1idavit.
B. Summary .Judgment

A cause of action by a named beneficiary

111

a Will against the attorney who

prepared the Will was recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Harrigleid v. Hancock.

140 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). The elements of such a legal malpractice
negligence claim are: "(a) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b) the
existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure to perf()ffTI the duty; and (d) the
negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client."

Id. at 136. This represents a very narrow departure from the general rule that an attorney
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may haw liability for his or her negligence only to his or her client and not to a person
with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship. Id. at 137. In the
IimitL'd exception at issue here is the Supreme Court's determination that "an attornt'y
preparing tt'stamentary instruments owes a duty to tht' benetkiaries named or identified
thert'in to prepare such instruments "so as to etJectuate the testator's intent as expressed
in the testamentary instruments:' ld. at 138.
The undisputed material facts in this case lead the court to conclude as a matter of
hnv, with respect to the first two elements of the cause of action, that to the extent
recognized by Harrigjetd, there was an attorney-client relationship between Mr. Fletcher
and Ms. Soignier that arose from Mr. Fletcher's preparation of Zachary Cowan's Will in
which Mr. Soignier was a named beneficiary. Mr. Fletcher owed Ms. Soignier a duty as
a result of this relationship.
The next clement of the cause of action is whether this duty was breached. The
court determines that the relevant material facts are undisputed and that these facts do not
establish that Mr. Fletcher breached the professional duty he owed to Ms. Soignier.

f{arrig(eld established a very narrow and limited cause of action, The Supreme
Court discussed the parameters of this cause of action at length and in great detail. The
Supreme Court very narrowly defined the scope of the attorney's duty to the beneficiary.
The duty is "very limited" and "the attorney ... has no duty to see that the testator
distributes his or her property among the named beneticiaries in any particular manner."

lei. at 138-13(j.

Furthermore. the Supreme Court stated that .. this extension of an

attorney's duty will 110t subject attorneys to lawsuits by persons ... who simply did not
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recei n.! in the testamentary instruments what they understood the testator had st;lted or
indicated they would receive." Id at 139.
The attorney's duty to a beneliciary named or identified in the instrument is: I) to
prepare the testamentary instrument; and

::n

if requested by the testator, to have the

instrument properly executed so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the

testamentary instrument. Id at 138 [emphasis addedj. The Supreme Court limited the
means of ascertaining the testator's intent to a review of the testamentary instrument.
which would not include any will, codicil or other instrument that had been revoked,
meaning that only a validly executed instrument is to be examined. Id

The Supreme

Court determined that a person who has the mental capacity to make a valid "viII knows
the names and identities of the persons who are the objects of his bounty, would also
know whether or not such persons are included as beneficiaries under the testamentary
instrument before executing them, and can understand how his or her property will be
distributed under the testamentary documents. ld.
The undisputed material facts and inferences establish that Zachary Cowan was
competent to make his Will, that he possessed testamentary capacity, that he signed and
declared the Will in the form in which it had been prepared by his attorney, Mr. Fletcher,
that the witnesses to his Will attested to his competency and his declaration, and that the
Will was valid and had legal etTect. As the Idaho Supreme Court noted, it is therefore
presumed that the Will was as he wanted it to be. ld. at J 38.
The relevant undisputed facts before the court do not establish a genuine dispute
tbat the Will that Mr. Fletcher prepared in any way frustrated Zachary Cowan's intent, as
Mr. Cowan's intent was expressed in Will. The facts do not establish a genuine dispute
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that the preparation of the Will \vas negligent such that the instrument \vas invalid. It may
\\ell be that Ms. Soignier did not receive a gift of \vhat she understood Zachary Cowan
may have stated or othemise indicated that he would give to her.
expedation alone does not

satist~

Ilowen:r, her

the Hurrigteld test regarding whether or not

~1r.

Fletcher breached his duty to her.
The court concludes as a matter of law that Mr. Fletcher did not breach his very
narrow and limited duty to Ms. Soignier.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. Plaintitrs claim is dismissed.
Counsel for the Defendant will please prepare an Order consistent with the
foregoing and present the same to the court for signature.

DATED thisriay of September, 2009.

Michael R. Crabtree
District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CY 2009-517
9

000213

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this ," day of September, 2009, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:

1.

Allen BEllis
Ellis, Brown & Sheils
P.O. Box 388
707 North 8th Street
Boise, 10 83701

_ _ U.S. Mail

2.

Michelle R. Points
Craig l. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, 10 83701-1617

_ _ U.S. Mail

Tara Gunderson
DeputY Clerk
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Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL El'I'NIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, 1D 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxeIl.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, rN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
W. KENT

FLETCHE~

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)

-----------------------------)
The Court having granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing
Plaintiffs claim against Defendant,
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FOREGOrNG, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant W. Kent

ORDER AND JUDGMENT - 1
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Crystal Severson

9/22/2009 10:55:27 AM

Troxell
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Fletcher. and that the claim of attorney malpractice against Defendant and the Complaint in its
entirety, is hereby dismissed with prejudice. and with PlaintitTtaking nothing thereby.
?z-d

DA TED THIS '"

day of September, 2009.

Michael R. Crabtree
District Judge

ORDER AND JUDGMENT - 2

000216
().ol18' 0070 le64930.1

l~r
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9/22/2009 10:55:36
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of September. 2009, 1 caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT by the method indicated below. and
addressed to each of the following:

Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS. BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED

Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ TeJecopy: 208.345.9564

707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintifi1

v

Jeffrey A Strother
STROTHER LAW OFFICE
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Del i vered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.342.2429

Michelle R. Points

HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 8370 1-1617

v-"U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid

~ U,S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.954.5252

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the Court
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Craig l. Meadows. ISB No. 1081
Michelle R. Points. ISB No. 6~2"
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadO\\.s(£l.. hawleytroxell.com
mpoints(£i'hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys tor Defendant W. Kent Fletcher

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF
A TTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

)

W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Defendant W Kent Fletcher, by and through his counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this motion for his attorney fees and costs incurred in
defending this matter.
This motion is brought pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 58, and

I.e.

* 2-120(3).
J

The basis of this motion is that Defendant is the prevailing party, as per the Order and
Judgment entered September 22,2009, and Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

00021.8
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This 1110tion is supported by the Affidavit of ~tichelle R. Points in Support of
~1t.:morandllm

of Costs and Attorney Fees and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs

and Attorney Fees, both filed concurrcntly herewith.
DATED THIS

~fScPtembcr, 2009.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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thi~SePtember. ~009.

r HEREBY CERTIFY that on
I caused to be sern:d a
true copy orlhe foregoing MOTION FOR AN A \VARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS. BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564

Jeffrey A. Strother
STROTHER LA W OFFICE
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30
Boise. ID 83702
(Attorneys for Plaintiff]
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(.mig L. Meadows, ISH No. 1081
Michelle R. Points, ISH No. 6224
HA \VLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, 1D 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@ha\vleytroxell.com
mpoints@ha\v·leytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,
PlaintifT,
vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR COSTS AND
A TTORNEY FEES

Defendant W. Kent Fletcher ("Defendant"), by and through his attorneys of record,
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, submits this Memorandum in Support of his Motion for
an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs in connection with his successful defense of this action.

A.

Background
This is a legal malpractice action. Defendant Zachary Cowan was retained to perlorm

professional legal services, as his attorney in the underlying case. In this case, Plaintiff alleged
that Defendant committed an act of malpractice in drafting Mr. Cowans' Will.
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On September 9, ::::009 this Court entered its Memorandum Decision Granting
Defendant's Motion tt>r Summary Judgment and entered corollary Order and Judgment on
September 22. ::::009, dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. For the purpose of an attorney fee and
cost determination Defendant is the prevailing party.
Defendant, through this motion, requests an a\vard of attorney fees and costs incurred in
defending against Plaintiffs claims pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 as the prevailing party, and I.C.

§ 12-120(3). as the prevailing party in a commercial transaction.
B.

Attorney Fees Must Be Awarded Under

I.e. § 2-120(3).

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides a basis for an attorney fee award in this case. That
statutory provision mandates a fee award in cases based on a "commercial transaction." Before
the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in Blirnka v. My Web Wholesaler. LLC, 143 Idaho
723,152 P.3d 592 (2007), however, section 12-120(3) had been interpreted not to apply in
"commercial transaction" cases in which the theory of recovery was a tort theory. In Blirnka, the
court overruled all prior decisions prohibiting fee awards in such cases. Id. One decision plainly
overruled by Blimka, is Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991). There,
the court refused to award fees under section 12-120(3) in a legal malpractice case simply
because such a case is a tort case, "even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the
malpractice was a 'commercial transaction.'" /d. There is no doubt that the Defendants'
attorney-client relationship with Cady is a "commercial transaction." Accordingly, on its face,
section 12-120(3) appl ies, and it mandates an award of attorney fees.
In a recent attorney malpractice case, District Judge McLaughlin held that given the
Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Blimka. supra, an attorney fee award was appropriate under

I.e. § 12-120(3).

Judge McLaughlin's Decision (City of Me Call v. Burton. et al.) is attached
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hereto as Exhibit A for the Court's review. Judge McLaughlin specifically held that a contract
ft)r attorney sen ices was a commercial transaction, and, .. the fact that the contract was lor
attornt.:y st.:nices. not any other service, Jot.:s not change the nature of the transaction into one for
either personal services or houst.:hold services." Exhibit A, p. 5.
~fore

I.e.

recently, District Judge Copsey also held that attorney fees are a\vardable under

12-120(3) to a prevailing party in an attorney malpractice case because the underlying action

is based on an attorney-client relationship, a contract to perfonn professional services. A true
and correct copy of Judge Copsey's decision (Cady v. Jones, et 01.) is attached hereto as
Exhibit B.
Given the clear applicability of I.e. § 12-120(3) to the facts of this case, and because
Defendant is the prevailing party, attorney fees should be awarded to Defendant incurred in
defending this action.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED

THI~f September, 2009.
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

thiS~

I IIEREBY CER rIFY that on
September. 2009, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing ~vlE:\tORr\NDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BROWN & SIIEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintift1

V'

U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564

V'

Jdfrey A. Strother
STROTHER LAW OFFfCE
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintift1

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Deli vered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ TeJecopy: 208.342.2429
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T~·---

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COuNTY OF ADA

4
5
6

CITY OF MCCAll, a municipal
corporation.

Case No. CVOC0608079

7

a

Plaintiff,

9

vs.

10
11

12

13

14

SUSAN E. BUXTON, MOORE, SMITH,
BUXTON & TRUKE, CHARTERED, a
professional service corporation, WILLIAM
A. MCCURDY and BRASSEY,
WETHERELL, CRAWFORD & GARRETT,
a limited liability partnership,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES AND PLAINTIFPS .
MOTrON TO DISALLOW
ATTORNEY FEES

. Defendants.

15

APPEARANCES

16

For Plaintiff: Alfen B. Ellis of Ellis, Brown & Sheils, Chartered and Jeffrey A.
Strother of Strother Law Office for City of McCall

17
18

19

20

For Defendants: Craig L. Meadows and Jason D. Scott of Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LlP for Susan E. Buxton and Moore, Smith. Buxton & Turcke,
Chartered
Matthew L. Walters of Elam & Burke, P.A. for Wifliam A. McCurdy and Brassey.
Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett

21

22
23

PROCEEDINGS
This matter came before the Court on September 18. 2007 upon the Plaintiff's

24

Motion to Disallow Fees. Following oral argument by counsel the Court took the matter
25
~

under advisement.
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A

,
BACKGROUND
This litigation arises out of allegations of legal malpractice by the Defendants.

2

3

The cfaims of malpractice allegedly occurred while the Defendants were representing

"

the City of McCall during a course of events leading up to and throughout the litigation

5

invoMng Employers Insurance of Wausau and the construction of a wastewater storage

6

lagoon. As a result of this al/eged malpractice, the Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on

7
8

May 3, 2006, filing a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. On June 15, 2006, the
Plaintiff filed their First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. On November

9

13.2006, Defendants William A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett,
10

filed their Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. And on
11
>

12
13

14

,

November 14, 2006, Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore. Smith, Buxton & Turcke,
Chartered filed their Answer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
Subsequently, on January 17, 2007, the Court entered an Order Denying

15

Plaintiffs Motion to Hold Matter in Abeyance Pending Completion of Ninth Circuit·

16

Appeal and Motion for Protective Order. The Defendants separately filed motions for

17

summary judgment, which the Court granted on June 22, 2007.

18

The Defendants

William A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett filed the present

19

Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees on July 23, 2007.

Also on July 23, 2007, the

20

Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore, Smith. Buxton & Turcke fifed a Memorandum
21
22

23

of Costs and Attorney Fees, which was followed by a Supplemental Memorandum
asking for an additional $2,819.00. The Plaintiff fifed the present Motion to Disallow

24

Attorney Fees on August 3, 2007.

The Plaintiff also requested that the Court

25

reconsider the original decision granting summary judgment and the Court issued a

26
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,

. .

Memorandum Decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

LEGAL STANDARDS

2

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendants are not entitled to the attorney fees

:1

4

they have requested under the foUowing statutory provisions:

Attorney fees for civil actIon to recover In commercia' transaction

5

I.

6

A trial court may provide for attorney fees to the prevailing party when there is a

7

nexus between the lawsuit and a commercial transaction, under Idaho Code § 12-

a

120(3).

Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 835, 907 P.2d 807, 812

(1995).

A commercia' transaction is defined as any transaction that is not for

9
10

11

12

"personal or household" purposes. Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

II.

Attorney fees for claim defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation

13

Under Idaho Code § 12-121, a trial court may award attorney fees to a
14

prevailing party where it finds that the case was "brought, pursued or defended
15
16

frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Bums v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480,

17

486,65 P.3d 502,508 (2003). However. if any alternative legal basis can be found to

18

support the opposing party's claims, attorney fees are unwarranted under this rule.

19

Hanf v. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 370, 816 P.2d 320, 326 (1991). This

20

determination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, but any such award "must

21

be supported by findings and those findings, in tum, must be supported by the
record." Sunshine Mining Co. v. Metropolitan Mines Corp., 111 Idaho 654, 659, 726

23

P.2d 766, n1 (1986).

24

25
26
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III.
2
3

Attorney fees for party adverse to a state agency that did not act
with a reasonable basIs In fact or raw

Idaho Code § 12-117 provides that if a state agency against whom the
judgment is rendered acted 'Without a reasonable basis in fact or law," the prevailing

4

party shall be awarded attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-117(1}.
5

DISCUSSION

6

The fact that the Plaintiffs lawsuit is one in tort, rather than contract, does not

7
8

mean that the lawsuit is not a "commercial transaction" under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

9

Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-729. 152 P.3d 594, 599-600
Prior to Blimka, the Idaho Supreme Court did not award attorney fees for

10

(2007).

11

professional malpractice cases because the theory of recovery was in tort. See Fuller

12

v. Wolters, 119 fdaho 415,424-425,807 P.2d 633, 642-643 (1991). Since Fu/lerand

13

the cases that followed no longer bar recovery after Blimka, the only issue is whether a

14

contract to provide attorney services is a "commercial transaction."
15
16

The Idaho Supreme Court has, in dicta, addressed this issue.

In Fuller, the

17

Court held that "an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and even though the

18

underlying transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial transaction,'

19

attorney fees under 12-120(3) are not authoriZed." Id. at 425, 807 P.2d at 643. This

20

statement by the Court indicates that, had the Court been able to award attorney fees

21

under the statute for a tort claim, the Court would have because the underlying

22

23

transaction - a contract for attorney services - was a commercial o"e. The Court has
articulated this same reasoning in other cases that follow Fuller. See B.g. Brooks v.

24

Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 79, 910 P.2d 744, 751 (1996).
25
26

The Defendants are the prevailing parties in this action, which is not an issue

000228
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...
'that Plaintiff argues otherwise. The record demonstrates that this transaction is a
2

contract for attorney services and therefore was a commercial transaction. The fact

3

that the contract was for legal services, rather than another type of services, does not

4

change the nature of the transaction into one for either personal services or household

5

services. Since the two requirements set forth in section 12-120(3) have been fulfilled,

6

the Court is compelled to award reasonable attorney fees under that statute.

7

a

The Defendants have also argued that they are entitled to attorney fees under
Idaho Code §§ 12-121 and 12-117. While the Court does not necessarily believe that

9

this lawsuit was without foundation or without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the
10

Court need not continue analysis under either sections 12-121 or 12-117 since attomey
11

12

fees are both appropriate and required under section 12-120(3).

13

The record does not reflect any objection to the amount of attorney fees or costs

14

claimed by any of the Defendants. The Defendants William A. McCurdy and Brassey,

15

Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett have asked for $58.00 in costs as a matter of right and

16

$30,285.00 as reasonable attorney fees. The Defendants Susan E. Buxton and Moore,

17

Smith, Buxton &' Turcke have asked for $58.00 in costs as a matter of right and

18

$26,731.00 as reasonable attorney fees.

Based upon the sworn affidavits of

19

Defendant's counsel the Court finds that the attorney fees incurred by the Defendants
20

were reasonable conSidering the time and labor involved in this litigation. The Court will
21

22

23

award the Defendants these costs and reasonable attorney fees, as requested.
CONCLUSION

24

The Court will DENY the Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and will

25

award the Defendants Wilfiam A. McCurdy and Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett

26
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.

costs as a matter of right in the amount of $58.00 and reasonable attorney fees in the
amount of $30,285.00. The Court will also award the Defendants Susan E. Buxton and
2

Moore, Smith. Buxton & Turcke costs as a matter of right in the amount of $58.00 and·
3

reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $26,731.00. Counsel for the Defendant
4

5

William McCurdy will prepare a judgment with an IRCP 54 (b) certification that comports

6

with the Court's decision.

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

DATED this

2f..

day of September 2007.

9
10

11

CHAEL McLAUGHLIN
DISTRICT JUDGE

12
13

14

15
16

17
18

19

20
21

22
23

24

25
26
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2

I hereby certify that on the

L

:f

I),~he(

day of ~er 2007. I mailed (served) a

3

true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
4

5

8
7
8
9
10

11

12

Allen B. Ellis
Ellis Brown & Sheils
P.O. Box 388
Boise, 10 83701
Jeffrey A. Strother
Strother Law Office
200 N. 4th St., Ste 30
Boise, lD 83702
Craig Meadows
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, 10 83701

13

14
15
16

James D. laRue
Elam & Burke
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, 10 83701

J. DAVID NAVARRO

Clerk of the District Court

17
18
19
20

21

22
23

24

25
26

000231.
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THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlC

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY

ADA
I

3

I

4

5
6

STEVEN P. CADY, et aI.,

8

Case No. CV OC-2007-13830

Plaintiffs,

7

ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

vs.

9
10

ROR Y R. JONES, JONES,
FURHMAN & EIDEN, P.A.

HESS,

11
12

Defendants.

13
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

JI

On July 10, 2008, the Court entered final judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' case with
prejudice having granted summary judgment to Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden,
P.A. that same day. On July 17,2008, Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. timely
filed their Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs as the prevailing party asking the Court to award
attorney fees under

I.e. § 12-120(3). The Plaintiffs never replied or opposed. The Court heard

argument on August 21, 2008. The Plaintiffs did not appear.
LR.C.P. 54(e)(6) states that "[a]ny objection to the allowance of attorney fees, or to the
amount thereof, shaH be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as provided by Rule
54(d)(6)." LR.C.P. 54(d){6) provides that "[a]ny party may object to the claimed costs of another
party set forth in a memorandum of costs by filing and serving on adverse parties a motion to
disallow part or all of such costs within ten days of service of the memorandum of costs ....
Failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all
objections to the costs claimed."
By failing to respond at all or to appear at the oral argument, the Plaintiffs thereby waived
their right to further contest the amount of the award of attorney fees.

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) and

54(d)(6); I.C. § 12-120(3); Conner v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761,653 P.2d 1173, (1982). The Court

OOOZ32
ORDER CRANTINC COSTS AND ATTORNEV FEES
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EXHIBIT
R

notes that both the Defendants and the Plainti ffs clearly requested costs and attorney fees in their
2

respective pleadings and that the Defendants requested attorney fees pursuant to I.e. § t 2- t 20(3).

3

Based on the following, in an exercise of discretion, the Court awards $216.75 in non-

4

discretionary costs! and grants an award for attorney fees in the amount of $19, 144.50. The Court

5

denies any award for discretionary costs because the Court does not find these costs

6

ex traordinary. 2

7

ANALYSIS

8

In Idaho, parties pay their own attorney's fees unless a statute or contract provides

9

otherwise. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 911 P.2d 133 (1996); Owner-Operator Independent

10

Drivers v. Idaho Public Utilities Com 'n, 125 Idaho 401,871 P.2d 818 (1994); Matter of Estate of

1I

Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1994) (also called the "American Rule"). The

12

party who claims attorney fees must present the Court either a statute or contract between the

13

parties permitting such an award; if the party does not point the Court to a statute or contract,

14

attorney fees may be denied. Fournier v. Fournier, 125 Idaho 789, 74 P.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1994).

15

Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. moved for attorney's fees and costs

16

pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3), I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) and 54(e)(1). They cite to no other statutory

17

authority in support of the requested fees. They further contend they are the prevailing parties and

18

that the gravamen of the case was a commercial transaction making attorney's fees proper under

19

I.e.

§ 12-120(3).

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

I While the Defendants request an expert witness fee of $9.320.51 as a cost pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(C), only
expert witness fees may be awarded as a matter of right where the witness either testified at trial or in a deposition and
the amount is limited to $2,000.00. I.R.C.P .. 54(d)( I )(C)(8) reads as follows: "Reasonable expert witness fees for
an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an action not to exceed the sum of $2,000 for each expert
witness for all appearances." (Emphasis added.) Since there is no evidence that Dennis Reinstein either testified at
trial or in a deposition, the Defendants cannot get these costs as a matter of right. If the Defendants provide evidence
that Reinstein testified, the Court will reconsider.

2 Rule 54(d)(1 )(0) governs discretionary costs and provides in relevant part as follows:

Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph
ron be allowed upon a show in" that said costs were netessary
and exceptional coslS reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against
the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon objettions to such discretionary costs contained in
the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such s~cific item of discretionary
cost should or should not be allowed.
(C) {"Costs as a Matter of Right"],

The Court recognizes this issue as one of discretion. Although the costs may be reasonable and necessary. the Court
cannot find that these are "exceptional" costs as contemplated by the Rule.
ORDER GRANTING COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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:

The PlaintifTs did not oppose. However, the fact that the Plaintiffs failed to timely object
2

does not absolve the Court of its responsibility to independently review the legal basis for the

3

attorney fee award or the amount of the award; whether a statute authorizes an award of fees is a

4

question of law. See Security Pacific Bank of Idaho. FSB. v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 320, 847 P.2d

5

1181, 1189 (Ct. App. 1993); Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho I, 713 P.2d 437 (Cl. App.1986); Fearless

6

Farris Wholesale. Inc. v. Howell, 105 Idaho 699, 704,672 P.2d 577,582 (Ct. App. 1983).3

7

A.

THE DEFENDANTS ARE THE PREY AILING PARTIES.

8

The Court finds Defendants are the prevailing parties. The determination as to which

9

party, if any, prevailed is within the Court's discretion. Holmes, 125 Idaho at 787, 874 P.2d at

10

598 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Badell v. Badell, 122 Idaho 442, 450, 835 P.2d 677, 685 (Ct.

I1

App.1992». In determining whether there is a prevailing party, the Court first looks to the Idaho

12

Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(e)(1) incorporates Rule 54(d)(l)(8) which provides in part:

13
14
15
16

In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs,
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought' by the respective parties, whether there
were multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, crossclaims, or other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to
which each party prevailed upon each of such issue or claims.

17

See also Jerry J Joseph c.L. U Ins. Associates v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.

18

App.1990).

19

The Plaintiffs prevailed on no issue, and the Court finds in an exercise of its discretion

20

that Rory R. Jones, Jones, Hess, Furhman & Eiden, P.A. are the prevailing parties in this matter.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31

3 In Fearless Farris, the court wrote as follows:

Failure to timely object to a memorandum of costs and attorney fees constitutes a waiver of the right
contest the requesting party's entitlement to the fees sought. Conner v. Dralce, 103 Idaho 761,
653 P.2d 1173 (1982). This don nol me..n lite trial COli" alltomatlcally mllst award tlte full
IImount .rpec/flttd /11 Ihe memonmdllm. See Operating Engineers local Union ] 70 v. Goodwin
Construction Co. of Blaclcfool. 104 Idaho 83, 656 P.2d 144 (el. App.1982). But it does mean [hat
the party who fails to object has waived its right to contest any award within the amount sought.
Therefore, we hold that, having failed to object to Fearless Farris' memorandum in support of an
award of attorney fees, [he Howells cannot now be heard to complain either concerning the fonn of
the request or [hat the court erred in failing to make a written finding as to the basis and reasons for
awarding such fees to Fearless Farris.
10

(Emphasis added.)
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The Court therefore finds they are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney's fees provided a

2

statute applies to its request.

3

B.

4

5
7

9
10
1I

12
13
14
15
16

120(3).

I.e. §

12-120(3) provides that the prevailing party in an action based upon "any

commercial transaction" is entitled to recover attorney fees. The statute defines "commercial

6

8

THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES UNDER I.C. §12-

transaction" as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." The test
for the application of this section is "whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen
of the lawsuit, that is, whether the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes
the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 776,
890 P.2d 714, 717 (1995). The term "commercial transaction" is defined in

I.e.

§12-120(3) to

mean "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Thus, by the
plain terms of the statute, "[ w Jhere a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a
type embraced by section 12-120(3), . . . that claim triggers the application of the statute."

Continental Casualty, 127 Idaho 835, 907 P.2d 812.

However, there must also be a nexus

between the commercial transaction and the lawsuit:

20

[T]he award of attorney's fees [under § 12-120(3) J is not warranted every time a
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is
whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit.
Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.e. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party
is attempting to recover.

21

/d. (quoting Brower v. E.l DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349

22

(1990». This case is a legal malpractice case.

17
18
19

23

In Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991), the Idaho Supreme Court

24

decided "that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and even though the underlying

25

transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial transaction,' attorney fees under

26

12-120(3) are not authorized." Id. at 425, 807 P.2d at 643. The Fuller court ruled that "under our

27

present statute, 'tort actions are essentially actions in which the parties bear their own attorney's

28

fees, regardless of [who J prevail(ed}. '"

29

reject claims for attorney fee awards in legal malpractice actions. See Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho

Id. The Fuller rule has been continuously applied to

30
31
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897,901. 980 P,2d 561, 565 (1999); Smith v, David S Shurtleff & Assoc., 124 Idaho 239,858
2

P.2d 778 (Ct. App.1993).

3

The Defendants cite the recent Supreme Court case, Blimlca v. My Web 1f1zolesaler. LLC.

4

143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007), for the proposition that because the underlying relationship

5

between them and the Plaintiffs is a commercial transaction, attorney fees are authorized.

6

However, a close reading of Blimlca and its recent progeny suggests otherwise. In Blimlca. the

7

fraud arose in the commercial transaction itself. In Blimlca. the Supreme Court observed that I.e.

8

§ 12-120(3) does not prohibit attorney fees for commercial transactions involving tortious conduct

9

when "the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which

10

the party is attempting to recover." Id at 728,152 P.3d at 599 (quoting Brower v. £1 DuPont De

I1

Nemours & Co.. 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990) (emphasis added». In this case,

12

the commercial transaction, the parties' attorney client relationship, is integral to the Plaintiffs'

13

claims. Absent an attorney-client relationship, there can be no malpractice claim.

14

The Supreme Court's recent reading of Blimka in Lee v. Nickerson, _Idaho_,189 PJd

15

(2008) suggests that where the nexus of the claim even where it sounds in tort is the relevant

16

inquiry.4 In Lee, the Nickersons hired Lee to construct a level bam pad and do some work on a

17

pond on their property. Lee filed suit against the Nickersons. Lee's complaint contained claims

18

of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and implied contract. Lee also filed a $20,000 tort claim

19

based on the Nickersons' alleged refusal to allow Lee to retrieve his equipment left on the

20

Nickerson's property. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Nickersons after a jury

21

trial. On the question of attorney fees, the district court stated that I.C. §12-120(3) did not entitle

22

the Nickersons to attorney fees on the tort claim. Based on its reading of Blimka, the Idaho

23

Supreme Court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees and held that the Nickersons

24

were entitled to reasonable attorney fees relating to their defense of Lee's tort claim.

25

Supreme Court stated that the commercial transaction, the parties' contract, initiated the presence

26

afLee's equipment on the Nickerson's property and was integral to Lee's claim.

The

27
28
29
30
31

4

The Court recognizes that the Honorable Judge Michael Mclaughlin's decision awarding attorney fees in City uf
v. Buxton, et a/., (a legal malpractice case) is currently on appeal.

M(..~all
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Lee seems to create a "but for" standard for determining whether a civil action is "to
2

recover ... in any commercial transaction" for purposes of I.e. § 12-120(3). In other words, but

3

for the contract or commercial transaction between Lee and the Nickersons, Lee's equipment

4

would not have been on the Nickersons' property and no tort could have been committed. Under

5

this standard, most, if not all, legal malpractice claims would faU within the scope of I.c. § 12-

6

120(3) since legal malpractice can only occur where the parties have entered into an attorney-

7

client relationship, which most often involves a contract or commercial transaction. In short, Lee

8

greatly expands the scope of I.e. § 12-120(3).

9

In this case, the commercial transaction, the contract or attorney-client relationship

10

between the parties, gave rise to the attorney's duties and obligations to his client. But for the

I 1

underlying contract, no legal malpractice could have occurred. Therefore, Plaintiffs were seeking

I2

recovery of damages sustained as a result of a commercial transaction and the prevailing parties,

13

the Defendants, are entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).
The Court finds there was such a nexus. Clearly, the contractual relationship was central

14

15

to all the Plaintiffs' claims and attorney fees are awardable.

16

C.

ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF 519,144.50 ARE REASONABLE.

17

The Defendants sought an award of 519,144.50 in attorney fees. Determining whether the

18

amount of an attorney fee award is reasonable is within the Court's sound discretion. P.o.

19

Ventures. Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 159 P.3d 870 (2007); Craft

20

Wall of Idaho. Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 701 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1985).

21

constitutes a reasonable fee is controlled by the criteria of I.R.C.P. 54{e)(3). See Sanders v.

22

Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000); Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 81 I

23

P.2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1991). "These factors are applicable wherever they would not conflict with

24

the contract or statute upon which the award is based. See Rule 54(e)(8)." Banlc of Idaho v.

25

Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 326, 647 P.2d 776, 782 (Ct. App. 1982).

What

26

The Court is "permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by

27

the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the

28

attorney." Craft Wall, I 08 Idaho at 705-706, 701 P.2d at 325. In this case, Cady does not contest

29

30

3I
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•

I

•

'0

the reasonableness of the claimed attorney fees and, in fact, waived any objection to the amount.

2

However, the Court independently examined the bills.

3

The Court finds that fees charged by each individual attorney given their respective

4

experience and the prevailing fees for similarly experienced attorneys are reasonable. The Court

5

further finds that the number of hours claimed are reasonable.

6

After considering all the factors listed in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3), the Court finds, in its

7

discretion, attorney's fees in the total amount of $19,144.50 are reasonable fees and awards the

8

Defendants $19,144.50 in attorney fees.

ORDER

9
10

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Rory R. Jones and Jones, Hess, Furhrnan

1I

& Eiden, P.A's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees is hereby GRANTED and Rory R. Jones and

12

Jones, Hess, Furhrnan & Eiden, P.A. are awarded attorney's fees in the amount of$19,144.50 and

13

costs as a matter of right in the amount of $216. 75.

14

IT IS SO ORDERED.

15

Dated this 11 th day of September 2008.

16
17
18
District Judge

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
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2
3

CERTIFICA TE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

4

5
6
7

8

Jl-

day of September 2008, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:
CHRIST T. TROUPIS
TROUPIS LA W OFFICE
P.O. BOX 2408
EAGLE, IDAHO 83616-9116

9
10

1I
12
13
14

15

R. BRAD MASINGILL
P.O. BOX 467
WEISER, IDAHO 83672

CRAIG L. MEADOWS
MICHELLE R. POINTS
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
P.O. BOX 1617
BOISE, IDAHO 83701-1617

16

17

1. DAVID NA VARRO
Clerk of the District Court

18

19
20

21
22

,

23
24

25
26
27
28

29
30
31
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Craig L. \teadows, ISH No.1 OS 1
Michelle R. Points, ISH No. 622.t
I iA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & flA WLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ro 83701-1617
Telephone: 20S.3.t4.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlTNTY OF CASSIA

MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

W. KENT FLETCHER,

)
)
)

Defendant.

Case No. CV 2009-517
AFFIDA VIT OF MICHELLE R. POINTS
SETTING FORTH MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

Michelle R. Points, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:

I.

Affiant. I am an attorney with the law tirm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley

LLP, which represents Defendant W. Kent Fletcher in this action. I am licensed to practice law
in the state of Idaho. This aftidavit is submitted in support of Defendant's motion for attorney
fees and costs, filed concurrently herewith. It is intended to comply with provisions of Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54, including but not limited to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5)
and 5.t( e)( 5).

000240
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OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - I
04188007016725051

Basis of Affidavit. The matt.:rs set forth in this aftidavit are bas.:d upon my
personal knowledge, the work records of my law tirnl, and a review of those records made by me
and other persons with knowl.:dge. The records w.:re mad.: contemporaneously with the events
set t(xth in the records, were made in the ordinary course, and were regularly kept by llawley
Troxell Ennis & I lawley LLP. counsel tor Plaintiff.
3.

Fees and Costs Claimed. Accompanying this affidavit is Exhibit A, which

itemizes the requested attorney's fees and costs, organized in a manner which details the nature
and amount of attorney's fees and costs sought by Defendant, based upon Defendant having
successfully defended against all claims asserted by Plaintiff I am familiar with the fact of, and
the necessity for, such attorney's fees and costs having been incurred in this case. Such fees and
costs were actually, necessarily, and reasonably incurred. To the best of my knO\vledge and
belief, the items are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d)(5). The attorney's fees claimed are for work actually performed in this action
and represent time which relates to Plaintiff against whom Defendant seeks recovery of fees and
costs. The costs are claimed in compliance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l).
Defendant is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) as Defendant is the
prevailing party in this case, the underlying case of which was a commercial transaction.
4.

Parties Against Whom Defendant Claims Fees and Costs. Defendant W. Kent

Fletcher seeks recovery of fees and costs from Plaintitf Mary Killins Soignicr.
5.

Basis for Claim ft.gainst Plaintiff The basis for Defendant's claim arises from

this Court's finding that Defendant is the prevailing party in the Order and Judgment entered
September 22,2009.

000241.
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6.

Fa,-=tors Supporting the Reasonableness of Ddl:ndant's

CI~lim

for Attornev Fees.

Factors that the Cnurt should consider in determining the reasonableness of Defendant's claim
tt)r attorney fees are set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e)(3). Those factors arc
individually
7.

di~ussed

in the follmving paragraphs of this affidavit.

The Time and Labor Required. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3 )(:\)

provides that the Court shall consider the time and labor required. There were several
characteristics about this case which required substantial time and labor in order to fully and
fairly pursue and obtain Defendant's complete defense in this case. In addition, thorough
evaluation of client documents, Court filings, as vvell as applicable law vvas required.
8.

The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

54(e)(3)(8) provides that the Court shall consider the novelty and difficulty orthe questions. As
discussed in the previous paragraph, it was necessary to review voluminous documents and
research applicable law to evaluate the case and craft a successful Motion for Summary
Judgment.
9.

The Skill, Experience and Abilitv of the Attorney. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

54(e)(3)(C) provides that the Court shall consider the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly and the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular tield of law. The lawyers
primarily involved in this case are: Craig Meadows, IS8 No. 1081, Partner, and myself,
Mi,-=helle R Points, IS8 No. 6224, Associate. Mr. Meadows and I have the requisite skill and
experience to properly and efficiently handle this case.
10.

The Prevailing Charges. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(D) provides that

the Court shall consider the prevailing charges for like work. Throughout the course of this

00024.2
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litigation. I bdic\e that the charges billed for lawyers and litigation assistance staff have been at
[he prevailing charges for like work.
11.

l\IandatoryJ.:Qsts. 1\tandatory costs, as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

54( d)( J )( C) are as follows:
I.R.C.P 54(d)( I )(C)( I) Court tiling fees:
12.

$ 58.00

Discretionarv Costs. Discretionary costs, as outlined in Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(d)(l )(0) are as follows:

$ 467.46
$ 264.58
$ 732.04

Photocopies (at 18¢/pg):
Assisted Legal Research (Westlaw)
Total
13.

Factors Supporting the Reasonableness of Defendant's Claim for Costs.

Defendant is claiming costs as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(I)(C), and discretionary costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D). The
date set forth to each cost, on the exhibit attached hereto, is the date the cost was posted to the
accounting records of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, and not necessarily the date the
cost was incurred.

SUMMARY OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES REQUESTED:
Attorney fees
Mandatory costs (LR.C.P 54(d)(J )(C)
Discretionary costs (I.R.C.P 54(d)(I)(0)
Total

DATED this

~

$10,914.00
58.00
732.04
$11,704.04

$
$

September, 2009.
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

) ss.
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

~~day of September, 2009.

~

~ina Slegers

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at N4mf'tA. , Idaho
My commission expires Jut1(.

II

~

2015'"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

thi~SePtember,

I HEREBY CER nFY that on
:::009, I caused to be sened a
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDA VIT OF MICI fELLE R. POINTS SETTING FORTll
MEMORANDUrv1 OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES by the method indicated below. and
addressed to each of the follO\ving:

Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS, BRO\VN & Sf fElLS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff1

/u.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy: 208.345.9564

V'" U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Jeffrey A. Strother
STROTHER LA W OFFICE
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintiffj

Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
_ _ Telecopy:
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FEES FOR 4188-070
Date Initials Hours
4/3/2009 CLM
35

Amount Description
61250 E-mail wIth attachments from J Ries, review
letter from K. Fletcher; revIew complaint
with attachments. telephone call wIth J
Ries, telephone conference with K Fletcher;
review Idaho Supreme Court case on duty owed
to beneficiary by scrivener of will; e-mail
to J. Ries; telephone call with A Ellis.

4/3/2009 MPOI

08

11600 Conference with C Meadows re factual history
of claims and e-mail exchanges with client re
same; research most recent Supreme Court
decisions re statute of limitation and "some
damage" rule.

4/6/2009 CLM

04

70.00 Receipt of acknowledgement of service from A
Ellis; conference with M. POints re
stipulation to move matter to Cassia County.

4/6/2009 MPOI

15

217.50 Create caption and draft stipulation and
order re change of venue; call to court re
assigned judge; review civil rule for
provision for transfer outside of judicial
district; review recent cases on standing and
statute of limitation issues.

4/7/2009 MPOI

1.5

217.50 Draft answer with affirmative defenses
responsive to Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial.

4/8/2009 MPOI

0.8

116.00 Final edits to answer and forward to clients
for review; brief conference with C. Meadows
re additional affirmative defenses.

4/9/2009 ClM

02

35.00 E-mail from K Fletcher; e-mail to K.
Fletcher regarding documents to be copied.

4/9/2009 MPOI

0.3

43.50 Review and execute stipulation for change of
venue and final edits to answer, both for
filing today.

4/10/2009 MPOI

0.5

72 50 Brief review of client file; exchange calls
with court clerk re check for change of venue
to Cassia County.

4/15/2009 MPOI

0.3

43 50 Draft amended complaint to include citation to
applicable statute of limitation; exchange
e-mails with client re case file.

4/16/2009 MPOI

13

188.50 Identify potential estoppel issue re
Plaintiffs settlement of claim with American
Cancer Society; begin review of deposition of

1

EXHIBIT
A

00021\6
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K. Fletcher.
4/17/2009 MPOI

02

29.00 Call from court clerk in Cassia County re
change of venue issues and filing of answer.

4/22/2009 MPOI

0.2

29.00 Review exhibits to deposition of K. Fletcher.

4/27/2009 MPOI

0.8

116.00 Finish review of clients deposition and
exhibits and outline potential summary
judgment motion.

4/28/2009 MPOI

0.5

72.50 Begin review of deposition of Stephen
Westfall.

4/29/2009 MPOI

0.7

101 50 Continue to review deposition of S. Westfall.

5/11/2009 MPOI

1.3

188.50 Continue to review client file and outline
potential issues.

5/13/2009 MPOI

0.8

116.00 Exchange e-mails with client re documents and
pleadings from underlying case; brief
research re Idaho cases on relevant duty
issues.

5/13/2009 DBRO

0.4

22.00 Retrieve docket; edit docket for speCific
document requests and supply to Clerk of the
Court for processing.

5/14/2009 MPOI

0.3

43.50 Review stipulation re settlement of
underlying case and brief conference with C.
Meadows re the same.

5/18/2009 MPOI

0.2

29.00 Follow up with D. Brown re obtaining ~ t 6\'SSi",County records.

5/19/2009 DBRO

0.2

1100 Receive documents from Court, copy, supply
set to M. Points. Draft and Finalize Letter
to Clerk with Payment and Mail.

5/20/2009 MPOI

1.3

188.50 Review underlying will contest pleadings from
Cassia County.

5/21/2009 MPOI

0.3

43.50 Draft e-mail to N. Trammel re research on
issues of duty and statute of limitation
regarding Plaintiffs. claims.

5/27/2009 MPOI

03

43.50 Conference with M. O'Dowd re research on
statute of limitation and duty issues;
research case law re estoppel argument.

5/27/2009 MODO

2.6

32500 Read and review project assignment from M.
Points regarding attorney malpractice case

~v11l

2
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FEES FOR 4188-010
including complaint, will and will construction
opinion e-mail M points regarding research;
find and print recent Idaho cases regarding
statute of limitations for attorney
malpractice; meeting with M. Points regarding
project

5/28/2009 MODO

31

38750 Telephone call with reference attorney at
Westlaw; research caselaw regarding duty to
third party beneficiaries; read and review
caselaw regarding statute of limitations.

5/28/2009 MPOI

15

217.50 Draft motion for summary judgment and begin
draft of memorandum and affidavit of K.
Fletcher in support of motion.

5/29/2009 MODO

3

37500 Drafting argument outline for statute of
limitations issue.

5/31/2009 MODO

2.4

300.00 Drafting statute of limitations section of
motion for summary judgment brief.

6/1/2009 MPOI

0.3

43.50 Draft e-mail to client re issues for
potential motion for summary judgment

6/1/2009 MODO

7.7

962.50 Complete drafting argument section for
statute of limitations; draft argument
section for breach of duty owed to named
beneficiaries in testamentary documents.

6/2/2009 MODO

2.8

350.00 Finish draft of brief; review and make
corrections suggested by 8. Smethers; meeting
with M. Points.

6/2/2009 MPOI

1.8

261.00 Meet with M. O'Dowd re research on issues for
motion for summary judgment; continue to
draft motion and memorandum in support of
motion for summary judgment

6/3/2009 MPOI

1.7

246.50 Continue to draft and edit all pleadings in
support of motion for summary judgment.

6/7/2009 MPOI

0.2

29.00 Exchange e-mails with client re motion for
summary judgment.

6/11/2009 MPOI

04

58.00 Exchange e-mails with client re motion for
summary judgment and issues re deposition;
e-mail J. Ries re the same.

6/12/2009 MPOI

0.8

116.00 Call to court clerk re hearing on motion for
summary judgment and draft notice of hearing;
edit memorandum to reflect changes in client

3
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FEES FOR 4188-070
affidavit; finalize all pleadings and
exhibits for fili~g today.

6/30/2009 MPOI

04

58 00 Review motion and proposed order on motion to
disqualify Judge Crabtree; exchange e-mails
with client re same and related matters.

7/212009 MPOI

03

4350 Review pleading from counsel vacating motion
to disqualify and forward the same to client;
review notice of hearing on motion

7/16/2009 CLM

0.5

87.50 Telephone call from A Ellis; e-mail from A
Ellis; conference with M. Points on issues
raised by A Ellis in response to motion for
summary Judgment and production of K.
Fletcher's will file.

7/16/2009 MPOI

1.2

174 00 Call from counsel for Plaintiff re deposition
of client and related 56{f) motion;
conference with C. Meadows and calls with
client re the same; review of client file in
anticipation of providing file to counsel for
Plaintiff and call to the same re arranging a
time for inspection.

7/21/2009 MPOI

0.3

43.50 Brief conference with A Ellis ra client
file; draft e-mail to client re case status
and related matters.
175.00 Conference with A Ellis; produce K. Fletcher
documents to A Ellis; arrange for copying of
K. Fletcher documents; conference with M.
Points.

7/21/2009 ClM

7/21/2009 CWAM

2.3

218.50 Scan, process, bates number documents
electronically in preparation for production.

7/22/2009 CWAM

5

47500 Continue to bates number documents
electronically in preparation for production.

7/27/2009 CLM

14

7/28/2009 ClM

2

7/28/2009 MPOI

15

245.00 Receipt and review of Reply Memorandum,
Affidavit and exhibits in response to Motion
for Summary Judgment; e-mail materials to M.
Points; e-mail to K. Fletcher.
350.00 Research issues raised by Response Memorandum;
review of will for Cowan; e-mail research
issues and thoughts to M. Points on motion for
summary judgment.
217. 50 Review and outline opposition of Plaintiff to
motion for summary judgment.

4
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7/29/2009 MPOI

22

319 00 Begin draft of reply bnef or. motion for
summary judgment.

7/30/2009 MPOI

32

464 00 Continue to draft reply to plaintiffs
opposition to motion to summary Judgment

7/30/2009 ClM

23

402 50 E-mail from M. Paints. review and revise
Reply Memorandum on Motion for Summary
Judgment; forward to K Fletcher and file
with Court.

8/412009 MPOI

0.3

4350 Follow-up on service and filing of reply
brief and review association of counsel

8/5/2009 MPOI

0.3

43.50 Conference with C Meadows re argument in
motion for summary judgment

8/7/2009 MPOI

09

130.50 Prepare materials for upcoming motion for
summary judgment and outline argument motion
to strike client's affidavit; conference with
C. Meadows re the same.

8/9/2009 MPOI

0.9

130.50 Prepare for hearing on motion for summary
judgment

8/10/2009 MPOI

4.2

609.00 Travel to Burley, continue to prepare for
hearing, meet with client and argue motion
for summary judgment to Judge Crabtree.

9/11/2009 MPOI

0.6

87.00 Review decision on motion for summary
jUdgment; exchange calls and e-mails with
client and J. Ries re the same.

9/14/2009 MPOI

0.4

58.00 Exchange e-mails with J. Ries and client re
potential motion for attorney fees and
settlement issues.

9/16/2009 MPOI

0.3

43.50 Draft e-mail to counsel for Plaintiff re
proposed settlement of case re waiver of fee
motion for agreement to not appeal recent
motion for summary judgment decision.

9/22/2009 MPOI

0.4

58.00 Call from judge's clerk re order and judgment
re decision on motion for summary judgment;
draft same.

TOTALS

78.8

10914.00

5
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COSTS FOR 4188-0070
Date Initials Qty.
4/6/2009 HTEH
2

Rate
o 18

4/9/2009 MPOI

1

58

419/2009 HTEH

24

018

4/10/2009 MPOI

9

Amount Description
036 COPYING USER-=454 UNIT-=13 TIME=12 00 PAGES:::2
58 CLIENT CHARGES - ADA COUNTY CLERK Filing fee
for Answer
432 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME:11 32 PAGES=24
9 CLIENT CHARGES - CASSIA COUNTY Fee for transfer
of venue to Cassia County

4/15/2009 HTEH

557

0.18

100.26 COPYING USER:::111 UNIT=11 TIME=0803 PAGES=557

4/15/2009 HTEH

322

0.18

5796 COPYING USER:::111 UNIT=9 TIME=0838 PAGES=322

4/15/2009 HTEH

499

0.18

89.82 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=11 TIME=0857 PAGES=499

4/15/2009 HTEH

65

0.18

117 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=15:18 PAGES=65

4/15/2009 HTEH

14

0.18

2.52 COPYING USER=454 UNIT=13 TIME=1523 PAGES=14

4/16/2009 HTEH

6

0.18

1.08 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=10:59 PAGES=6

4/16/2009 HTEH

6

0.18

108 COPYING USER=493 UNIT=13 TIME=11:08 PAGES=6

4/17/2009 HTEH

46

0.18

8.28 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=10:54 PAGES=46

4/23/2009 HTEH

1

4

4/28/2009 HTEH

40

0.18

5/4/2009 HTEH

1

0.18

0.18 COPYING USER=401 UNIT=13 TIME=15:47 PAGES=1

5/13/2009 HTEH

224

0.18

4032 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=9 TIME=1327 PAGES=224

288

5/19/2009 DBRO

4 MESSENGER
7.2 COPYING USER=111 UNIT=13 TIME=16:01 PAGES=40

288 CLIENT CHARGES - CLERK OF THE COURT For Records
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Craig L. Meado\',s, ISB No. 108!
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000

P.O. Box 16J 7
Boise. ID 83101-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com

mpoints@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF ruE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE Cor:rF CASSIA
MARY KILL INS SOIGNIER.,
Plaintiff,

)

II

;i

)
)

Case No. CV 2009.. S17

)

NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.

)

W. KENT FLETCHER.

)

)

Defendant.

)
)

-----------------------------)
TO:

ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-named Defendant will call up for hearing his

Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs on the 25th day of November, 2009, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon
thereafter as counsel may be heard, at the Cassia County Courthouse. before the Honorable
Michael R. Crabtree Burley. Idaho.
!

The parties have stipulated to conduO! thehearing

telePhOnitrIY;

I
j

I

I

NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
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04183 0010 1681'22.1

DATED THIS

1-!;;.y

of October. 2009.
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HA WLEY LLP

NOTICE OF HEARING· 2
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004188 0070.1881922 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREB Y CER TIFY that on thiS"J!!;;;of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true
I..'opy of the foregoing :.10 liCE OF HEARfNG by the method indicated below, and addressed to

ea\:h of the following:
Allen B. Ellis
ELLIS. BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P,O. Box 388
Boise, 10 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintifi]

__ U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
---:;7 Telecopy: 208.345.9564

Jeffrey A. Strother
STROTHER LAW OFFICE
200 N. Fourth Street. Suite 30
Boise, 10 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintifi]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
E-mail
Telecop~: 208.342.2429

L

, I

f,

,(I

;\OTICF OF

HEARJ~G
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0<111180010 1881t22.1

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

1
,

,

j'

~..

JEFFREY A. STROTIfER
STROTHER LA W OFFICE
200 North 4th Street, Suite 30
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone)
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 2014
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,

W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517

MOTION TO DISALLOW
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

)

Comes now the plaintiff, through her attorneys of record, and moves the Court for an
order disallowing a portion of defendant's claimed costs and the entirety of the claimed attorney
fees set forth in defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees and
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES - I
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supporting affidavit. both dated September 30, 2009. This motion is made upon the following
grounds:
(1 ) Plaintiff s complaint is not based upon a contract with the defendant nor is it based

upon a "commercial transaction" with defendant. Accordingly, I.e. §12-120(3) does not entitle
defendant to attorney fees.
(2) Unlike City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), the underlying
matter here, in which the alleged malpractice occurred, was not a commercial matter.
(3) Even if this action is deemed to arise from a commercial transaction, the commercial

transaction is not essential or integral to plaintiffs cause of action.
(4) Portions of defendant's claimed attorney fees are service fees for work which may

have been performed by persons who are not licensed attorneys; and
(5) With respect to the claimed discretionruy costs, defendant has failed to demonstrate

that these costs were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred" and "in the interest
of justice be assessed against" the plaintiffhere. See Rule 54(d)(1)(D), LR.C.P.
This motion is based upon the Memorandum of Law filed herewith, the pleadings and
records in this action, and such other oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the
hearing.
DATED this 13 th day of October, 2009.

AllenB.EC_
Attorney for Plaintiff

MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13 th day of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following;

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-J617

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
-X- Facsimile
954-5238

A11enB~S~~
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ALLEN B. ELLIS

ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED

,r

I i

tIl

Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, fdaho 83701-0388
(208) 345·7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

JEFFREY A. STROTHER
STROTHER LA W OFFICE
200 North 4tll Street, Suite 30
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone)
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 2014
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,

W. Kent Fletcher,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISALLOW
COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES

)

Defendant.

)

--------------------------)
Basis of motion: Defendant's claimed attorney fees should be disallowed for each of the
following reasons:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES - 1
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(I) Plaintitrs complaint is not based upon a contract with the defendant; nor is it based upon

a "commercial transaction" with defendant. Accordingly, 1. C. § 12-120(3) does not entitle defendant
to attorney fees.

(2) Unlike City of McCall v. Bux/on, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), this action does
arise from a commercial matter.
(3) Even if this action is deemed to arise from a commercial transaction, the commercial

transaction is not essential or integral to plaintiff's cause of action.
(4) A portion of defendant's claimed attorney fees are service fees for work performed by
non-attorneys; and
(5) With respect to the claimed discretionary costs, defendant has failed to demonstrate that
these costs were "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred" and "in the interest ofjustice
be assessed against" the plaintiff here. See Rule 54(dXl)(D), I.R.C.P.

BECAUSE PLAINTIFf DID NOT ENTER INTO A CONTRACT OR
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION WITH DEFENDANT. DEFENDANT IS NOT
ENTITLED TO ATIOR1%YFEES UNDERIDAHQ CODE §12-120(3)
Plaintiff's status in this matter is as a named beneficiary in the Will of Zachary Cowan. She
never enjoyed an attorney/relationship with the defendant Fletcher. The duty owed to plaintiff
Soignier arose out of the common law as articulated in Harrigfold

\I.

Hancock, not out of an

attorney/client relationship with defendant:
Considering these factors we hold that an attorney preparing
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or
identified therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested by the
testator to have them properly executed, so as to effectuate the
testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments.

Harrigfoldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90P.3d 884 (2004)
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES· 2

000263

This duty was identified by the Court in its Memorandum Decision (p. 7).

Because the plaintiff and defendant never entered into a contract or commercial transaction.
Idaho Code §12·120(3) is simply not applicabJe: "In any civil action to recover on a
contract . . . and in any commercial transaction . . . the prevailing party shall be allowed
a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." The statute
requires that there be a contract or commercial transaction. City ofMcCall v. Buxton, supra. In this
case there were no dealings whatsoever between the parties, commercial or otherwise.
Plaintiff's "civil action" against defendant is based upon the common law duty articulated
in Harrigfe/d, not upon a "contract" or upon a "commercial transaction". Accordingly, defendant,
as prevailing party, has no entitlement to attorney fees.

AS DISTINGYISijED FROM CITY OF MCCAll v BUXTON,
TIIE l.lNQE~YING MATTER HERE WAS NOr A COMMERCIAL MAmR
City 0/ McCall overruled Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991). Fuller
held:
We now hold that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action, and
even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the
malpractice was a "commercial transaction", attorney fees under
12-120(3) are not authorized.
Id 119 Idaho at 425.

The City o/McCali case does not hold that all actions for legal malpractice qualify as actions
to enforce a "commercial transaction". Notably the defendant in his brief eschews reference to the
Supreme Court's language in the City o/McCall but references the district court's statement, which
is !lQ1 the holding in City of McCall: "The record demonstrates that this transaction is a contract for
attorney services and therefore was a commercial transaction". See Exhibit A, p. 5. Rather, City
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND AITORNEY FEES· 3
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of McCall holds that: "It [I.e. §12-120(3)} mandates the awarding of a reasonable attorney's fee to
the prevailing party "in any commercial transaction"." [d., 146 Idaho at 665. That is a far cry from
stating that every time someone hires an attorney, he has entered into a commercial transaction.
In City o/McCall, (he underlying transaction was a construction contract between the City and
a general contractor. The matter was "commercial" in nature from its very outset. The allegedly
negligent advice, i.e., to terminate the general contractor, was with respect to a commercial matter.
Likewise, in Fuller v. Wolters, now ovenuled, the clients hired the attorney to represent them in a
lawsuit arising from the purchase and sale of farm equipment, clearly a commercial matter. Id, 119
Idaho at 418.
In the case at bench, the underlying matter was with respect to the drafting of a will and
plaintiff's status as a beneficiary, clearly not a commercial matter. Idaho Code §12-120(3) excepts
"personal or household" transactions from the scope of the statute.

THE GRAVAMEN OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT IS NOT
COMMERCIAL IN NATURE, RENDERlNG IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) INAPPLICABLe
In Brower v. E.l DuPont de Newmours and Co .. 117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990), Idaho's
Supreme Court made clear that Section 12-120(3) applies only when the essence of plaintiff's claim
is commercial in nature:
These cases [dealing with section 12-120(3)] lead to the conclusion
that the award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a
commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather,
the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen
of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and
constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. To
hold otherwise would be to convert the award of attorney's fees from
an exceptional remedy justified only by statutory authority to a matter
of right in virtually every lawsuit filed. (bracketed material
\

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES - 4
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explanatory)
117 Idaho at 784, partiaJly quoted in Blimka, 143 Idaho at 728.
In AG Services ofAmerica v. Kechter, 137 Idaho 62, 44 PJd 1117 (2002)
The statute (section 12-120(3)] does not authorize the awarding of
attorney fees every time a commercial transaction is connected with
the case. Bingham v. Montane Resource Assoc., 133 Idaho 420,987
P.2d 1035 (I 999). The test is whether the commercial transaction
constitutes the essential part of the lawsuit. (bracketed material
explanatory)
As indicated above, the transaction between the City of McCall and its attorneys was
inherently commercial in nature from the beginning. That is not so in this case, where plaintiff had
no relationship of any nature with defendant. That a third party attempted to name plaintiff as a
beneficiary in his will did not give rise to any commercial relationship between plaintiff and
defendant. Even if there were such a relationship, it was hardly essential to plaintiff' 5 claim, which
arose under common law not the Uniform Commercial Code.

.

DEFENDANT APpeARS TO Be SEEKING ATTORNEY FEES
FOR SERVICES PERFORMED BY NON-ATTORNEYS
In her affidavit, Ms. Points recites that the fees identified in Exhibit A reflect "attorney fees
claimed for work actually performed". These fees include fees for legal work performed by
"MODO", i.e., 23.4 hours ($2917.50). Although "MODO" is not actually identified, an entry dated
6/2/09 states: "Meet with M. O'Dowd re research on issues for motion for summary judgment".
Neither the Idaho State Bar website nor The Advocate (2009 -20 I 0), identify an attorney with the
surname of "O'Dowd" as an attorney licensed by the State ofIdaho. Plaintiff requests the Court to
take judicial notice of this fact. Rule 20 1(b), Idaho Rules of Evidence.
Also, on page 4 of Exhibit A there are entries for bates numbering documents by "CWAM",

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES - 5
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totaling 7.3 hours ($693.50), apparently secretarial work charged out at $95 per hour.
Assuming attorney fees are deemed appropriate, these fees ($3610) may not be not recoverable
as attorney fees. These fees are not claimed as paralegal fees. In the case of MODO, these fees may
not be characterized as "attorney fees" if MODO is not a licensed attorney. In the case of bates
stamping documents, if this work was done by a paralegal, he or she was severely underemployed
and the dient was overcharged (at $95 per hour).

WITH RESPECT TO DISCRETIONARY COSTS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
PRESENTED THAT THpSE COSTS WERE "NECESSARY AND EXCEPTIONAL"
AND. TH;EREFO&E. SHOULD NOT BE ASSESSED AGAINST PLAINTIFF
See Rule 54(d)(l)(D), l.R.C.P.

CONCLUSION
Inapplicability of Idaho Code §12-1200}: This malpractice action is not a "civil action" to
enforce or collect damages in a commercial transaction, i.e., section 12-120(3) is not applicable. The
herein matter is a suit for damages arising from breach ofthe attorney's common law duty to a person
(the plaintiff) to whom a duty of care was owed. Unlike City of McCall and Fuller v. Wolters. the
underlying matter was not commercial in nature.
The inspiration for the City ofMcCall decision was Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143
Idaho 723, 152P.3d 594 (2007) which stood for the simple proposition that tortious conduct arising
during a commercial transaction does not disqualify that transaction from treatment under section 12120(3) because of the tort. The defendant now seeks to construe City ofMcCall as holding that (1)
because all attorney/client relationships are commercial relationships, and (2) because Blimka allow3
attorney fees even where there is tortious conduct in a commercial transaction, (3) therefore, attorney
fees are recoverable under section

12~ 120(3)

in all malpractice actions.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES - 6

000267

First, City o/McCall does not hold that the prevailing party in all legal malpractice cases is
entitled to attorney fees. Defendant cited the district court's opinion, ignoring the language in City

o/McCall.
Secondly, no attorney/client relationship existed between defendant and plaintiff, the district
court's conclusion notwithstanding.'
Thirdly, in addition to the absence of a relationship with the plaintiff, defendant was
performing services ofa "personal" nature for the testator. See the "personal or household" exception
in I.C. §120-120(3), i.e., it was not a "commercial transaction".
Finally, plaintiffs entitlement to non-negligent conduct on the part of defendant is not
grounded on the terms of or course of dealing in a "commercial" matter; rather it is based upon the
common law of Idaho respecting the duty of an attorney to his client and others. Harrigfeld v.

Hancock, 140 Idaho at 138. That is, in contrastto the language ofI.C. § 12-120(3), this is not a "civil
action" to enforce a commercial transaction. There is a consistent line of cases which holds, that in
order for a "commercial transaction" to qUalifY the prevailing party for attorney fees, "the commercial
transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to
recover", e.g., Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594 (2007); Lee v.

Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 12, 189P.3d467(2008). Such is notour case.
A portion of the atto~ey fees claimed appear to be services by non-attorneys: If "MODO"
is M. O'Dowd, plaintiff can find no evidence that this person is a licensed attorney. Attorney fees

I Had an attorney/client existed between defendant and plaintiff, defendant would have placed
himself in a conflict of interest given his relationship with the testator.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES - 7

000268

incurred as a result of services by "CWAM" appear to secretarial services billed at $95.00 per hour.
There is no evidence presented that

the claimed

discretionary costs are "necessary ang

exceptional" as required by the Rules.
DATED this 13 th day of October, 2009.

Allen B.
s
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13 th day of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated beJow, and addressed to the

following:

Michelle R. Points
Craig 1. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & HaWley. LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
- L Telecopy (FAX)
954-5238

Allen . E

'

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATIORNEY FEES - 8

000269

. .,
1

,
,

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELUS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626

~
I /)
1

.,'

,

1

JEFFREY A. STROTHER
STROTHER LAW OFFICE
200 North 4th Street, Suite 30
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone)
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 2014
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-517
NOTICE OF HEARING

)

W. Kent Fletcher,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

Please take notice that a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees
will be held on the 25th day of November, 2009, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable

Michael R. Crabtree at the Cassia County Courthouse, Burley, Idaho.
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1
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DATED this

nIh

day of October, 2009.

Allen B. Ellis
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13 th day of October, 2009, J caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following;

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

Allen B. Ellis

NOTICE OF HEARING - 2
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
-X.... Facsimile
954-5238

ALLEN B. ELUS
ELLIS, BRO\VN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
Attorneys-at-Law
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, Idaho 83701-0388
(208) 345-7832 (Telephone)
(208) 345-9564 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 1626
JEFFREY A. STROTHER
STROTHER LA W OFFICE
200 North 4th Street, Suite 30
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 342-2425 (Telephone)
(208) 342-2429 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 2014
Attorneys for Plaintiff!Appellant

TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
Mary Killins Soignier,
Plaintiff!Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)

Case No.CV 2009-517
NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

W. Kent Fletcher,
Defendant!Respondent.

TO:

)
)
)

THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named plaintiff, Mary Killins Soignier, appeals against the above-named

NOTICE OF APPEAL - I

OR\G\l~AL

,

.
defendant to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order and Judgment granting defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment entered September 22, 2009, the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree.
2.

The appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order and

Judgment identified in paragraph I is appealable under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant intends to assert

in the appeal is as follows:
a.

Whether the district court committed an error of law in ruling that defendant
Fletcher did not breach the professional duty he owed to plaintiff, to wit,
that defendant Fletcher was not negligent;

b.

Whether the district committed an error of law in ruling that defendant
Fletcher, in drafting the testator's Will, did not frustrate the testator's intent;

c.

Whether in granting summary judgment based upon issues (a) or (b) above,
the district court committed reversible error given the existence of
genuine issues of material fact.

4.

There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

S.

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript: that hearing held on August 10,2009.
6.

The appellant requests those portions of the clerk's record automatically included

under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as the following:
a.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;

b.

Affidavit of W. Kent Fletcher;

c.

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment;

NOTJCE OF APPEAL - 2
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·

7.

d.

Aftidavit of Mary Killins Soignier;

e.

At1idavit of John F. Magnuson;

f.

Af11davit of Allen B. Ellis;

g.

Motion to Strike At1idavit ofW. Kent Fletcher;

h.

Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's Mtn. For Summary Judgment;

I.

Order and Judgment.

I certifY:
(a)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of

the reporter's transcript.
(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

(c)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(d)

That the court reporter has been served pursuant to Rule 17(k)(l), I.A.R.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20,I.A.R.
Dated this 22 nd day of October, 2009.

Attorney for

Plaintiff/Ll'cu~·
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 22 0d day of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
follo\ving:
Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
X Facsimile
954-5238

Denise Schloder
Court Reporter
Cassia County Courthouse
1459 Overland Ave.
Burley, Idaho 83318

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
- X- Facsimile
878-9503

b~)
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Craig L. Meadows. ISB

~o.
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Michelle R. Points. ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & I IA WLEY LL?
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email: cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawle)1foxell.com

( jJ

Attorneys for Defendant W. Kent Fletcher

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIfTH JUDICIAl DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN .o\N,J FOR THE COUNTY Of C ~SS.A

MARY KILLINS SOIGNIER,
Plaintiff,

vs.
W. KENT FLETCHER,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CV 2009-517
REPL Y TO PL.t\INTIFF S lvWffOH TO
D1SALLOW C)STS AhD ATTOR'lEY

FEES

)

)
)

Defendant W. Kent Fletcher, by and H rough his ;ounsei of record. H",wley Trmell End:;
& Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this resl>Jnse to Plainti:l's "Motion to DiHJlow Ccsts and

Attorney Fees" filed on or about October 13, ::009.
As the Court is aware, this is a legal nnlpractice

il,~tion.

Defer:dant

WII.';'

ret'l;led to

perform professional legal servicts, as his attl)rt1e:;' in the '.mdcrlying ClSe. [n this ca:;e, P~a.ntjff
alleged that Defendant committed an act of mdpractice by acting with negligence in perfor:ning
the professional service of drafting Mr. Cowar 's Will,

REPL Y TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DIS t\LLOW COSTS AND ATTOMEY FEES· 1
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On September 9, 2009, this Court ent~red its Memorandum Decision Cranting
Defendant's Motion for S'lmmary Judgmen1 and er:.terd :cro/lary

O~der

and

hjg:~len:

(Ill

September 22, 2009, dismissing PlaintirTs CJmplaint. For the purpcse of an attome~r :ee and
cost detennination, Defendant is the prevailing party.
Defendant,

thro~gh

this motion, requ:sts an aWHd c f

anome~f

defending against Plaintiff's claims pursuan:. to I R.C.P 54, and

I.e.

~

fees and co:;r.:; in ;urt d :r
12-120(3),

(;~; lh,!

prevailing party, as the underlying case invol ved a commercial transaction.

1.

That Plaintiff Did Not Conti sct With ])dc!ndant Is Not Di!J:positiH: Of
Defendant's Motion For A":I)rney }'eeH.

The underlying transaction involved i:achary C(wan retaining the proi{'ssional ler/ice,
of Mr. Fletcher. It is the commercial transaction at issue in the underlying action that dictates
whether attorney fees shmJd be award,ed und~r I.e. § 1:~··;,20(3)~ thu~, it is iceJev<lnt to this
motion whether Plaintiff a:so had a contract

~/ith

Dc;'end,mt. ?Iaintiff canno r,!mO\'e her

malpractice claim outside of the underlying c,)mmercial transaction based on her reasoning that
Defendant only had a duty to her as a benefic: my. or that she was not a part cf the conunelc ,al
transaction as between DefendanT and 1"fr. Cowan. Plaintiff's claim

i;;

based or the .:onunercid

transaction as between Defendant and Mr. Cowan.
As set forth in Defendant's opening memorandum on this motion, Idahc Co,::e

§ 12-120(3) mandates a fee award in cases b~:::ed ;m c: ccmmercial transactior.. Beflne the ldane
Supreme Court's recent decision in BIimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723.
152 P.3d 592 (2007). however, section 12-12')(3) had been interpreted not to apply n
"commercial transaction" cases in which the ::leOlY ofrecovl!ry was a tort theory.

f~ llrm~a,

the

court overruled all prior decisions prohibiting fee aW2.rds in such cases. /d. On,; dedsicn Flllinly
overruled by Blimka is Fullen'. Wolters, 119 dato 415.425,807 P.2,j 633, (4:; (19j 1) Th,.:re,
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S \tOT]ON'lODISAL.. OWCOSTSANDATTOR~lE'! FEES· 2
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0£.188 OClC 72E23"

the court refused to award fees under section 12-120(3) in a legal malpractic e case sirn )/y
because such a case is a tort case, "even thou 3h the underlying transaction which resulted in the
malpractice was a 'commercial t·a11saction. ,.,. Id There

3

no doubt hat the dt t~ndam:i'

attorney-client relatiomhip w:th Cady is a "(,>;nme:HiaJ trlr.~action." AccJrdirlgly. on its

fcc,~.

section 12-120(3) applies, and it mandates an award of atlOmey fees.
As also pointed cut in Defendant's opening memorandum on this mo;icn, In a r!cen;
attorney malpractice case, District Judge McLaughlin hdd that given the Ida,1o

Surn~me C(ur~':;

holding in Blimka, supra, an attorney fee award in a malpractice case was appropriate .:mder

I.e. § 12-120(3).

See City of McCall v. Buxtcn, et ar Plaintiff attempts to distJnguish Cit)'

McCall by asserting that ttc t~:ln~;actions at

i:Bllf:

rJ/

How~ver,

in that (i.Sf! involved a cont"2.<:t

Plaintiff ignores Judge McLaughlin's plain slatement that a contract for attorr..ey se::l'vlces was a
commercial transaction, and, "the- fact that the: contract was for attorney

seryic,~s,

service, does not change the natu::e of the transac:lion int:> ,)ne for either pers{,rcal

not any ether
servic,~s

or

household services." Exhibit A to Defendant's Opening :Memorandum. p. 5. S?e Also, Cady v.
Jones, et aJ., Opening Memorandum, Exh. B.
Plaintiff in this case is suhg Defendant fo:" hi!: pu:'ormance of profi!s~il)nal

:;~rv eeli

:Or

Mr. Cowan. The gravamen of the underlying ;;ase on which Plaintiff .;omplains was a
commercial transaction. Given the applicability of I.e. S' 12-120(3) to the facts of this case, and
because Defendant is the prevailing party, attcrney fees

~hould

be awC'xded to

Defet1.dan~

incmeJ

in defending this action.

REPL Y TO PLAfNTIFF'S MOT10N TO D[S t\LLOW COSTS AND ATTOR}' EY :~EES . 1
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2.

Mr. Fletcher Can Seek

Fee~

Fo!" Non-A.!;torneys.

Pursuant to the Supplemental Affida'lt of \1ichelle R Points In Sup )ort (.1' ~v'~ctio 1 for
Attorney Fees and Costs, submitted herewith. the fees of "MODO" and "CW.\,\f' are
recoverable and should be awarded to Defendant.
3.

There Is Sufficient Evidencf For Cairns Of Discretionary

(OS18.

Plaintiff asserts, in a heading, that there is "no evidence presented that these cm;ts were

'necessary and exceptional' and therefore, sh:)Uld not be assessed against Pkintiff." Plaintitl
then states. "[sJee Rule 5"4·:d)( 1)(0). LR.C.P" Defe:ndall re·quested n32.04 in cE:;,:retiorutry
costs, consisting of $467.46 in photocopy co~ t5 and S264 5E in assist<!d legal re sean;h.
Paragraphs 3 and 8 of the Affidavit of Michd Ie R. Poin'.s Setting ForlI Memorandum (If CCS1.~
and Fees address the necessity for the costs claimed.
Discretionary costs may include photccopying. Hayden Lake Fire Plotgction Dist. v.

Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161,168 (2005). The use of assisted legal resear·;h:o t.'li:;
case, given the breadth of legal issues partic1.Jarly contained in Defendant' s ~,fction fer Sunmary

Judgment, was minirnat Given the cornplexJY of the

is~;ues

subject of this Ii :igatior"

me

amounts sought for discretionary costs are more than reasonable. The: discretknary costs SOUg;1!
were necessary and exceptional, and were rea:;onE:bly in(:IL'red in the defense of this

cag.~

mll:i

should in the interest of justice be assessf~d against th~~:intifr.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED THI,

J~ day of November, 2009.
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.... _ _

naW.1ey Troxell

_ ,,-",Y'.I.l.WV1J

CERTIFICf. T~ OF SERVICE

thisl.~~~:NoVCmber,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
2009, I cau:;d to he sened a
true copy of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAJNTIFF' 5 MOTION TO DISAL~OW c:m;~~ A>I)
ATIO~\1EY FEES by t:11! mdhod imfk:ated Je/ow, mc !Iddressed to each 0' Jl~ t(>.~o\{in r
Allen B. Ellis

ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS, CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
[Attorneys for Plaintiff.

_ _ U.S. Mail, ?cslagc Prep,Jd
Hand DeJh ered
___ OVffnight Jv!.ml
~-lllail
__'_Tel,!cop}: 2:8J4S.:f:;6·~

Jeffrey A. Strother

STROTHER LAW OFFICE
200 N. Fourth Street, Suite 30
Boise, ro 83702
[Attorneys for Plaintiff:
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Craig L. Meadows, ISB No. 1081
Michelle R. Points, ISB No. 6224
HA WLEY TROXELL EI\"NIS &: I IA WLEY Lt»
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ill 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5238
Email; cmeadows@hawleytroxell.com
mpoints@hawleytroxell.com

!
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Attorneys for Defendant W. Ken, Fletcher

TN THE DISTRICT COURT 0; THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OFDAHO, fN .\l\n) FI)R THE COUNfV OF C".SSIA
MAR Y KILL INS SOIGNIER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

W. KENT FLETCHER,

Case No. CV 2009-517
SU:[>P~_EMEN1AL APFIDA\Tf 0'::
MCHELLE R. POINTS fN SCP?();(T
OF .\10TION FOR ATTORN::Y FEES

AND COSTS

)

MICHELLE R. POINTS, being first d'lly :;wom tr::OIl e.ath, deJoses lllJ(J state s a::
1.

fdJo·.F~;

I am an attorney with t~e law firm ef Hawley T:-oxell Ennis & Hawley

LLP, counsel of record for W. Kent Fletcher, Defendant in the above-referenced matter. I make
this affidavit based upon my own personal kncwledge, and em testify as to the lruth e.fthe
matters contained here in if .;:all cd upon as a wi tIless at

2.

th(~

trial of this action.

'vlODO, who is listed in EX:11bit A to the previous affidavit r submined in

support of this motion and ,vhc 5C fee)

a~~:

chal

t;n~,ed

,),:>1 :ti:1titf, is tv egan 0'[ o\\'(!, who

Sl'PPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. ?Oll'- TS IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR AITORNE Y FEES AND CO~;TS - 1

000281.

worked in this office as a second year

Sum.'TIi~r

Asso:ia'e attorney. Her fee~ are pr:p'!Ily

documented. Ms. O'Dowd worked on this eESe Cit a \0\"(:1' tOUTly

ratl~

in a:1 cfbr1 tc conser:e

costs, but did perform attorney functions.
3.

CW AM, who is also li ,ted in Exhi:,it A to the previous affidav:t I

submitted in support of this motion and whase fees are ehaLenged b} Plainti [1; is C1ristian
Wamhoff, who is a member of the Litigation Support Group at this firm and who pe·rforms
paralegal functions, including those listed in Exh:;bit A. !'''fr. Warnhotfs fees are pr,:perly
documented.

!h
£1 '
~~. 4.;~ W.Jc~!l!:ll------I~

Further, your affiant sayetb naught.

/.7

Il/1

""'---~.'/

.'

/
I

O .

/

j

~/'!],

l'~.: omts
,f

l

<

.f'

I

I

//

11'?

~.

I

''-'/
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

I:S+~~day ofNovembe;r. 2009.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R PO[,'ITS TN SUPPORT (I::
MOTION FOR ATIOR;\iEY FEES Al\D CCGfS - 2
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CERTIfIC'~Or SERVICE

. --~
L~ ar~lN,)vcmber,
(

I HEREBY CERTIFY th.lt on this
20C9, I caus.!j to be senej"
true copy of the foregoing SUPPLE\fENTAt AFF!DAV [T OF MICHELLE'S .. poers iN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORi~JEY FEES AND COSTS by the J:1.:t.od in.:li:Htec
below, and addressed to each of i:he following:

_ _ U.S. Mail, Pestage Prepaid
Hand Deli\ ered
___ Ov( might lv~ml
_fo- n .ail
_V_TTelecopy: 2=8J.:".~;,64

Allen B. EHis

ELLIS, BROWN & SHEILS. CHARTERED
707 North 8th Street
P.O. Box 388
Boise, ID 83701-0388
(Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Pr!paid

Jeffrey A. Strother

STROTHER LAW OFFICE
200 N. Fourth Street, SU.lte 30
Boise, ID 83702
[Attorneys for Plainti:fI]

Har.d Detiver!d

Ove mig!'.t rIJ~ il
__-'- E-rr ail
_-\7__
TeI(C~Y: /~8 34:!.2.:;,29
_~

c~/

.-."~'

.!

/,

I H(~~ htL-fj~i'di~~'___- i

If 0 nts

1

I

J

I
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SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE R. POfNTS IN SUPPORT Ot;
MOnON FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND cc:,rs - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY
COURT MINUTES
CV -2009-0000517
Mary Killins Soignier vs. W Kent Fletcher
Hearing type: Motion for Fees and Costs
Hearing date: 11/25/2009
Time: 8:58 am
Judge: Michael R Crabtree
Court reporter: Maureen Newton
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number: CHAMBERS via telephone conference call
Allen Ellis
Jeff Struthers
Michelle Points

Michelle Points argues Motion for Fees and Costs; cites considerations.
Objection by Allen Ellis; cites considerations.
Reply by Michelle Points.
The Court takes this matter Under Advisement.
9:09 a.m.

Hearing concludes.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIf'TH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TilE STATE OF II) A II 0, IN AND FOR CASSIA COliNTY
MARY KILLlNS SOIGNIER.
PlaintitT,

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CY 2009-517

)

vs.

)
W. KENT FLETCHER.

)

Defendant.

)
)
)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Appearances:
For the Plaintiff:

Allen B. Ellis of the firm Ellis, Brown and Sheils, Chartered; and
Jeffrey A. Strother.

For the Defendant:

Michelle Points of the firm Hawley, Troxell. Ennis and Hawley
LLP.

Held: Defendant's Motion Granted in Part. Denied in Part.
BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2009, the court entered an Order dismissing the Plaintiff's (hereafter
Ms. Soignier) Complaint after granting the Defendant's (hereafter Mr. Fletcher) motion for
summary judgment. Subsequently, Mr. fletcher filed a memorandum of costs and attorney's
Memorandum Opinion
CY-2009-517
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fees on October l, 2009. Ms. Soignier tiled a motion to disallow costs and attorney's fees on
October 13, 2009. I Iearing on the motions took place on November 25. 2009. at \\hich time
the court took the matter under advisement.
Mr. Fletcher argues that the Court should enter an award of costs and attorneys fees in
its t:lVor, pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). and I.R.Civ.P. 54 (d) and 54( e).
Ms. Soignier opposes an award of either costs or attorneys fees because: 1) the
discretionary costs submitted by Mr. Fletcher are not exceptional, and therefore not authorized
by I.R.Civ.P. 54(1.1)(1); 2) attorney's fees are not mandatory under I.C. § 12-120(3) because the
underlying action in this case was not a commercial transaction; and 3) Mr. Fletcher requests
attorney's fees for \vork performed by non-attorneys.

DISCUSSION
A.COSTS
I.R.Civ.P. 54( d)(l )(A), provides that except as otherwise limited by the Rules, certain
costs are allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party.
Prevailing party is de tined at LR.Civ.P. 54(d)(1)(8). In reaching this determination, the
court is to exercise discretion and consider the tinal result of the casc in relation to the relief
sought. In this case, Mr. Fletcher is the prevailing party because the court granted his motion
for summary judgment and the claims against him were dismissed with prejUdice, thereby
affording him complete relief in thc action. Therefore. costs are awardcd to Mr. Fletcher as set
forth below.

1. Costs as a Matter of Right. I.R.Civ.P. S4(d)(l)(C)
~fr.

Fletcher claims the follmving costs as a matter of right. Thc court's disposition on

each item claimed is set forth below:
Court Filing Fees:

Memorandum Opinion
CV -2009-517

Gnmted: Rule 54(d)( I )(C)( 1)

$58.00

2
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Total costs awarded to Mr. Fldcher as a matter of right:

$58.00

2. Discretionarv Costs. I.R.Civ.P. 5 ... ( d)( 1)( D).

\Ir. Fletcher claims certain costs as discretionary costs. The court has discretion to
consider and allow costs as discretionary costs upon a showing tbat the cost claimed were
necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred. and should in the interest of justice be
assessed against the adverse party.
In support of his claim It)!" discretionary costs. Mr. Fletcher argues that the requirement
that the cost be exceptional was satisiied because of the complexity of the legal issues in this
case.
Notwithstanding this argument, the court determines that Mr. fletcher has not met its
burden to show that either of the two requests for discretionary costs it claims were necessary
and exceptional, reasonably incurred within the meaning ofI.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1)(D).
The discretionary costs claimed by Mr. Fletcher are:
1. $467.46 for photocopies.

Mr. Fletcher did not make a showing that these copy

charges were exceptional. Copy charges are usual costs of litigation.

The court is not

convinced that the interest of justice requires that these copy charges should be assessed
against Ms. Soignier. Therefore. this cost is denied.
2. 264.58 for assisted legal research (Westlaw). Mr. Fletcher did not make a showing
that these costs were exceptional. Mr. Fletcher made a strategic decision to argue several legal
theories on summary judgment: each of these theories necessarily required research. The court
is not convinced that the interest of justice requires that these costs for legal research should be
against Ms. Suignier. Therefore. this cost is denied.

l'v1cmorandum Opinion
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B. ATTORNEY'S FEES

1. Attornev's Fc.'es under I.e. § 12-120(3).
Idaho Code § 12-1 20( 3) pnn ides in relevant part that "'in any commcrcial transaction
unk'ss provided by law. the prc\ailing party shall be all()\\ed a reasonahle attorney's I\:e to be
set by the court."

A commercial transaction is any transaction that is not for "personal or

household" purposcs. I.e. § 12-120(3). Mr. Flctcher assel1s that he is entitled to attorney's
t\:es under this statute hecause Ms. Soignier hrought the case as an attorney-malpractice action
arising from a "commercial transaction;" and that the commercial transaction was the
transaction he tween Mr. Fletcher and Zachary Cowan, who hired Mr. Fletcher to draft his will.
Ms. Soignier argues that her claim against Mr. Fletcher sounds solely in tort, and arose from a
judicially created duty as articulatcd in !!arrigleld v. Hancock. in which the court held:
that an attorney preparing testamentary instruments
owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified
therein to prepare such instruments, and if requested
by the testator to have them properly executed, so as
to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the
testamentary instruments.
140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884 (2004).
In determining whether to award attorney's fees under

I.e.

§ 12-120(3), the test is in

two parts. "First. there must be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim. Second.
the commercial transaction mllst be the basis upon which recovery is sought." Brooks
Gigt(~v

1'.

Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 78,910 P.2d 744 (1996). J\ lawsuit which sounds in tort

rather than contract, does not preclude the prevailing party from collecting attorney fees under

I.e. § 12-120(3).

Blimka

1'.

Aly Weh Wholesaler, LLC 143 Idaho 723,728-729, 152 P..1d 594

(2007). Moreover. the prevailing party in an attorney malpractice lawsuit may collect attorney
fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). City oj'AfcCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009).
A commercial transaction occurred between Mr. Fletcher and Zachary Cowan when

lYkmorandul11 Opinion
CY -2009-517
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Mr. ('tman contracted with Mr. Fletcher to prepare his will.

Ms. Soignier was a named

heneficiary in the will that t\fr. Fletcher prepared t()r Mr. Cowan. AllY claim that \1s. Soignier
had as named heneliciary against \fr. Fletcher for attorney-malpractice arose from the duty set
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in l!(/rrigleld

l'.

l!allcock, as cited above. \1s. Soignier was

not Mr. Fletcher's client. and the two dill not have a contractual relationship.

Ilo\\e\\~r,

\ls.

Soignier is. in manner of speaking. a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Zachary
Cowan and \k Fletcher.
In this case, the commercial transaction between Zachary Cowan and Mr. Fletcher is
hoth integral to Ms. Soignier's claim and the basis upon \vhich she sought recovery because
without that transaction, she \\:ould not have any sort of claim against Mr. Fletcher.
Accordingly, an award of attorney's tees under I.e. § 12-120(3) is appropriate in this case.

2. Amount of Attorney's Fees under I.R.Civ.P.54(e)(3)
The amount of an award of attorney fees is a discretionary matter for the trial court. and
the court perceives it as such. 5;un Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Relinery Corp., 139
Idaho 761,769,86 P.3d 475,483 (2004). The bounds of the court's discretion are a function of
the "reasonableness" of an attorney fee claim, and is considered by the court based on the
factors in LR.Civ.P. 54(e)(3). Id. For an award based upon

I.e.

§12-120(3), it is not necessary

that the court address all of the LR.Civ.P. 54(e)(3) factors in writing, however the record must
clearly indicate the court considered all the factors. Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, I L 189 P.3d
467 (2008).
I.R.Civ.P. 54(e)(3) states:
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it
shall consiLler the following factors in determining the amount of sllch fees:
(A)
(B)
(C)

The time and labor required.
The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
The skill requisite to perform the legal servIce properly and the

Memorandum Opinion
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or

(D)
(E)

(F)
(0)

(I {)
(I)
tJ)

(K)

(L)

expl.'ril.'ncl.' and anility
the attornl.'Y in thl.' particular lield of law.
The prevailing charges for like \vork.
Whether the lee is lixed or contingent.
Till.' time limitations il1lposed by the client or the circumstances of the
L'ase.
Thl.' amount imoln:d and the results obtained.
fhe undesirability of the case.
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
Awards in similar cases.
The reasonable cost of automatl.'d legal research (Computl.'r Assisted
Legal Resl.'arch), if the court finds it was rl.'Llsonably necessary in
preparing a party's case.
Any other t~lctor which the court deems appropriate in the particular
cuse.

Mr. Fletcher submitted an affidavit and memorandum of fees and costs and a
supplemental affidavit in support of the motion, which the court has duly considered.
affidavit and memorandum of fees and costs addressed several of the

t~1Ctors

Thl.'

listed above. Ms.

Soignier specifically disputed the requested kes incurred by a second year Summer Associate
attorney. and a paralegal, which are documented in the affidavit and memorandum, and
explained in the supplemental atlidavit. It appears that the work performed by the second year
Summer Associate was billed at only a slightly lower hourly rate ($125.00) than the work
performed by the attorneys in this case ($145.00). The court, in its discretion, finds that this
rate is disproportionate. Mr. Fletcher did not offer a basis for which the court should consider
the high rate attributed to the Sumer Associate and paralegal as the usual rates charged in this
jurisdiction.

The court considers a lower rate for the work performed by these individuals

more appropriate given that they are not licensed legal professionals, and will therefore reduce
the amount of attorney's fees requested by Mr. Fletcher accordingly

CONCLUSION
The court hereby awards costs and attorneys tees against the Plaintiff and in favor of
the Defendant as follows:
Cost of right: $58.00
Memorandum Opinion
CV -2009-517
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Discretionary costs: denied
Attorney's fees total: 58,.2.2S.00
Counsel for the Ddt:ndant will please submit an Order and Amended Judgment to the
court ttn signature, consistent with above.

MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge

Memorandum Opinion
CV -2009-SI7
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this ,~1('1 day of December, 2009, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:

1.

Allen BEllis
Ellis, Brown & Sheils
P.O. Box 388
707 North 8th Street
Boise, 10 83701

__
/_ U.S. Mail

2.

Michelle R. Points
Craig L. Meadows
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley
P.O. Box 1617
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, 10 83701-1617
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1;\1 THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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